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by higher diversification exhibiting higher risky innovation, revenue, volatility, and
growth. I present a stylized model that rationalizes these empirical findings.
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the implications of leverage for firm growth and response to shocks using a new
dataset that combines private firms’ balance sheets with Census Bureau data. We
show that firm age and size are good predictors of leverage for private firms but not
for publicly-listed ones. Using the Great Recession as a shock to financial conditions,
we show that during the Great Recession leverage declines for private, but not public
firms. We also provide evidence that private firms’ growth is positively associated
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Chapter 3 explores the extent to which interest rate fluctuations during sud-
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Preface
Investment, innovation, and the efficient allocation of resources play a central
role in driving economic growth. A critical determinant of the amount and type of
investments firms make is their ability to access financial resources. This disserta-
tion contributes to three extensive bodies of literature that study the influence of
ownership, bank financing, and financial shocks on firm investment and growth. In
the three chapters, I study how owner diversification, financial leverage, and sudden
stops affect the investment decisions of firms, and consequently how they affect firm,
sectoral, and aggregate outcomes.
In chapter 1, I ask whether firms held by owners with more diversified business
are more likely to innovate outside of their existing area of technological expertise.
This type of innovation lying outside of a firm’s core business, while risky, has
been found to contribute disproportionately to aggregate growth (Akcigit and Kerr
(2018)). I build off the insights of a long-standing literature that emphasizes the
relevance of ownership structure for investment (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama
and Jensen (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), and Holmstrom and Costa (1986))
and the importance of diversification opportunities for risk-taking (Obstfeld (1994)
and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)). I fill a gap in the existing empirical literature
that has not directly examined the relationship between diversification and risky
innovation, and rationalize my empirical findings through a stylized model that
highlights how diversification incentivizes risky investment through risk-sharing.
I construct a unique dataset that combines ownership data from Moody’s Bu-
reau van Dijk with patenting data from the USPTO and other firm-level data from
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the U.S. Census Bureau. Using the ownership data, I measure owner diversification
as the total number of firms an owner controls. Following Akcigit et al. (2016), I
use patenting data to construct a measure of risky innovation as the technologi-
cal distance between a firm’s new patents and its existing patent portfolio. I then
document that higher owner diversification leads to riskier innovation.
In particular, I exploit the richness of the data and account for firm life-
cycle characteristics, access to finance, and other features of the firm ownership
structure. I rule out that the positive relationship between diversification and risky
innovation is driven by more diversified owners targeting inherently riskier firms for
acquisition by taking advantage of the panel nature of the data and controlling for
firm fixed effects. I rule out that the positive relationship is driven by higher ability
owners being better able to identify diversification and innovation opportunities by
controlling for owner fixed effects. And I rule out that the positive relationship
is entirely driven by higher risky innovation incentivizing owners to become more
diversified by showing the firms held by initially more diversified owners undertake
riskier innovations. I then exploit cross-sector variation in owner diversification and
outcomes to emphasize the aggregate importance of the risk-sharing channel. I
show that sectors characterized by higher diversification exhibit riskier innovation,
are larger and more volatile, and grow faster.
To rationalize these findings, I construct a stylized model featuring risk-averse
owners that are differentiated by their degree of diversification and choose how
much risky, productivity-enhancing investment to undertake in their portfolio of
firms. The outcome of this investment is uncertain and uncorrelated across firms.
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The first feature creates a tradeoff for owners because higher investment is asso-
ciated with both higher potential returns and a higher gap between success and
failure. The second features creates safety in variety. As a consequence, the risk-
sharing channel is active and more diversified owners choose riskier investments.
Through the findings documented in Chapter 1, I establish owner diversification as
an important factor incentivizing riskier, growth-enhancing, innovation.
In chapter 2, which is joint work with Emin Dinlersoz, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan,
and Henry Hyatt, we study how firms’ access to finance evolves over their lifecycle,
and evaluate the implications of financial leverage for firm growth and responsiveness
to financial shocks. Little is known about how U.S. firms finance their growth due to
the limited availability of financial data for privately-held firms. Yet, these private
firms are the most likely to face the financial frictions emphasized by Schliefer and
Vishny (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke
and Gilchrist (1999), Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004), Moll (2014), and other. Understanding the consequences of financial frictions
for these firms is critical for understanding the firm-level and aggregate impacts of
financial shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Khan and Thomas (2013), Chodorow-
Reich (2014), Buera and Moll (2015), Giroud and Mueller (2017), Gopinath et al.
(2017), Gilchrist et al. (2018)). We contribute to these strands of literature by
constructing a new dataset that combines the balance sheets of publicly-listed and
privately-held firms with other firm-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which
allows us to study the financial leverage dynamics of U.S. firms.
We first document a series of stylized facts. Conditional on age, large private
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firms have higher short-term and long-term leverage and lower equity as a fraction
of their assets. Conditional on size, young private firms have higher leverage and
lower equity. By exploiting the panel nature of the data, we show that private
firms become more leveraged as they grow over time. These dynamics are quite
different among publicly-traded firms. Conditional on age, large public firms have
lower short-term leverage and higher long-term leverage, suggesting a compositional
shift in debt maturity as these firms grow. The equity-size relationship exhibits an
inverted-U shape, providing further support for compositional shifting. Conditional
on size, the relationship between all measures of leverage and age is weak among
public firms, and the age-equity relationship is weakly negative. Moreover, firm size
has no effect on short-term or long-term leverage within public firms over time.
We then exploit the Great Recession as a financial shock. We find that among
private firms, both small and large firms are forced to deleverage during the crisis
and that short-term leverage is more affected than long-term leverage. Meanwhile,
the leverage of small and large public firms is unaffected by the financial crisis.
Finally, we study the relationship between bank financing and growth. In both cross-
sectional and panel specifications, we show that short-term leverage is positively
associated with revenue growth among private firms, while its effect is attenuated
and even negative among public firms. The findings of Chapter 2 emphasize the need
to account for the financial constraints faced by U.S. private firms when evaluating
the implications of financial frictions for firm-level and aggregate outcomes.
In chapter 3, I explore whether interest rate shocks worsen resource allocation
and contribute to the fall in productivity observed during sudden stops. Over the
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past three decades, emerging economies have experienced a series of sudden stops
that are characterized by large capital outflows and spikes in the real interest rate.
These crises result in short-run falls in output, investment, and productivity. The
small open economy literature has proposed several explanations for these declines
in producutivity. Ates and Saffie (2016) and Queralto (2018) focus on the effect
of interest rate shocks on firm entry, while Meza and Erwan (2007) study factor
utilization and Pratap and Urrutia (2012) emphasize resource misallocation across
sectors. I focus on a complementary channel, within sector resource misallocation
arising from capital and labor adjustment frictions.
Using data on manufacturing firms in Chile, I adopt the Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) framework and show that the dispersion of marginal products of capital
and labor rose during the 1998 sudden stop. These findings suggest that resource
reallocation across firms slowed during the crisis. To understand a potential source
of this slowdown, I show that the share of firms delaying investment and hiring rose
substantially during this period. When firms face hiring costs and investment is
partially irreversible, an increase in the level or volatility of the interest rate slows
down the responsiveness of firms to demand shocks. This slowdown manifests itself
as an increase in the dispersion of marginal products and a fall in productivity.
I then take a structural approach in order to quantify the contribution of these
adjustment frictions to the fall in productivity during a sudden stop episode. I build
a small open economy industry equilibrium model featuring heterogeneous firms that
are subject to capital and labor adjustment frictions, and an exogenous interest rate
process that is subject to level and volatility shocks. I calibrate the model using
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Chilean data and show that interest rate level and volatility shocks trigger declines
in investment, hiring, and output, as well as increases in the dispersion of marginal
products and decline in aggregate productivity. The model is qualitatively consistent
with my empirical findings, but explains only a small fraction of the observed decline
in productivity. The results of chapter 3 highlight that along with firm entry, factor
utilization, and cross-sector resource reallocation, within-sector resource reallocation
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Chapter 1: Diversification & Risky Innovation among U.S. Firms
1.1 Introduction
An extensive literature establishes innovation as a critical engine of sustained
development, and emphasizes the disproportionate contribution of ”risky innova-
tion” to growth. Akcigit and Kerr (2018) find that 80% of the aggregate growth
due to innovation is driven by innovation lying outside a firm’s existing area of
technological expertise. The factors that incentivize firms to engage in this type
of innovation are not yet fully understood. The literature considers investments
made outside a firm’s core business as risky, and recognizes ownership structure as
an important determinant of firm risk-taking. In this paper, I study the impact of
owner diversification on the innovation decisions of firms. More specifically, I exam-
ine whether firms held by owners with more diversified business interests undertake
riskier innovations, assess the relevance of the risk-sharing channel, and evaluate
whether the firm-level relationship has implications for sector level outcomes.
The intuition connecting owner diversification and risky investment is straight-
forward. When firm owners are risk averse, their expected utility falls as the variance
of their wealth rises. For this reason, a well diversified owner is more risk tolerant be-
cause she shares firm-specific risk across her portfolio (Obstfeld (1994) and Acemoglu
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and Zilibotti (1997)). The literature refers to this mechanism as the ”risk-sharing
channel.” Innovation is an important type of risky investment that entails a high
level of uncertainty and potentially high payoffs. These risks are magnified when
firms venture into new technological areas.
Existing empirical studies have not directly examined the relationship between
owner diversification and risky innovation and have not tested the risk-sharing chan-
nel. The literature connecting diversification to firm risk-taking often conflates diver-
sification with other, confounding features of ownership structure, such as ownership
concentration. This literature does not focus on innovating firms and only examines
noisy, volatility-based measure of riskiness, which only indirectly correspond to the
risky investments emphasized in the theoretical literature. The empirical literature
on innovating firms and organizational structure focuses on innovation intensity and
quality, rather than riskiness, and has paid little attention to diversification. Due to
data limitations the existing literature studies non-representative samples of firms,
with U.S. studies relying on publicly-listed firms. Existing empirical studies also
rarely concern themselves with the aggregate implications of firm-level findings.
In this paper, I tackle the gap in the empirical literature. I construct a unique
dataset that combines Moody’s Bureau van Dijk (BvD) global ownership data for
a sample of privately-held and publicly-listed U.S. firms with the Census Bureau’s
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), Compustat, and USPTO patenting data.
The resulting data contain 38,000 firm-owner-year observations between 2007 and
2013, the majority of which belong to privately held firms. Using data from privately
held firms is important because until recently publicly listed firms have been the sole
2
focus of research in the United States.
The newly constructed data set has several advantages. The BvD global own-
ership data allow me to identify the ultimate owner of each firm as the owner holding
the largest fraction of the firm’s equity in a particular year. For each owner-firm
pair, the ownership data also help disentangle owner diversification from other po-
tentially confounding features of ownership structure, such as ownership concentra-
tion. Owner diversification captures how many firms an owner holds in her portfolio
and ownership concentration captures the fraction of equity she control in each of
these firms. Theory predicts that the positive relationship between diversification
and risky investment arises from risk-sharing. The relationship between concentra-
tion and risky investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, closely held firms may be
subject to fewer agency frictions, which incentivizes risk-taking (Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). On the other hand, in closely held
firms owners extract private benefits, which disincentivizes risk-taking (Fama and
Jensen (1983), Holmstrom and Costa (1986), and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992)).
Yet, owner diversification and ownership concentration are often conflated in the
literature because they are assumed to be strongly negatively correlated, which is
not borne out in the data. By distinguishing between the two, I isolate the influence
of owner diversification.
The Census Bureau firm-level data provide information on important firm life-
cycle characteristics including firm age, employment, and industry. These allow me
to control for time-varying firm characteristics that are simultaneously associated
with risky innovation and owner diversification. Moreover, the data allow me to
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address sample selection directly. Unlike other empirical studies, I identify dimen-
sions along which the raw analysis sample is not representative, construct sampling
weights using logistic regression, and use these weights in subsequent analysis. I
therefore make inferences about the relationship between diversification and risky
innovation for the representative patenting firm in the United States and about the
importance of owner diversification for sector-level outcomes.
The USPTO patenting data enable me to construct a direct measure of risky
innovation that improves upon the volatility-based measures of riskiness favored in
the empirical literature. Following Akcigit et al. (2016), I first measure the techno-
logical distance between any two patent classes, and then define risky innovation as
the average technological distance between each firm’s new patents and its existing
patent portfolio. I validate the measure of riskiness by verifying that it is positively
associated with revenue growth and volatility. A 10% increase in risky innovation
is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in revenue growth and a 0.2%
increase in revenue growth volatility. I also augment the data with Compustat in
order to identify firms that are publicly traded. Because innovation often requires
external financing, the publicly-listed status of firms proxies for access to finance.1
Using the merged data, I first document a strong statistically significant posi-
tive relationship between owner diversification and risky innovation, after addressing
sample selection, including a rich set of industry-year fixed effects, and holding con-
stant firm life-cycle characteristics, financial structure, prior risky patenting behav-
1Recent studies (Asker et al. (2015) and Dinlersoz et al. (2018)) have found evidence that
publicly-listed firms are less financially constrained than privately-held firms.
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ior, and other features of the firm’s ownership structure. A one standard deviation
increase in owner diversification is associated with a 5% increase in risky innova-
tion. The results are robust to alternative measures of both diversification and
risky innovation. In particular, the positive relationship holds when diversification
is measured by the number of unique industries in which the owner is active, and the
degree to which activity is dispersed across these industries. The relationship also
holds when the risky innovation is measured as the distance between a firm’s new
patents and the owner’s portfolio, which accounts for the possibility that when firms
innovate outside of their area of expertise they innovate within their owner’s area
of expertise. This baseline approach goes far in addressing selection on observables,
but unobserved heterogeneity precludes a causal interpretation.
Owner diversification may be correlated with unobserved firm characteristics,
such as a firm’s inherent riskiness. For instance, the baseline relationship can re-
sult from more diversified owners acquiring firms with riskier profiles, rather than
diversified ownership incentivizing firms to engage in riskier innovation. If this were
the case, changes in owner diversification should not be associated with changes
in innovation behavior. First differences control for the underlying risk profile of
firms, as well as other time-invariant firm characteristics. The first difference ap-
proach confirms the positive relationship between changes in owner diversification
and changes in risky innovation within firms over time.
However, the first difference specification does not account for inherent owner
characteristics. The existing literature emphasizes the importance of individual abil-
ity and past experience as influencing entrepreneurial decisions. For instance, higher
5
ability investors may be better equipped to take advantage of both diversification
and innovation opportunities. To rule out this possibility, I focus on the sub-sample
of firms that are held by the same owner over the entire period. By focusing on this
sub-sample in a first-difference estimation, I also control for time invariant owner
effects. I find that even after accounting for both time invariant firm and owner char-
acteristics, higher owner diversification leads to riskier innovation. This relationship
can be interpreted as causal if owner diversification and the remaining unobserved
time-varying firm and owner characteristics that are summarized in the error term
are orthogonal.
An alternative interpretation of the positive relationship is that it arises from
more risky innovation incentivizing owners to diversify in order to offset the increased
risk they face. First, while possible, it is unlikely that the innovation decisions of
firms are the sole reason owners acquire or sell other firms in their portfolio. Second,
to formally address this story of reverse causality, I focus on a balanced sample of
firms that are held by the same owner throughout the period, calculate changes in
risky innovation and other time varying firm-level controls over a three year horizon,
and measure owner diversification and ownership concentration at the beginning
of the period. The initial conditions specification confirms that changes in risky
innovation are higher among firms held by initially more diversified owners than
among those held by initially less diversified owners. This specification controls for
time varying and time invariant firm characteristics, and shuts down the dynamics
feedback from riskier innovation leading to higher owner diversification.
The first difference and initial conditions specifications are complementary.
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The first difference specification shows that the relationship between owner diversi-
fication and risky innovation is not driven by time invariant firm and owner charac-
teristics. The initial conditions specification shows that the positive relationship per-
sists when the feedback from risky innovation to owner diversification is shut down.
Even in the presence of remaining questions regarding the identifying assumptions,
my paper documents new findings about the relationship between owner diversifi-
cation and risky innovation among U.S. firms. These findings highlight the role of
owner diversification in facilitating risky innovation, and provide a springboard for
studying whether this relationship is consistent with theories of risk-sharing, and
whether it survives aggregation and has implications for sector-level outcomes.
Theory suggests that the mechanism underlying the positive relationship be-
tween diversification and risky-innovation is risk-sharing. I evaluate this mechanism
by taking advantage of variation in owner types. Owners can be classified as in-
dividuals, companies, or institutional owners (mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
Individual owners are relatively more exposed to the risk arising from firm-level
innovation decisions than companies due to the limited liability of the latter, and
institutional owners are least exposed since they manage portfolios on behalf of other
investors. Consistent with the risk-sharing mechanism, I find that the relationship
between diversification and risky innovation is strongest for firms held by individual
owners.
I test whether the positive firm-level relationship between owner diversification
and risky innovation has aggregate implications by exploiting cross-sector variation
in diversification, innovation, and revenue. For each sector, I calculate average owner
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diversification, average risky innovation, total risky innovation, total revenue, and
revenue growth in each year. Sectors characterized by higher diversification are char-
acterized by higher average and total risky innovation, total revenue, and revenue
growth. The results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects that neutralize the
effects of aggregate conditions and industry-specific differences in diversification and
outcomes. In particular, a 10% increase in sector-level diversification is associated
with 4.4% more risky innovation, 1.2% higher total revenue, and 0.3 percentage
point higher revenue growth rate.
My empirical findings show that diversification facilitates risky innovation.
Yet, the endogenous growth and firm dynamics theoretical literatures leave no role
for the risk-sharing channel that underpins the observed relationship. The endoge-
nous growth literature features firms that hold a portfolio of products, but the
commonly imposed risk-neutrality assumption leaves no role for risk-sharing. Mean-
while, the firm dynamics and experimentation literature features risk averse agents,
but does not allow owners to control more than one firm, leaving no opportunity for
diversification.
To rationalize my empirical findings and highlight the model ingredients needed
to activate the risk-sharing channel, I construct a stylized, static, single-agent model
featuring risk averse owners, who can hold multiple firms, and face risk arising from
investment decisions. More specifically, risk averse owners differ in their degree of
diversification. Each owner chooses how much productivity-enhancing investment
to undertake in her portfolio of firms. Critically, the outcome of this investment is
uncertain and uncorrelated across firms. With some probability the investment is
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successful and contributes positively to productivity. If the investment is unsuccess-
ful, productivity declines. Higher investment is associated with higher returns in
when investment is successful, but also with a larger gap between success and failure.
Because success is uncorrelated across firms, owners find safety in variety. An owner
holding more firms shares idiosyncratic risk across her portfolio and chooses riskier
investment. The model also highlights the relevance of owner diversification in high
uncertainty environments. Intuitively, as the probability of success approaches one,
the investment decisions of more and less diversified owners converge since the ben-
efits of risk-sharing decline as investment outcomes become more certain. I verify
that diversification has qualitative implications for aggregate outcomes by conduct-
ing a simple partial equilibrium aggregation exercise. By comparing the investment
and output of of sectors composed of firms held by owners with different degrees
of diversification, I show that sectors characterized by higher diversification feature
higher investment and output.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses this
the existing literature. Section 1.3 describes the data and variable construction. Sec-
tion 1.4 discusses the empirical approach and reports results. Section 1.5 describes
the stylized model and implications. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature
This paper contributes to two strands of the empirical literature. The first
strand examines whether ownership structure influences firm risk-taking and finds
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mixed evidence. This literature measures firm risk as the volatility of stock prices or
operating revenue. As a consequence, the literature cannot disentangle the specific
types of risky investment strategies firms engage in, such as innovation. The mixed
results highlight the importance of addressing sample selection and distinguishing
between different features of ownership structure. Wright et al. (1996) and John et
al. (2008) focus on ownership concentration and find no significant relationship with
risk-taking among publicly-listed U.S. firms when concentration is measured by the
presence of large blockholders or the equity stake of owners. Paligorova (2010) also
measures concentration as fraction of equity controlled by the owner, but documents
a positive relationship in a global sample of public and private firms. Sraer and
Thesmar (2007) proxy for concentration and find that family owned firms outperform
firms with more disperse ownership. Anderson and Reeb (2003) also analyze family
ownership but consider it a proxy for low diversification and find it to be associated
with higher operating risk. Other studies use alternative proxies for diversification
and document a positive relationship with riskiness. These include Thesmar and
Thoenig (2011) who distinguish between diversified listed and undiversified private
firms; Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014) who proxy diversification with foreign ownenrship;
and Faccio et al. (2011) and Lyandres et al. (2018) who measure diversification as
the number of firms held by the owner.2 I confront the limitations of this literature
by measuring ownership concentration and owner diversification separately, similar
to Faccio et al. (2011) and Lyandres et al. (2018) and addressing sample selection
2As in Thesmar and Thoenig (2011), Davis et al. (2006) document similar differences in the
volatility of private and listed firms for the United States without linking the findings directly to
owner diversification.
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directly using the LBD. I further contribute by focusing on the important, but
understudied subset of innovating firms, and moving beyond indirect volatility-based
measures of firm risk.
A second strand of empirical literature evaluates the relationship between or-
ganizational structure and innovation, but rarely emphasizes diversification or risk-
taking. Several papers study venture capital funding. Kortum and Lerner (2000),
Tian and Wang (2014), Bernstein et al. (2016a), and Akcigit et al. (2018) find that
VC funding is associated with more and higher quality patenting by funded firms.
Others focus on private equity investment. Hall (1990) finds that leveraged buy-
outs (LBDOs) have little impact on innovation. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and
Lerner et al. (2011) document a positive relationship between LBOs, R&D expen-
diture, and patent quality. A couple focus on firms’ listed status. Bernstein (2015)
finds that firms shift towards acquiring new technologies following their IPO; and
Phillips and Sertsios (2017) finds that innovation in public firms is more responsive
to changes in financing. Several papers focus on institutional ownership. Francis
and Smith (1995), Eng and Shackell (2001), and Aghion et al. (2013) find that insti-
tutional ownership is associated with higher R&D investment and productivity. Yet,
none study owner diversification. I focus on the role of diversification in influencing
the innovation decisions of firms, and move beyond the measures of R&D expendi-
ture and efficiency and patenting intensity and quality favored in the literature by
emphasizing risky innovation.
This paper also advances the theoretical literature. My empirical results high-
light a role for owner diversification in facilitating risky innovation. Existing models
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of endogenous growth and firms dynamics leave little room for the risk-sharing chan-
nel. Recent research in the endogenous growth literature focuses on the importance
of incumbent innovation (Acemoglu and Cao (2015), differences in innovative ca-
pacity (Acemoglu et al. (forthcoming) and Ates and Saffie (2016)), and drivers of
heterogeneous innovation (Akcigit and Kerr (2018) and Acemoglu et al. (2017)).3
Small firms (Akcigit and Kerr (2018)) and those open to disruption (Acemoglu et al.
(2017)) are more likely to undertake radical innovations. The firms in this literature
are characterized by a portfolio of products and are assumed to be risk neutral,
which leaves no role for risk-sharing. In the firm dynamics literature, Vereshchagina
and Hopenhayn (2009) show that poor risk-averse entrepreneurs choose to under-
take risky projects. In Choi (2017) risk-averse entrepreneurs with higher outside
options in paid employment engage in riskier activities. And Celik and Tian (2018)
emphasize better corporate governance and incentivized CEO contracts as drivers of
disruptive innovation. Although the entrepreneurs in this literature are risk-averse,
because they own only one firm there is no role for diversification. The stylized
model described in section 1.5 contributes to this literature. It incorporates risk-
averse owners who can hold multiple firms and make risky investment decisions.
The model rationalizes the positive relationship between diversification and risky
innovation documented in the data.
3The recent literature builds off work of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt
(1992),Kortum (1997), Howitt (1999), and Aghion et al. (2001), Klette and Kortum (2004), and
Lentz and Mortensen (2008). The recent literature also builds off the influential research by Romer
(1986), Romer (1990), and Jones (1995) in which growth arises from expanding varieties.
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1.3 Data and Measurement
1.3.1 Data set construction
To study the importance of the risk-sharing channel for innovation among U.S.
firms, I construct a new data set and test whether firms held by more diversified
owners engage in riskier patenting. I combine the LBD from the U.S. Census Bureau
with ownership data from Moody’s Bureau van Dijk (BvD), patenting data from the
USPTO, and firms’ publicly listed status from Compustat. These four data sources
are combined using employer identification numbers (EINs) and probabilistic name
and address matching.4
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) tracks all non-farm private busi-
nesses with at least one paid employee from 1976 through 2015. A business (or
establishment) corresponds to the physical location where business activity occurs.
Establishments that are operated by the same entity, identified through the Eco-
nomic Census and the Company Organization Survey, are grouped under a common
firm identifier. Firm size is measured by total firm-level employment. Firm age
is based on the age of the oldest establishment of the firm when the firm is first
observed in the data.5 Industry of operation is based on the NAICS code associated
with the highest level of employment.6 Firm revenue is measured in constant USD,
4For this paper, I match LBD records with BvD records. The match between LBD and
Compustat was generated as a part of Dinlersoz et al. (2018). The match between LBD and
USPTO data was kindly provided by Nikolas Zolas from the U.S. Census Bureau.
5Based on this definition, all existing firms in 1976 (when the data series begins) are classified
as age 0 in that year. This results in left-censoring of the age variable. In regression analysis, I
include a dummy variable that identifies left-censored firms.
6NAICS codes are based on time-consistent industry classifications developed in Fort and
Klimek (2018).
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where the GDP Implicit Price Deflator is used to convert nominal to real values.7
Ownership data are obtained from Moody’s BvD global historical data and
span 2007 through 2016. Information on firms and their owners are gathered from
a variety of sources including official registers, regulators, annual reports, company
websites, and correspondences. As a consequence of regulations, in the United
States much of the data derive from SEC filings. If a public or private company
registers its equity securities under the Exchange Act, then any shareholder who
holds 5% of shares or more is required to file beneficial ownership reports as long
as their holdings remain at or above 5%. The filings contain information on the
shareholder and her future investment intentions.8 The data therefore primarily
include shareholders with at least 5% equity stake in the firm. In this paper, I
focus on the characteristics of firms’ largest owner(s) so not observing shareholders
controlling less than 5% of the firm does not present a challenge.
For each firm in a particular year, the data contain a list of owners, their coun-
try of origin, owner type (individual, industrial company, bank, mutual fund, etc.),
fraction of equity controlled (used to measure ownership concentration), and type
of relationship (immediate shareholder, domestic ultimate owner, global ultimate
owner, etc.). I focus on U.S. firms and their owners (both domestic and foreign),
but the BvD data has global coverage of over 150 countries. Existing empirical liter-
ature emphasizes the importance the largest shareholders for firm outcomes (Faccio
et al. (2011), Paligorova (2010)). I therefore focus on the characteristics of the share-
7For information on the construction of the revenue variable, see Haltiwanger et al. (2017).
8Information on reporting requirements associated with ownership can be found at the SEC
website (link).
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holder(s) who BvD identifies as the global ultimate owner with at least 25% equity
stake. More specifically, in a given year BvD identifies this global ultimate owner(s)
as the domestic or foreign shareholder who controls the largest fraction of the firm’s
equity. The 25% threshold helps exclude cases where the ultimate owner is unlikely
to have influence over the firm’s decisions because of her low equity stake. For this
ultimate owner, I directly observe the level of ownership concentration in the firm
and use the global nature of the BvD data to track her level of diversification. In
some cases, BvD identifies multiple shareholders as global ultimate owners in one
firm in the same year. This arises in cases of joint ownership. If BvD identifies
multiple global ultimate owners, I keep those owners that have an equity stake in
the ballpark of 50% (between 40% and 60% equity). In these cases, I track the
owner diversification and ownership concentration of multiple owners for the same
firm. I use the global nature of the data to construct owner diversification, which
measures the total number of firms held globally by an owner in a particular year.
The BvD data also contain the EIN, firm name, street address, city, state and zip
code for firms in the sample.9 This additional information is used in linking BvD
data to the LBD.
I augment the LBD-BvD linked data with two additional sources. Patent-
ing data are obtained from PatentsView, which is derived from USPTO data files
between 1976 and 2015. These data contain patent-level information including appli-
cation and grant dates, assigned technology class, number of citations made to and
9The full set of information – EIN, name, address, city, state and zip code – is not available
for every firm. I use whatever information is available for a firm in the linking procedure. The
matching procedure is described in appendix A.1.
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received from other patents, and the name and address of assignees.10 PatentsView
also provides citation level data that identifies the individual patents cited in each
patent application. I link the LBD-BvD-USPTO data with Compustat to track
the publicly listed status of firms in the sample.11 S&P’s Compustat derives from
quarterly and annual financial reports filed by publicly listed companies. Several
recent papers (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) and Dinlersoz et al. (2018)) find
that listed firms are less financially constrained than privates ones. I therefore use
a firm’s publicly listed status to proxy for access to finance.
The linked data contain both patenting and non-patenting firms. The full
data span 2007 through 2013 and contain information on approximately 91,000 U.S.
firms and 92,000 owners. There are more owners than firms because some firms
are jointly owned. The full data contain approximately 174,000 observations at
the firm-owner-year level that account for about 25% of U.S. employment, 30% of
payroll and 35% of revenue. I focus on patenting firms in the LBD-BvD-USPTO-
Compusat linked data, of which there are about 10,000 unique firms, 80% of which
are privately held. The analysis sample contains a total of 38,000 firm-owner-year
observations between 2007 and 2013. Approximately 28,000 of these observations
belong to firms held by corporate owners, 6,500 by individual owners, and 3,500 by
institutional owners. Eighty percent of these observations are linked using either
the EIN or the firm’s name and full address information12.
10These data were linked to LBD using name and address matching by Nikolas Zolas.
11The bridge between LBD and Compustat for 2002-2013 was created as part of Dinlersoz et
al. (2018).
12The linking procedure entails 10 matching criteria. The first three criteria provide the highest
quality matches. These criteria are 1) EIN, 2) firm name, street address, and zip code, and 3) firm
name, city, state and zip code. 80% of analysis sample matches are made using one of these three.
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1.3.2 Addressing selection
These 38,000 firm-owner-year observations constitute a sub-sample of patent-
ing firms in the United States. Table 1.1 shows that firms in the analysis sample
are large and old, with average employment above 9,000 and an average age of
nearly 30. They have a patent stock exceeding 900 patents. They are held by quite
diversified owners, who on average hold over 100 firms in their portfolio. And on
average, ultimate owners control nearly 75% of a firm’s equity. The average firm in
the sample is therefore closely-held by a well-diversified owner. From the summary
statistics alone, it is apparent that the raw sample is likely not representative.




revenue growth -0.0056 0.3623
employment growth 0.0062 0.2562
patent stock 962 6,582
diversification 103.3 345.3
concentration 0.7482 0.2518
Notes: The mean (column 1) and standard deviation (column 2) are reported. Data on employ-
ment, age, revenue growth and employment growth derive from the LBD. Revenue and employ-






for firm i in year t.
Patent stock is obtained from PatentsView, and diversification (total number of firms held globally
by an owner in a given year) and concentration (fraction of a firm’s equity controlled by an owner)
are obtained from BvD.
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To further explore this issue, figure 1.1 plots the firm age and size distribution
of patenting firms in the LBD and analysis sample. The x-axis of the left figure con-
tains age bins ranging from 0 − 5 to > 25. The blue bar represents the fraction of
patenting firms in the LBD in each age bin, and the grey bar represents the fraction
of firms in the analysis sample in each age bin. In the right figure instead of age, the
x-axis contains employment bins ranging from 1−19 employees to ≥ 500 employees.
Figure 1.1 shows that the analysis sample overrepresents the oldest and largest firms.
The sample is also not representative along other dimensions, including employment
growth and industry composition. Non-representativeness points to sample selec-
tion, which is a concern if the strength of the relationship between diversification
and risky innovation varies systematically with these observables. Without address-
ing sample selection, I cannot ascertain the importance of diversification for risky
innovation for the average patenting firm in the U.S. economy, or make inferences
about the aggregate implications of the firm-level relationship.
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1−19 100−249 20−49 250−499 50−99 >= 500
LBD Analysis (unweighted)
Notes: The left figure plots firm age bins (ranging from 0-15 to ¿ 25) on the x-axis. The
right figure plots firm employment bins (ranging from 1-19 employees to ≥ 500 employees. The
height of each bar is the fraction of firms that belong to each bin. The blue bar represents the
full sample of patenting firms in the LBD. The grey bar represents the sample of firms in my
LBD-BvD-USPTO-Compustat linked data.
An advantage of linking ownership and patenting data to the LBD is that I
can address sample selection directly. I focus on all patenting firms in the LBD
and create an indicator variable equal to one if the firm (indexed by i) is also in
the analysis sample. This indicator variable is the dependent variable of a logistic
regression that controls for firm size (ln(empi)), firm age (agei), employment growth
rate (EGi), sector (γs), and an indicator for the oldest firms that is equal to one if
the firm is 16 years or older (DA16):
Oi = α + β1 ln(empi) + β1agei + β3DA16i + β4EGi + γs + εit (1.1)
Because firms in the data enter and exit the sample throughout the period, the
logistic regression is run separately for each year. I use the inverse of the propensity
scores from the regression to re-weight the data in subsequent analysis.
Figure 1.2, adds a bar to the the firm age and size distributions shown in
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figure 1.1. The light blue bars in the left and right panels of figure 1.2 represent the
reweighted analysis data. After applying the propensity weights, the distributions
of both firm age and size are near the distributions observed for patenting firms
in the LBD. By using propensity weights in subsequent analysis, I can make state-
ments about the relationship between risky innovation and owner diversification for
the average patenting firm in the economy, and ascertain whether the firm-level
relationship has aggregate implications.


























1−19 100−249 20−49 250−499 50−99 >= 500
LBD Analysis (weighted)
Analysis (unweighted)
Notes: The left figure plots firm age bins (ranging from 0-15 to ¿ 25) on the x-axis. The
right figure plots firm employment bins (ranging from 1-19 employees to ≥ 500 employees. The
height of each bar is the fraction of firms that belong to each bin. The blue bar represents
the full sample of patenting firms in the LBD. The grey bar represents the sample of firms
in my LBD-BvD-USPTO-Compustat linked data. The light blue bar represents the weighted
LBD-BvD-USPTO-Compustat analysis sample. The weights are the inverse of the propensity
weights from the logistic regressions discussed in the text.
1.3.3 Variable construction
Several variables are directly derived from the LBD, PatentsView, and Com-
pustat. From the LBD, I obtain firm-level employment, revenue, age, and industry.
Using PatentsView, I measure the patent stock (stock) of a firm in a particular year
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as the total number of patents it has been granted up to that point. With Compu-
stat, I identify firms that are publicly listed, and use their listed status (listed) to
proxy for access to finance. In addition to these variables, I construct variables mea-
suring key features of ownership structure using Moody’s BvD and risky innovation
using PatentsView.
1.3.3.1 Ownership variables
Using Moody’s BvD, I measure four distinct features of a firm’s ownership
structure – foreign ownership, owner type, ownership concentration, and owner di-
versification. For each firm in each year, I first identify the global ultimate owner
(GUO). The GUO is the domestic or foreign owner holding the largest equity share
in a firm. When BvD identifies multiple global ultimate owners for the same firm
in a year, I keep the owners who have between 40% and 60% equity stake in the
firm and track their characteristics separately. When this occurs, one firm will be
associated with multiple owners in a particular year. BvD assigns each owner a
unique, time-invariant identifier, the first two digits of which identify the owner’s
country. Using this information, I construct a discrete variable equal to one if the
owner is located outside of the U.S. (foreign). Controlling for foreign ownership
is important because foreign owners may have a preference for innovating in their
domestic market and are subject to foreign aggregate or sectoral shocks that will
not be absorbed in the industry-year fixed effects.
Several types of owners appear in the BvD ownership data, including individ-
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uals, industrial companies, banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and others. The
reason ownership is not always traced down to the individual is that data are col-
lected from official filings. In these filings if an investor sets up a holding company,
her name does not appear as the owner of the individual firms in her portfolio.
I group owner types into two broad categories – individual and company. The
company category can be further broken down into industrial company and insti-
tutional investor. These owner types are differentially exposed to firm-specific risk.
Individual owners listed in official documents are most exposed. Industrial compa-
nies provide limited liability to their owners, which reduces their exposure to risk.
Institutional investors manage portfolios on behalf of investors and are therefore are
least exposed to risk.
For each owner, I construct a measure of owner diversification in each year.
For each owner-firm pair, I construct a measure of ownership concentration in each
year. Although these measures are often conflated in the literature, they are both
conceptually and empirically distinct.13 It is therefore important to measure them
separately. Owner diversification is measured as the total number of firms an owner
controls globally in a particular year. Global holdings are measured using data
from over 150 countries covered by BvD. If the owner holds only one firm, then he
is undiversified relative to an owner holding 100 firms. Ownership concentration
measures the percent of equity held by the ultimate owner in a particular firm. If
the GUO controls 100% of equity, then the firm is closely held. If instead the GUO
controls only 33%, then ownership is more dispersed since the remaining 67% of
13In the analysis sample, the correlation between diversification and concentration is only -0.03.
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equity must be spread across other owners who each control less than 33% of equity.
The distributions of owner diversification and ownership concentration are
shown in figure 1.3.14 The left panel shows that the distribution of log owner di-
versification is very skewed and concentrated at low levels. The peak of the owner
diversification distribution corresponds to an owner holding between five and six
firms. Yet, some owners in the data hold over a hundred firms in their portfolio. In
the right panel, ownership concentration is bimodal. Many firms are jointly owned
and many firms are closely held.
Figure 1.3: Diversification (left panel) and Concentration (right panel) Kernel Den-
sity Plot
Notes: The left figure plots the kernel density function of log owner diversification, measured as
the total number of firms held globally by an owner in a particular year. The right figure plots
the kernel density function of ownership concentration, measured as the fraction of equity held by
a firm’s global ultimate owner. The left and right tails of the distributions have been trimmed
for disclosure purposes. These figures pertain to the full BvD sample, rather than the patenting
sample alone. This was done for disclosure purposes.
14Note that the figures are for the full data, not just the patenting sub-sample. This was done
to facilitate disclosure and because these figures primarily serve an illustrative purpose.
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1.3.3.2 Risky innovation
The patent-based measure of risky innovation used in this paper coincides
closely with the finance and management literatures’ notion of risky investment.
In these literature, engaging in activities outside a firm’s core business is consid-
ered risky because these types of investments are associated with higher and more
uncertain returns. Following Akcigit et al. (2016), I define risky innovation as the
technological propinquity between an individual patent and a firm’s patent portfolio,
and validate this measure by verifying that it is positively correlated with growth
and volatility.
The measure is constructed in two stages. In the first stage, I use the citation-
level data to calculate technological distance between any two patent classes (X
and Y ) as 1 minus the number of patents that cite both X and Y over the number
of patents that cite either X or Y (dT (X, Y ) = 1 − #(X∩Y )
#(X∪Y )). Each patent is as-
signed an International Patent Classification (IPC) code. The IPC is a hierarchical
system that classifies patents based on the technology areas to which they pertain.
One technology area is Human Necessities, under which there are several 3-digit
classes, including Agriculture (A01), Baking (A21), and Footware (A43). Consider
a hypothetical example in which the technological distance between A01 and A43 is
calculated. The number patents that cite either A01 and A43 is determined, as well
as the number of these patents that cite both A01 and A43. In this hypothetical
example, if the first is 100 and the second 10, then dT (A01, A43) = 1− 10
100
= 0.90.
In the second stage, I calculate the average distance between each new patent
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p and firm f ′s patent portfolio: dP (p, f) = 1||Pf ||
∑
p′εPf
(Xp, Yp′). Suppose there is
a firm that currently holds 10 patents, all of which belong in Computing (G06).
Today, that firm applies for two patents, one in Computing (G06) and another in
Aviation (B64). Suppose that dT (G06, B64) = 1. The distance between the first
patent in G06 and the firm’s patent portfolio is zero, and the distance between the
second patent in B64 and the portfolio is one. The measure of risky innovation at
the firm-year level is the sum of the distances (dP (p, f)) calculated for each new
patent p, filed by firm f in a particular year. In the example above, the unadjusted
number of new patents is two, but the risk-weighted patent count (RWP ) is only
one. To take into account that innovation is slow moving, I consider the past three
years of firm patenting in calculating the risk-weighted patent count for a particular
year.
The assumption underlying the risk-weighted patent count is that innovating
outside of their existing areas of technological expertise is risky for firms. Instead,
this type of patenting could be part of a firm’s diversification strategy. To validate
the underlying assumption and rule out the diversification story, I test whether thee
risk-weighted patent count is positively associated with growth and volatility. If the
diversification story were true, risk-weighted patent count and volatility would be
negatively related.
I first measure firm-level growth and volatility. The DHS revenue growth rate
is defined as RGit =
Rit−Rit−1
0.5(Rit+Rit+1)
. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014), revenue
growth volatility (V OLit) is measured using a regression-based framework. The
following regression is estimated:
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RGit = φi + γst + νit (1.2)
where φi is firm fixed effects and γst is industry-year fixed effects. Revenue
growth volatility (V OLit) is calculated as ν
2
it, which captures how much revenue
growth differs from the average growth (across all firms) in a particular sector and
year st, and from average growth (over time) for a particular firm i. I then estimate
the following regression:
Yit =α + φ1 log(RWPit−1) + β1 log(stockit−1) + β2 log(ageit−1)+
β3 log(reveneueit−1) + β4PUBLICit + γst + εit
(1.3)
where Yit stands in for the dependent variable. In particular, equation 1.3
regresses revenue growth rate (RGit) and revenue growth volatility (log(V OLit)
of firm i in period t on lagged risk-weighted patenting (log(RWPit−1)), lagged
patent stock (log(stockit−1)), lagged firm age (log(ageit−1)), lagged firm revenue
(log(reveneueit−1)), a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is publicly listed
(PUBLICit), and 4-digit industry-year fixed effects.
The first column of table 1.2 report the results for revenue growth and second
column for revenue growth volatility. The results verify that risk-weighted patent
count satisfies the criteria for risky investment since it is positively associated with
both growth and volatility.
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industry-year FE Y Y
listed status Y Y
obs. 196,000 194,000
R2 0.1946 0.2114
Notes: The first column report results for revenue growth (RGit) and the second column report
results for revenue growth volatility (log(V OLit)). All controls are lagged by one period. These
controls include risk-weighted (RWP ), patent stock (stock), firm age (age), firm revenue (revenue),
publicly listed status, left censored dummy, and 4-digit industry × year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the 4-digit industry × year level. se in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and *
(10%)].
Before moving to more formal analysis, it is useful to evaluate the simple bi-
variate relationship between risky innovation and owner diversification. In Figure
1.4, firms are separated into those held by owners with high (solid line) and low
(dashed line) levels of diversification and the distribution of log RWP is plotted
for each type. The differences in risky innovation are striking. Firms held by more
diversified owners engage in far riskier patenting than firms held by less diversified
owners. Section 1.4 test whether the positive relationship between owner diversifi-
cation and risky innovation holds under more formal analysis.
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Figure 1.4: Risky Innovation and Diversification
Notes: The left panel plots the kernel density function of log risk-weighted patenting separately
for firms held by owners with high diversification (solid blue line) and low diversification (dotted
red line). The right panel plots the kernel density function of log risk-weighted patenting
separately for firms held by owners with high ownership concentration (solid blue line) and low
ownership concentration (dotted red line). Both tails of the distributions have been trimmed for
disclosure purposes.
1.3.3.3 Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of key firm-level variables are reported in table 1.3.
The first two columns report raw means and standard deviations and the last two
columns report the summary statistics using sampling weights. The average em-
ployment of the weighted sample is above 1,500 employees and the average firm age
is 21 years. These statistics reflect that patenting firms tend to be older and larger
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than non-patenting firms in the economy, which is consistent with the findings of
Graham et al. (2015). The average patent stock is nearly 200 patents and the av-
erage number of risk-weighted patents is three, but the large standard deviations
associated with both variables indicate a high degree of variation across firms. The
average degree of diversification is large, with an owner holding around 76 firms,
but as the left panel of figure 1.3 shows, the distribution of diversification is very
skewed.
Table 1.3: Summary statistics (raw analysis sample)
Unweighted Weighted
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
employment 9461 39310 1655 15710
age 29.26 9.588 20.64 12.2
revenue growth -0.0056 0.3623 0.0075 0.6466
employment growth 0.0062 0.2562 0.05 0.494
patent stock 962 6582 187.2 2651
risk-weighted patenting 11.54 89.4 2.625 36.16
diversification 103.3 345.3 75.67 267.3
concentration 0.7482 0.2518 0.7702 0.2586
Notes: Columns 1 & 2 report the raw statistics and columns 3 & 4 report weighted statistics.
Data on employment, age, revenue growth and employment growth derive from the LBD. Revenue







stock is obtained from PatentsView, and diversification (total number of firms held globally by an
owner in a given year) and concentration (fraction of a firm’s equity controlled by an owner) are
obtained from BvD.
1.3.3.4 Sector-level variables
For the sector-level analysis, I exploit variation across 2-digit NAICS codes
over time. My measure of sector-level diversification (DIVst) is the weighted average
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owner diversification of sector s in period t. More formally, DIVst = Σot (diversificationot×
weightot), where diversificationot is the diversification of owner o that holds firms
in sector s in year t; and weightot = (Σit employmentit×pwit)/EMPst, where employmentit
is the employment of firms held by owner o in period t, pwit is their propensity
weight, and EMPst is total propensity weighted employment of sector s in period t.
I correlate sector-level diversification with several sector-level outcome vari-
ables. The first is weighted average risky patenting (RWPst), which is measured
as ARWPst = Σit(RWPit × weightit), where RWPit is the risk-weighted patent
count of firm i in sector s in period t, and weightit = (employmentit×pwit)/EMPst. The
second is total risky patenting (TRWPst), which is calculated as the sum of risk-
weighted patent count across all firms i in a sector s in period t. More formally,
TRWPst = ΣitRWIit. The third is total revenue, which is calculated as the sum
of revenue across all firms i in a sector s in period t. Formally, Trevenuest =
Σit revenueit. The final outcome variable is organic revenue growth, which is mea-
sured as RGst = Σit (RGit × weightit).
1.4 Empirical Analysis
I begin by evaluating the firm-level relationship between owner diversification
and risky innovation. I then examine whether there is evidence of the risk-sharing




I now turn to the central question of the paper, do firms held by more diver-
sified owners engage in riskier innovation? The baseline specification estimates:
log(RWPiot) =α + λ1 log(diversificationot) + λ2concentrationiot+
γ1 log(employmentit) + γ2 log(ageit) + γ3 log(stockit) + γ4 log(pasti)+
γ5listedit + γ6foreigno + γ7LCi + ηst + εiot
(1.4)
Each firm i is held by owner o in period t. The dependent variable in equa-
tion 1.4 is risk-weighted patenting (log(RWPit)) and is measured at the firm-year
level (it). The variable of interest is owner diversification (log(diversificationot)
and is measured at the owner-year level (ot). Theory predicts that due to risk-
sharing, the coefficient λ1 should to be positive. The specification distinguishes
diversification from two other features of ownership structure – foreign ownership
(foreigno), which is measured at the owner level, and ownership concentration
(concentrationiot), which is measured at the firm-owner-year level. Depending on
whether higher concentration lowers agency conflict or raises the private benefits
of control, the coefficient λ2 may be positive or negative. Controlling for foreign
ownership accounts for potential differences in preferences of foreign investors and
for shocks not absorbed in industry-year fixed effects.15
The specification controls for important time-varying firm characteristics that
may be simultaneously correlated with risky patenting and owner diversification, in-
cluding employment (log(employmentit)), age (log(ageit), and patent stock (log(stockit).
15The coefficient on foreign is suppressed from output.
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The time-varying discrete variable (listedit) denotes whether a firms is actively pub-
licly listed and proxies for access to finance.16. The time-invariant dummy variable
LCi is included to control for left-censoring of the firm age variable.
17 The inclusion
of industry-year fixed effect (ηst) controls for cross-sectoral variation in patenting
and ownership structure.
A potential concern is that the cross-sectional relationship between risky in-
novation and diversification will be driven by the endogeneity of these variables.
In particular, the inherent riskiness of a firm may determine the type of owner it
is held by. To account for this possibility, I construct a time-invariant firm-level
variable that captures the average riskiness of innovation during a firm’s first five
years of patenting (log(pasti)). The variable proxies for underlying unobserved firm
heterogeneity. It is constructed using USPTO patenting data dating back to 1976.
I focus on the first five years of patenting because the firm dynamics literature has
emphasized the importance of early firm characteristics in explaining subsequent
outcomes (Schoar (2010), Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Guzman and Stern (2016),
Choi (2017), and others).
Table 1.4 reports the results of the baseline specification. The first column
shows that when introduced together and without sampling weights, owner diver-
sification and ownership concentration are both positively associated with risky
innovation. Consistent with the risk-sharing story, there is a significant positive
16Recent research finds evidence that listed firms are less financially constrained than private
ones. See Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) and Dinlersoz et al. (2018) for the U.S. and Faccio
et al. (2011) for Europe.
17The LBD tracks firms from 1976 onward and firm age is calculated based on the year in which
the firm’s oldest establishment is first observed in the data. As a result, the firm age of the oldest
firms is left-censored.
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relationship between diversification and risky innovation. The positive relationship
between concentration and risky innovation is consistent with higher concentration
lowering agency frictions and incentivizing risk-taking. The positive coefficient on
employment suggests that all things equal, larger firms have more resources and
organizational capacity to undertake risky patenting. The positive coefficient on
patent stock suggests that all things equal, firms with more patenting experience
are better equipped to apply their existing expertise in new technological areas. The
negative coefficient on age suggests that all things equal, younger firms are more
dynamic and willing to undertake risky patenting. This last result is consistent with
the insights of the firm dynamics literature that young firms are engines of growth
and innovation.
Before introducing sampling weights in columns (3) through (7), I explore
whether the relationship between diversification and risky innovation varies system-
atically across firm types. I start with the specification in column (1) and introduce
interaction terms between owner diversification and ownership concentration and
firm size and age. Recall that the unweighted analysis sample over-represents old
and large firms. Sampling weights therefore assign relatively more weight to ob-
servations belonging to young and small firms. The results in column (2) indicate
that reweighting towards younger firms is critical. Reweighting towards small firms
strengthens the relationship between concentration and risky innovation and weak-
ens it between diversification and risky innovation. Reweighting towards young firms
weakens the relationship between concentration and risky innovation and strength-
ens it between diversification and risky innovation. The weighted version the speci-
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fication in column (1) is reported in column (6). The result indicates that the latter
effect (reweighting towards young firms) dominates the former effect (reweighting
towards small firms). These results highlight the fact that sample selection bias
matters, and that it is important to investigate the various dimensions along which
a sample is not representative. In the remainder of the analysis, sampling weights
are used to address sample selection bias.
Columns (3) through (7) introduce different control variables to highlight how
their inclusion impacts the core relationship between diversification and risky inno-
vation. All results in columns (3) through (7) include sampling weights and 4-digit
industry-year fixed effects. Without controlling for any other ownership structure,
firm lifecycle or financial structure variables, column (3) highlights the strong pos-
itive relationship between diversification and risky innovation. The inclusion of
ownership concentration in column (4), which itself is negatively correlated with
risky innovation, has little effect on the coefficient on diversification. This results
from the low correlation (-0.03) between owner diversification and ownership con-
centration. The inclusion of firm age and employment in column (5) and patent
stock, listed status, and foreign ownership in column (6) attenuates the relationship
between diversification and risky innovation, though it remains positive and signif-
icant. This attenuation occurs because in the naive specifications that omit these
controls, the relationship between these variables and risky innovation is attributed
to diversification.
The result reported in column (7) serves as my baseline. This specification
controls for ownership concentration, foreign ownership and time-varying firm char-
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acteristics, and it verifies that the significant positive coefficient on diversification
is not driven by inherent firm heterogeneity by introducing a control for past risky
patenting. Owner diversification remains positive and significant (and ownership
concentration remains insignificant), but its effect is attenuated relative to column
(6). The result confirms that inherent firm heterogeneity, particularly underlying
risk profile, does influence ownership structure, but alone cannot fully explain the
relationship between diversification and risky innovation. In this preferred baseline
specification, a one standard deviation increase in owner diversification is associated
with an approximately 5% increase in risky innovation.
1.4.2 First differences
The baseline specification corrects for sample selection bias and introduces a
rich set of controls that go a long way in addressing selection on observables, but un-
observed heterogeneity precludes a causal interpretation. In particular, the baseline
specification controls for important time-varying firm characteristics (employment,
age, patent stock, and access to finance), a time-varying firm-owner characteristic
(ownership concentration), a time-invariant owner characteristic (foreign owner),
and time-invariant firm characteristics (past risky patenting and left-censoring).
Yet, controlling for a firm’s past risky patenting does not account for all of the in-
herent firm characteristics that may influence risk-taking and make firms attractive
to particular types of owners. Therefore, the positive relationship between diversi-
fication and risky patenting may still arise from more diversified owners acquiring
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Table 1.4: Cross-sectional specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(diversificationot) 0.0222
∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗






∗∗ 0.0686∗∗ -0.1427∗∗∗ -0.0923∗ 0.0032 0.0021
(0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0490) (0.0473) (0.0429) (0.0379)
concentrationiot × log(ageit) 0.0849
(0.0516)
concentrationiot × log(empit) -0.0328
(0.0200)
log(employmentit) 0.1394
∗∗∗ 0.1421∗∗∗ 0.1382∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0084)
log(ageit) -0.2698
∗∗∗ -0.2742∗∗∗ -0.0561∗∗∗ -0.1466∗∗∗ -0.1024∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0217) (0.0231) (0.0199)
log(stockit) 0.3304
∗∗∗ 0.3276∗∗∗ 0.2062∗∗∗ 0.1075∗∗∗




industry-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
listed status Y Y N N N Y Y
foreign ownership Y Y N N N Y Y
DLC Y Y N N Y Y Y
weights N N Y Y Y Y Y
obs. 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000
r-sq 0.5980 0.6011 0.1241 0.1259 0.2165 0.3905 0.4654
Notes: The dependent variable is risk-weighted patents. The variable of interest is owner diversi-
fication. Controls include ownership concentration, firm employment, firm age, patent stock, past
risk-taking, listed status, foreign ownership dummy, left-censored dummy, and 4-digit ind-year FE.
Standard errors clustered at the owner-level. SE in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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riskier firms, rather than incentivizing them to engage in riskier innovation. If the
positive relationship was entirely driven by this story, then changes in owner diver-
sification should not be associated with changes in firms’ innovation behavior.
In the absence of an instrument or exogenous shock to ownership structure
during the 2007 through 2013 period, I exploit within-firm variation to directly
test whether changes in diversification and/or concentration are associated with
changes in risky innovation. In particular, I exploit variation in risky patenting
and ownership structure within firms over time using a first-difference specification.
Because ownership structure evolves slowly, I focus on a sub-sample of firms observed
for the majority of the sample period (5 years or more) to ensure I have sufficient
variation in owner diversification and/or ownership concentration to make inference.
As in the baseline specific it is important to control for ownership concentration to
isolate the role of diversification.
Figure 1.5 documents the distribution of annual within-firm changes in diversi-
fication and concentration among firms observed for 5 years or more. In the left panel
changes in diversification are categorized into seven bins and in the right right panel
changes in concentration are categorized into three bins. The height of each bar is
the fraction of observations that fall into each bin. The results indicate that owner
diversification (left panel) is subject to more change than ownership concentration
(right panel). While ownership concentration is extremely persistent, with over 80%
of observations experiencing no change in this measure, ownership diversification is
subject to more fluctuations. If changes in ownership structure are associated with
changes in risky patenting, it is therefore more likely that diversification plays a role
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than concentration.

































< 0 = 0  > 0
Notes: In the left panel, one-year changes in diversification at the firm level are categorized
into seven bins depending on the degree of change (calculated as the change in log diversification
between t − 1 and t). In the right panel, one year changes in concentration at the firm level are
categorized into three bins depending on the degree of change. The height of each column is the
percent of observations that fall into each category.
For the sample of firms observed for the majority of the sample period, I
estimate the following first difference regression:
∆1 log(RWPiot) =λ1∆1 log(diversificationot) + λ2∆1concentrationiot+
γ1∆1 log(employmentit) + γ2∆1 log(stockit)+
γ5∆1listedit + γ6∆1foreigno + ηst + εiot
(1.5)
where ∆1 denotes the change in a particular variable between year t−1 and t.
Note that only time-varying firm, owner, and firm-owner characteristics are included
in the specification. Since the first-difference specification controls for firm fixed-
effects, firm age is dropped. Note further that ∆1foreigno is included as a control
because in this specification firms may experience changes in ownership over the
period, which may involve being bought or sold to owners with a different foreign
status.
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Table 1.5 reports the results of this specification. The results in column (1)
confirm the presence of a positive and significant relationship between changes in
owner diversification and changes in risky patenting. These results control for time-
invariant firm characteristics, and address the concern that owners are targeting
firms with particular risk-profiles. If this were the case, firms would be unresponsive
to changes in owner diversification because they would already be innovating at their
underlying level of riskiness. Instead, it appears that firm innovation is sensitive to
fluctuations in diversification.
This positive relationship may still be driven by unobserved owner character-
istics. The firm dynamics literature emphasizes the importance of owner ability and
prior experience for entrepreneurial activities. High ability owners may be better
equipped to take advantage of both diversification and innovation opportunities. To
address this concern, in column (2) of table 1.5, I further restrict the sample to only
those firms held by the same owner over the whole period. In column (3) I also
restrict the sample to a balanced sample of firms present in the data throughout
the entire period to rule out concerns about firm entry/exit. In these specifications,
changes in owner diversification arise from a firm’s existing owner expanding or
contracting her portfolio, after account for time-invariant owner characteristics.18
I find that higher owner diversification incentivizes riskier innovation. Given the
rich set of controls and focus on matched firm-owner pairs, these specifications lend
themselves to a causal interpretation as long as owner diversification and the re-
18Note that since these specifications control for time invariant owner characteristics, ∆foreigno
is dropped from the regressions.
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∆1concentration 0.0046 0.0184 -0.0154
(0.0591) (0.0658) (0.0755)
∆1 log(employment) 0.0164 0.0061 -0.0191
(0.0301) (0.0407) (0.0395)
∆1 log(stock) -0.0314 -0.0426 -0.0227
(0.0298) (0.0302) (0.0489)
industry-year FE Y Y Y
listed status Y Y Y
weights Y Y Y
obs. 16,000 10,000 7,000
r-sq 0.1444 0.1817 0.1869
Notes: In column 1 the sample consists of firms observed in the data for five years or more.
Columns 2 and 3 further restrict the sample to firms held by the same owner over the whole
period they are observed in the data. Column 3 further restricts the sample to a balanced panel
of firms. All variables are measured in changes between year t− 1 and t. The dependent variable
is change in risk-weighted patents. The variable of interest is change in owner diversification.
Controls include changes in ownership concentration, firm employment, patent stock, listed status,
and foreign ownership dummy (column 1). 4-digit industry-year FE are included. Standard errors
clustered at the owner level. SE in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
maining unobserved firm and owner characteristics summarized in the error terms
are orthogonal.
The previous specification accounts for time-varying firm characteristics and
time-invariant firm and owner characteristics. However, an alternative story posits
that the positive relationship arises not from increasing diversification incentivizing
more risky innovation, but from more risky innovation incentivizing owners to be-
come more diversified to offset the increased risk they face. When deciding whether
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to sell firms or acquire new ones, investors are not solely considering the riskiness
of the patenting being undertaken in the firms they own. First, if the goal was
to hedge risk arising from risky innovation, owners would likely first diversify their
financial portfolio, which is less costly and time-consuming than opening a new firm
or closing one down. Second, the decision to open a new firm, for example, is often
heavily driven by the recognition of growth opportunities in a new market (location,
industry, etc). To more formally address this story of reverse causality I perform an
additional test. I focus on a balanced sample of firms to rule out the possibility that
the results are driven by firm entry and exit and calculate changes in risky innova-
tion and other time-vary firm-level controls between year t−3 and t. To prevent the
dynamic feedback from riskier innovation leading to higher owner diversification, I
measure owner diversification and ownership concentration at the beginning of the
period:
∆3 log(RWPiot) =λ1 log(initial diversificationo) + λ2initial concentration io+
γ1∆3 log(employmentit) + γ2∆3 log(stockit)+
γ5∆3listedit + ηst + εiot
(1.6)
where ∆3 denotes the change in a particular variable between year t − 3 and
t. This initial conditions specification differences out time-invariant firm charac-
teristics and controls for time-varying firm characteristics. It compares changes in
risky innovation of firms held by initially more diversified owners with changes in
risky innovation of firms held by initially less diversified owners. The first column of
table 1.6 repeats the specification reported in column (3) of table 1.5 using changes
between year t − 3 and t rather than between year t − 1 and t. It confirms the
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positive relationship between changes in owner diversification and changes in risky
innovation. The second column of table 1.6 reports the results of the initial con-
ditions specification. The results show that changes in risky innovation are higher
among firms held by initially more diversified owners. This positive relationship
between initial owner diversification and changes in risky innovation lends credence
to the story that higher owner diversification incentivizes risky innovation as long
as initial owner diversification and remaining time invariant owner and time varying
firm characteristics are orthogonal.
The specifications exploiting within firm and within owner variation over time
are complementary. While the first difference results show that the positive relation-
ship between diversification and risky innovation is not driven by time invariant firm
and owner characteristics, the initial conditions specification shows that the positive
relationship is not entirely driven by the dynamic feedback from risky innovation
to owner diversification. Compared to previous empirical studies, the detailed data
and empirical approaches employed here make a causal interpretation of the rela-
tionship between owner diversification and risky innovation more plausible. Even
with remaining questions regarding the identifying assumptions, I document a new
finding that owner diversification facilitates risky innovation among patenting firms
in the United States.
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∆3 log(employment) -0.0587 -0.0621
(0.0395) (0.0414)
∆3 log(stock) -0.0821 -0.0845
(0.0729) (0.0747)
industry-year FE Y Y




Notes: The sample contains firms observed during the entire period and that are held by the same
owner throughout. All variables in column (1) are measured as changes between year t−3 and t. In
column (2) the ownership structure variables (ownership concentration and owner diversification)
are measured at the beginning of the period. The dependent variable is change in risk-weighted
patents. The variable of interest is change in owner diversification (column 1) or initial owner
diversification (column 2). Controls include changes in ownership concentration (column 1) or
initial ownership concentration (column 2) and changes in firm employment, patent stock, and
listed status. 2-digit industry-year FE are included. Standard errors clustered at the owner level.
SE in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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1.4.3 Risk-sharing channel
In the theoretical literature, the risk-sharing channel arises from the exposure
of risk-averse agents to idiosyncratic risk. To test whether there is evidence of this
channel, I take advantage of the different types of owners present in the BvD data.
In table 1.7, I estimate the baseline regression (column 3 of table 1.4) separately
for corporate and individual owners. The first two columns report unweighted re-
sults and the last two report weighted results. First, the table confirms that risky
innovation remains positively associated with owner diversification and unrelated
to ownership concentration across owner types. More importantly, the relationship
between diversification and risky patenting is stronger for individual than corpo-
rate owners. This result is consistent with the risk-sharing channel since individual
owners in the data have not set up holding companies, and are therefore even more
exposed to the risk of firms in their portfolio than corporate owners. Note that
the results are also robust to decomposing the owner types into three groups –
individual, corporate, and institutional owners. The positive relationship between
diversification and risky innovation holds across owner types, but is only significant
at the 10% level for institutional owners.19 This result is also consistent with the
risk-sharing channel since institutional investors manage holdings on behalf of indi-
vidual investors and therefore have less stake and exposure to firms in the portfolio.
Therefore, the theory of risk-sharing is least relevant for this type of owner.
19Note that the quantitative results for institutional investors are under disclosure review. Only
the qualitative results for this type of owner has passed disclosure review at this time.
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Table 1.7: Owner diversification & risky innovation across owner types
Corporate Individual Corporate Individual
log(diversificationot) 0.0231
∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0152) (0.0056) (0.0120)
concentrationiot 0.0138 -0.0205 -0.0056 0.0028
(0.0271) (0.0421) (0.0395) (0.0308)
log(employmentit) 0.1297
∗∗∗ 0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0078)
log(ageit) -0.2326
∗∗∗ -0.1103∗∗∗ -0.1071∗∗∗ -0.0504∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0170) (0.0136) (0.0115)
log(stockit) 0.2577
∗∗∗ 0.1292∗∗∗ 0.1214∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0152) (0.0121) (0.0090)
log(pasti) 0.2702
∗∗∗ 0.3616∗∗∗ 0.4848∗∗∗ 0.3843∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0687) (0.0503) (0.0791)
industry-year FE Y Y Y Y
listed status Y Y Y Y
foreign ownership Y Y Y Y
weights N N Y Y
obs. 26,000 6,000 26,000 6,000
r-sq 0.5767 0.4564 0.4512 0.3449
Notes: The dependent variable is risk-weighted patents. The variable of interest is owner diversi-
fication. Controls include ownership concentration, firm employment, firm age, patent stock, past
risk-taking, listed status, foreign ownership dummy, left-censored dummy, and 3-digit industry-
year FE. Standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry × year level. se in parentheses [***
(1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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1.4.4 Robustness
The baseline results establish a positive and significant relationship between
owner diversification and risky patenting when diversification is measured by the
number of firms an owner holds globally. Table 1.8 tests whether the positive rela-
tionship persists when alternative definitions of owner diversification are considered.
The first column serves as a reference point and reports the results from the baseline
specification in column 3 of table 1.4. The second column measures diversification
by the total number of firms controlled domestically (i.e. the number of firms in the
LBD held by each owner). This definition recognizes that over three-fourths of U.S.
firms’ R&D expenditure is performed domestically (Shackelford and Wolfe (2011))
and therefore domestic holdings may be particularly relevant for innovation-related
decisions. The third column measures diversification as the number of unique in-
dustries (3-digit NAICS codes) in which an owner holds firms. It recognizes that
an owner holding three firms in apparel manufacturing (code 315) may not be as
diversified as another owner holding three firms, in apparel manufacturing (315),
chemical manufacturing (325), and animal production and aquaculture (112). The
fourth column measures diversification as 1 minus an employment-based concen-
tration index. It distinguishes between an owner holding three firms with 90%
of employment in one of them, and an owner holding three firms with employment
equally spread across them. The fifth column measures diversification as 1 minus an
industry-level employment-based concentration index. The sixth column measures
diversification as the negative of the owner’s weighted industry-based beta. The
46
measure is constructed by first estimating the industry-specific beta for 48 Fama-
French industries using the Fama-French three factor model; then mapping these
industries to 3-digit NAICS codes; and calculating the owner’s weighted beta using
the total employment of firms held by the owner in a particular industry divided by
the total employment of all firms in the owner’s portfolio as weights. This measure
captures whether an owner is more diversified (lower beta) or less diversified (higher
beta) than the market portfolio. Across all six definitions, owner diversification
remains positively associated with risky innovation. Quantitatively, the results are
also similar to the baseline. For instance, a one standard deviation increase the
number of active 3-digit industries is associated with nearly a 5% increase in risky
innovation.
One concern with the risk-weighted patent count (RWP ) is that it does not
account for firms engaging in defensive patenting. Firms could patent outside their
area of expertise without intending to implement the new technologies to hinder
other firms from entering those markets. I construct a quality-adjusted risk-weighted
patent count measure (RWC) that gives more weight to patents that are cited
by other patents. Patent citations are a commonly used proxy for patent qual-
ity (Aghion et al. (2013), Akcigit et al. (2016)). If risky patents are defensive,
then they should garner few subsequent citations. Table 1.9 tests the relationship
between quality-adjusted patent count and the six alternative measures of owner
diversification. The results confirm that the baseline relationship is not driven by
defensive patenting since the positive relationship persists and remains significant
across all six specifications. In fact, the relationship is strengthened. A one standard
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Table 1.8: Alternative definitions of diversification




log(# firms owned (LBD)ot) 0.0490
∗∗∗
(0.0123)









-(weighted ind. β)ot 0.1268
∗∗
(0.0566)
concentrationiot 0.0100 0.0071 0.0067 -0.0021 -0.0028 0.0110
(0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0282)
log(employmentit) 0.0814
∗∗∗ 0.0829∗∗∗ 0.0828∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0806∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0068)
log(ageit) -0.1138
∗∗∗ -0.1142∗∗∗ -0.1138∗∗∗ -0.1152∗∗∗ -0.1148∗∗∗ -0.1101∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0131)
log(stockit) 0.1225
∗∗∗ 0.1244∗∗∗ 0.1242∗∗∗ 0.1244∗∗∗ 0.1245∗∗∗ 0.1273∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0098)
log(pasti) 0.4773
∗∗∗ 0.4772∗∗∗ 0.4764∗∗∗ 0.4815∗∗∗ 0.4808∗∗∗ 0.4903∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0335) (0.0333) (0.0341) (0.0339) (0.0350)
industry-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
listed Y Y Y Y Y Y
foreign Y Y Y Y Y Y
weights Y Y Y Y Y Y
obs. 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 37,000
r-sq 0.5045 0.5039 0.5042 0.5029 0.5031 0.5069
Notes: The dependent variable is risk-weighted patents. The variable of interest is owner diversi-
fication. Controls include ownership concentration, firm employment, firm age, patent stock, past
risk-taking, listed status, foreign ownership dummy, left-censored dummy, and 4-digit industry-
year FE. Owner diversification is measured as total number of firms held globally (column 1),
number of domestic firms (2), number of unique active 3-digit industries (3), one minus an em-
ployment concentration index (4), one minus an industry-based employment concentration index
(5), negative of the owner’s weighted industry-based beta (6). S.E. clustered at the 4-digit industry
× year level. SE in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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deviation increase in the baseline measure of diversification is associated with nearly
an 8% increase in quality-adjusted risky patenting; and a one standard deviation
increase in the number of active 3-digit industries is associated with a 7% increase
in quality-adjusted risky patenting.
Another possibility is that the risk-weighted patent count is capturing firms
innovating outside of their own area of expertise, but within their owner’s area of
expertise. If this were the case, then the distance between a firm’s new patents and
its owner’s patent portfolio would be smaller than the distance between a firm’s new
patents and its own patent portfolio. In particular, since more diversified owners are
active in more technological areas, the patenting of firms in their portfolio would ap-
pear less risky under the owner-based measure than the firm-based measure. If this
story is true, then I would expect the positive relationship between diversification
and risky innovation to be attenuated when the dependent variable is calculated
as the technological distance between a firm’s new patents and its owner’s patent
portfolio (owner-based risk-weighted patent count). Table 1.10 shows that instead of
weakening the results, the positive relationship between diversification and owner-
based risky innovation is stronger than the relationship between diversification and
firm-based risky innovation. A one standard deviation increase in the baseline mea-
sure of diversification is associated with nearly an 8% increase in owner-based risky
innovation; and a one standard deviation increase in the number of active 3-digit
industries is associated with a 7% increase in owner-based risky innovation.
Innovation is not the only means by which firms engage in risky investment.
For example, expansion into new industries is potentially risky because it entails
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Table 1.9: Quality-adjusted risk-weighted patenting
















-(weighted ind. β)ot 0.2626
∗∗∗
(0.0836)
concentrationiot 0.0165 0.0128 0.0125 -0.0026 -0.0038 0.0130
(0.0429) (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0437) (0.0415)
log(employmentit) 0.1175
∗∗∗ 0.1198∗∗∗ 0.1195∗∗∗ 0.1212∗∗∗ 0.1209∗∗∗ 0.1174∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0098)
log(ageit) -0.1774
∗∗∗ -0.1779∗∗∗ -0.1771∗∗∗ -0.1798∗∗∗ -0.1792∗∗∗ -0.1761∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0159)
log(stockit) 0.2109
∗∗∗ 0.2139∗∗∗ 0.2133∗∗∗ 0.2142∗∗∗ 0.2142∗∗∗ 0.2178∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0149)
log(pasti) 0.3432
∗∗∗ 0.3425∗∗∗ 0.3420∗∗∗ 0.3466∗∗∗ 0.3462∗∗∗ 0.3557∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0246)
industry-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
listed Y Y Y Y Y Y
foreign Y Y Y Y Y Y
weights Y Y Y Y Y Y
obs. 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 38,000 37,000
r-sq 0.4724 0.4718 0.4723 0.4702 0.4705 0.4737
Notes: The dependent variable is quality adjusted risk-weighted patents. The variable of interest
is owner diversification. Controls include ownership concentration, firm employment, firm age,
patent stock, past risk-taking, listed status, foreign ownership dummy, left-censored dummy, and
4-digit industry-year FE. Owner diversification is measured as total number of firms held globally
(column 1), number of domestic firms (2), number of unique active 3-digit industries (3), one minus
an employment concentration index (4), one minus an industry-based employment concentration
index (5), negative of the owner’s weighted industry-level beta (6). S.E. clustered at the 4-digit
industry × year level. SE in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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Table 1.10: Owner-based risk-weighted patent count




log(# firms owned (LBD)ot) 0.0841
∗∗∗
(0.0124)












concentrationit 0.0133 0.0098 0.0082 -0.0055 -0.0073 -0.0108
(0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0298) (0.0300) (0.0293)
[1em] log(employmentit) 0.0805
∗∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0828∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0860∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0069)
log(ageit) -0.1224
∗∗∗ -0.1232∗∗∗ -0.1226∗∗∗ -0.1246∗∗∗ -0.1240∗∗∗ -0.1252∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0141)
log(stockit) 0.1191
∗∗∗ 0.1214∗∗∗ 0.1210∗∗∗ 0.1217∗∗∗ 0.1217∗∗∗ 0.1225∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0105)
log(pastit) 0.4937
∗∗∗ 0.4934∗∗∗ 0.4924∗∗∗ 0.5003∗∗∗ 0.4992∗∗∗ 0.5030∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0361) (0.0358) (0.0369) (0.0365) (0.0377)
industry-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
weights Y Y Y Y Y Y
obs. 37,000 37,000 37,000 37,000 37,000 37,000
r-sq 0.5015 0.5008 0.5013 0.4981 0.4985 0.4968
Notes: The dependent variable is owner-based risk weighted patent count. The variable of interest
is owner diversification. Controls include ownership concentration, firm employment, firm age,
patent stock, past risk-taking, listed status, foreign ownership dummy, left-censored dummy, and
4-digit industry-year FE. Owner diversification is measured as total number of firms held globally
(column 1), number of domestic firms (2), number of unique active 3-digit industries (3), one minus
an employment concentration index (4), one minus an industry-based employment concentration
index (5), negative of the owner’s weighted industry-level beta (6). S.E. clustered at the 4-digit
industry × year level. se in parentheses [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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firms entering new markets, facing new competitors, attracting new customers, and
incurring disruptions during the expansion. Expansion into new industries may be
particularly relevant for patenting firms because a potential reason for these firms
to engage in risky innovation is the desire to enter new markets. In table 1.11, I
test whether firms held by more diversified owners also undertake risky investments
outside of patenting by asking whether they are more likely to expand into new
industries. I construct a measure of industry expansion using information on es-
tablishment openings from the LBD. The dependent variable is a discrete variable
equal to one if a firm has opened an establishment in a new 3-digit industry over
the previous three years. The regression controls for the stock of active industries
(log(stockit), measured by the number of unique 3-digit industries in which the firm
is active; and in the last column also controls for the amount of industry-expansion
the firm undertook in its first five years of operation (pastit). Consistent with the
risky innovation results, table 1.11 shows a positive relationship between owner
diversification and industry expansion. As with previous results, ownership con-
centration has no significant effect on industry expansion, now in both unweighted
(column 1) and weighted (columns 2 and 3) regressions.20 The results suggest that
firms held by more diversified owners engage in risky investments broadly, though I
focus in this paper on their innovation strategies specifically.
20Firm expansion into new industries can also be seen as an independent form of risky invest-
ment. A robustness exercise that expands the sample of firms to non-patenting firms confirms the
positive relationship between diversification and industry expansion in the broader sample.
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industry-year FE Y Y Y
listed status Y Y Y
foreign ownership Y Y Y
weights N Y Y
obs. 35,000 35,000 35,000
r-sq 0.1778 0.2576 0.2582
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm opened an estab-
lishment in a new 3-digit industry in the past three years. The variable of interest is owner
diversification. Controls include ownership concentration, firm employment, firm age, number of
active industries, average amount of industry expansion in the firm’s five years, listed status, for-
eign ownership dummy, left-censored dummy, and ind-year FE. Standard errors clustered at the
4-digit industry × year level. significance levels reported – [*** (1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
1.4.5 Sector-level relationship
Through firm-level regressions, I document a positive relationship between
diversification and risky innovation within 4-digit sector-years. In this section, I
examine whether the firm-level relationship survives aggregation to the sector level.
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I first plot the simple bivariate relationship between average sector-level diversifi-
cation and risky innovation, output, and growth; and then estimate the following
regression:
Yst = α + λlog(DIVst) + νs + νt + εst (1.7)
where Yst is the outcome variable of 2-digit industry s in year t, and includes
weighted average risky patenting (ARWP ), total risky patenting (TRWP ), total
revenue (Trevenue), and the revenue growth rate (RG). Both industry (νs) and year
(νt) fixed effects are included to neutralize the effects of industry-specific differences
and aggregate conditions.
Figure 1.6 plots the bivariate relationship between weighted average owner
diversification at the sector level and weighted average risky innovation (left panel)
and total risky innovation (right panel). If diversification is relatively higher in
the largest firms, then the relationship between diversification and risky patenting
should survive aggregation. Figure 1.6 and the first two columns of table 1.12
confirm the positive relationship. In particular, a 10% increase in diversification is
associated with a nearly 5% increase in average risky patenting and 4.4% increase
in total risky patenting at the sector level.
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Figure 1.6: Diversification, average RWP (left panel), and total RWP (right panel)
Notes: In both figures, the red dots represent (2-digit NAICS, year) observations. The dotted
grey line represents the bivariate linear relationship, and the shaded grey area represents the
95% CI of this relationship. The x-axis in both figures is the log of activity-weighted average
diversification. The y-axis in the left panel is log of average activity-weighted risk-weighted patent
count (ARWP ) and the right panel is log of total risk-weighted patent count (TRWP ).
Figure 1.7 plots the bivariate relationship between weighted average owner
diversification at the sector level and total revenue (left panel) and revenue growth
rate (right panel). The figure and the last two columns of table 1.12 document a
positive correlation between diversification, output, and growth. In particular, a
10% increase in diversification is associated with a 1.2% increase in total revenue
and a 0.03 percentage point increase in the revenue growth rate. The positive
correlation is suggestive, and can arise from factors outside of risky patenting. The
stylized model presented in the next section shows how diversification can generate
the patterns observed at the sector level through the risk-sharing channel.
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Figure 1.7: Diversification, total revenue (left panel), and revenue growth rate (right
panel)
Notes: In both figures, the red dots represent (2-digit NAICS, year) observations. The dotted
grey line represents the bivariate linear relationship, and the shaded grey area represents the
95% CI of this relationship. The x-axis in both figures is the log of activity-weighted average
diversification. The y-axis in the left panel is log of total revenue (Trevenue) and the right panel
is revenue growth rate (RG).
Table 1.12: Sector-level: regressions
ARWP TRWP Trevenue RG
log(diversificationst) 0.4714
∗∗ 0.4408∗∗∗ 0.1155∗ 0.0256∗∗
(0.1826) (0.1622) (0.0660) (0.0124)
industry FE Y Y Y Y
year FE Y Y Y Y
obs. 134 134 134 134
r-sq 0.8751 0.9390 0.9627 0.3208
Notes: The unit of analysis is (2-digit NAICS industry, year). The dependent variables are the log
of activity weighted average RWP (ARWP ) (column 1), log of total risk-weighted patent count
(TRWP ) (column 2), log total revenue (Trevenue) (column 3), and revenue growth rate (RG)
(column 4). The key control variable is log of activity weighted average owner diversification.
Additional controls are industry and year fixed effects. S.E. are robust, and in parentheses [***
(1%), ** (5%), and * (10%)].
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1.5 Stylized Model
The empirical analysis establishes that owner diversification facilitates risky
innovation. Yet, existing models in the firm dynamics and endogenous growth lit-
eratures do not feature the risk-sharing channel that underpins the observed em-
pirical relationship. In this section, I present a static single-agent model of risky
productivity-enhancing investment. This stylized model highlights the features
needed to activate the risk-sharing channel, and rationalizes the positive relationship
between diversification and risky investment documented empirically. I also take a
stand on the direction of causality. The model shows that when owners are more
diversified, they choose to undertake riskier investments. Through a simple partial
equilibrium aggregation exercise, I also show how higher diversification can lead to
the higher aggregate output and investment shown empirically.
1.5.1 Setup
There is a single period composed of two sub-periods. Consider an owner who
is endowed with n firms. For analytical tractability, it is assumed that the owner
has log utility and that all income is consumed without saving.21 Each firm held by
the owner produces via the following production function:
y = q(1−α)lα (1.8)
21The assumption that the number of firms an owner holds is exogenous, and the assump-
tion that all income is consumed without saving is relaxed in the two-period model presented in
appendix A.2.
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where q is a measure of productivity and l is labor demand, which has a per
unit cost of ω. In the second sub-period q is known, l is chosen, and output is
produced. Productivity (q) evolves according to the following process:
q =
{
(1 + x) w/ prob. λ
(1− x) w/ prob. (1− λ)
(1.9)
where x is a choice variable reflecting risky investment and λ is a parameter
denoting the probability of success. Investments are chosen in the first sub-period,
and are restricted to x ε [0, 1] to ensure positive output (y). First, the outcome of
investment is uncorrelated across firms. Second, consistent with the notion of risky
investment, higher investment is associated with higher potential returns, and and a
larger gap between productivity in the case of success versus failure. To highlight the
role of diversification, it is assumed that there is no additional cost associated with
implementing risky investment x. This type of binomial process of risky investment
and experimentation is used in the existing literature (Ates and Saffie (2016), Buera
and Fattal-Jaef (2016), Choi (2017), Caggese (forthcoming)).
This formulation of risky investment can be thought of as a reduced form
representation of firm patenting and/or expansion into new business areas. These
activities tend to be associated with uncertain outcomes. R&D efforts may or may
not produce new technologies, and patents for these technologies may or may not
be filed ahead of competitors researching in similar areas. Successful innovation
can increase the efficiency of existing operations and/or create opportunities in new
markets. Failures may involve unsuccessful implementation of technologies that are
difficult to revert (Caggese (forthcoming)), as well as the kinds of switchover and
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disruption costs described in Holmes et al. (2012).
Each owner chooses the labor input (li) and investment (xi) in each firm
i ε [1, n] that she owns to maximize his expected utility.












(1 + xi) w/ prob. λ
(1− xi) w/ prob. (1− λ)
(1.11)
Assuming that the period is split into two sub-periods separates the investment



















As a result, when xi is chosen in the first sub-period, the owner’s expected
utility is:










1−α . Because π is common to all firms, the owner chooses
xi = x for the firms she controls. Using the fact that the probability of success follows
a binomial distribution, define P(k, n, λ) as the probability of observing k successes
in a binomial process with n trails and success probability λ:
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P(k, n, λ) ln(π[k(1 + x) + (n− k)(1− x)]) (1.16)
1.5.2 Solution
A closed form solution for x is available when n ε {1, 2}. Consider first an
owner that holds only one firm. She chooses x1 to maximize:
λ ln((1 + x1)π) + (1− λ) ln((1− x1)π) (1.17)
which yield the following solution for x1:
x1 = 2λ− 1 (1.18)
Now consider an owner that holds two firms. She chooses x2 to maximize:
(1−λ)2 ln(2(1−x2)π)+λ2 ln(2(1+x2)π+2λ(1−λ) ln((1+x2)π+(1−x2)π) (1.19)
which yields the following solution for x2:
x2 =
2λ− 1
2λ2 − 2λ+ 1
(1.20)
The analytical results yield a few intuitive insights. First, risky investment
is only positive when the probability of success is sufficiently high. As long as
λ ε (0.5, 1], x is positive and expected returns are increasing in x. Second, owners
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controlling two firms choose higher x than owners controlling one firm. This arises
because investment outcomes are uncertain and uncorrelated across firms. As a
consequence, there is safety in variety. Third, as the probability of success moves
towards one, the difference between x1 and x2 declines. When λ = 1, x1 = x2. This
arises because higher uncertainty (lower λ) is associated with a higher gap between
success versus failure, which strengthens the risk-sharing channel.
While an analytical solution is unavailable for n > 2, the model can be solved
numerically to confirm that the positive relationship between x and n remains. Table
1.13 reports the parameter values used in the numerical exercise. Owners are allowed
to control up to 10 firm.22 Figure 1.8 reports the results. The left panel plots the
optimal investment (y-axis) against diversification (x-axis) and the right panel plots
the resulting expected value (y-axis) for each level of diversification (x-axis). For all
n, optimal risky investment (x) and expected value are increasing in diversification
(n). As n rises, owners are better able to pool firm-specific risk across their portfolio
and optimally choose to undertake riskier investments. Yet, the marginal benefits
of diversification are decreasing and the investment policy becomes flat. Each figure
reports investment and expected values for different success probabilities (λ), and
shows that both are increasing in the success probability.







λ {0.55, 0.60, 0.70, 0.75}
Notes: This table reports the parameter values used in the numerical solution of the model
described in section 1.5. α denotes the decreasing returns to scale parameter, ω denotes the per
unit cost of labor, and λ denotes the probability that investment will be successful.
Figure 1.8: Diversification, Investment & Value
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Notes: The figure in the left panel plots the investment level (x) on the y-axis against the level
of diversification (n) on the x-axis. The figure in the right panel plots the expected value on the
y-axis against the level of diversification (n) on the x-axis. Each line represents the solution of the
model for different values of success probability λ.
1.5.3 Aggregation
I use this stylized model to perform a simple partial equilibrium aggregation
exercise to qualitatively show how diversification may generate aggregate outcomes
consistent with those observed in the empirical sector-level analysis. This exercise
ignores important general equilibrium effects, which would alter the quantitative
implications of the exercise, but should not impact the qualitative results. For
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the exercise, I consider a sector that consists of 100 firms. By doing so, I assume
that the law of large numbers does not apply because if it did, idiosyncratic shocks
would wash out in aggregate. Recent work by Gabaix (2011), Stella (2015), and
Yeh (2017) confirm that firm-level fluctuations do have aggregate implications in
the U.S. context. I consider five different scenarios under which the degree of owner
diversification is varied, and evaluate the qualitative implications for aggregate in-
vestment and output. The owners’ problem is described in 1.5.1, and their optimal
investment decisions are those reported in section 1.5.2 for the case where λ = 0.55.
In each scenario, the 100 firms are subject to a series of idiosyncratic shocks
(realizations of λ) over a number of periods.23. For each firm, the series of idiosyn-
cratic shocks is the same across the scenarios. The only thing that varies across
scenarios is the degree of owner diversification. In the first (1) scenario, there are
100 owners, each controlling only one firm. This is the scenario with the lowest
degree of owner diversification. In the second (2) scenario, there are 50 owners, each
controlling two firms. In the third (3) scenario, there are 25 owners, each control-
ling four firms. In the fourth (4) scenario, there are 20 owners, each controlling five
firms. And in the fifth (5) scenario there are 10 owners, each controlling 10 firms.
This last scenario represents the highest degree of owner diversification.
Figure 1.9 shows that investment and output is increasing in the degree of
owner diversification. Investment and output are lowest in the scenario in which
firms are controlled by owners holding only one firm and highest in the scenario
23The model is simulated for 5,000 periods. The figures report the average value of sectoral
output and investment for the last 200 period
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in which firms are controlled by owners holding 10 firms. Under scenario 1, the
investment in each of the 100 firms is x = 0.20, which reflects the optimal investment
of the 100 investors that hold one firm each. Under scenario 5, the investment in
each of the 100 firms is x = 0.99, which reflects the optimal investment of the 10
investors that hold 10 firms each. As a consequence, aggregate investment is 20 in
scenario 1 and 99 in scenario 5. Investment is successful in approximately 60% of
firms in each case. As a consequence, output is approximately 11 under scenario 1
and 13 under scenario 5. Because the model is stylized, and the aggregation exercise
ignores general equilibrium effects, the takeaway is qualitative. Sectors characterized
by higher average diversification are associated with higher risky investment and
output, which is qualitatively consistent with the sector-level findings documented
empirically.





























1 2 3 4 5
Scenario
Notes: The figure in the left panel plots total investment on the y-axis for five different scenarios.
The figure in the right panel plots the total output on the y-axis for five different scenarios. In
scenario 1 there are 100 owners each holding one firm; in scenario 2 there are 50 owners each
holding two firms; in scenario 3 there are 25 owners each holding four firms; in scenario 4 there are
20 owners each holding five firms; and in scenario 5 there are 10 owners each holding ten firms.
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1.6 Conclusion
Recent work establishes that risky innovation contributes disproportionately
to aggregate growth (Akcigit and Kerr (2018)). The factors that incentivize firms
to engage in this type of innovation are not yet fully understood. In this paper, I
study owner diversification, which prior literature emphasizes as an important de-
terminant of firm decisions-making. In particular, I examine whether firms held by
owners with more diversified business interests engage in riskier innovation, whether
the relationship arises through risk-sharing channel, and whether the firm-level re-
lationship has implications for sector-level outcomes.
I first tackle the question empirically. To do so, I construct a novel dataset
that combines ownership information from Moody’s Bureau van Dijk database for a
a sample of privately-held and publicly-listed U.S. firms, with patenting data from
the USPTO and other firm-level data from the Census Bureau. The data provide a
rich set of time varying firm-level and owner-level controls. The panel nature of the
data also allow me to exploit variation in risky patenting within firms and variation
in diversification within owners over time. In a first-difference specification that
accounts for both time-varying and time-invariant firm and owner characteristics,
I show that higher owner diversification incentivizes more risky innovation. The
results can be interpreted as causal as long as owner diversification and remaining
unobserved firm and owner characteristics are orthogonal. To address an alterna-
tive story that posits the positive relationship arises solely from riskier innovation
incentivizing higher owner diversification, I show that changes in risky innovation
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are higher among firms held by initially more diversified owners. The rich set of con-
trols and the empirical approaches employed in this paper lend credence to a causal
interpretation of the empirical findings. The results provide new evidence on the im-
portance of owner diversification in incentivizing risky innovation and pave the way
for studying the relevance of the risk-sharing channel and aggregate implications of
owner diversification.
To test whether the positive relationship between owner diversification and
risky innovation arises due to risk-sharing, I classify owners as individuals, corpo-
rations, and institutional owners. Individual owners are most exposed to firm-level
risk, followed by corporations and institutional owners. Consistent with the risk-
sharing mechanism, I document that the positive relationship between risky innova-
tion and owner diversification is strongest among firms held by individual owners. To
examine the sector-level implications of owner diversification, I exploit cross-sector
variation and document a positive relationship between sector-level diversification
and risky innovation, revenue, and revenue growth, after accounting fixed effects
that account for industry-specific and aggregate conditions.
The empirical results suggest that the risk-sharing channel plays a role in
firms’ risky innovation decisions. I develop a stylized model in which I take a stand
on the direction of causality and show how higher owner diversification leads to
riskier investment. The model features risk-averse owners, multi-firm ownership,
and risky productivity-enhancing investment. Because investment outcomes are
uncertain and uncorrelated across firms, owners face idiosyncratic risk from the
firms in their portfolio. Through the lens of this simple model, I show that consistent
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with the firm-level empirical findings, more diversified owners find safety in variety
and choose riskier investment because they are better able to share idiosyncratic
risk across the firms they hold. Moreover, through a simple partial equilibrium
aggregation exercise, I show that consistent with my sector-level empirical findings,
higher sector level diversification endogenously gives rise to higher investment and
output.
In this paper, I establish owner diversification as an important factor in facil-
itating risky innovation. My findings suggest promising areas for future research.
The stylized model introduced in this paper can be embedded into a standard firm
dynamics model in order to study the quantitative implications of owner diversi-
fication for aggregate innovation and growth. Empirically, the newly constructed
data can be used to study whether owner diversification matters for other risky
investment strategies, such as expansion into new domestic and foreign markets.
It can also illuminate whether owners’ internal networks facilitate firm-level invest-
ment and innovation through technology spillovers and vertical integration. This
paper and complementary lines of research provide important and interesting new
insights into how ownership structure affects firms’ willingness and ability to under-
take growth-enhancing investments.
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Chapter 2: Leverage over the Life Cycle & Implications for Firm
Growth & Shock Responsiveness1
2.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature studying the growth and employment dynamics
of the U.S. firms over their life-cycle. Far less is known about how these firms
finance their growth. Much of what is known about firms’ financing behavior derives
from publicly-listed, relatively large and old firms in Compustat. Yet, the behavior
of private firms, which are much younger and smaller on average, has important
macroeconomic implications since these firms account over 70 percent of aggregate
US employment and over 55 percent of aggregate US gross output, and they are the
ones that are most susceptible to the effects of financial shocks that impede lending
and borrowing.2
Our aim in this paper is to better understand how firms at different points in
their life-cycle choose to (or are able to) finance their operations and the implications
1This chapter is coauthored with Emin Dinlersoz, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Henry Hyatt.
2As we show in detail in our data section below, between 2005 and 2012, listed, non-financial
firms accounted for around 25 percent of domestic employment and 46 percent of domestic gross
output in the U.S. Using financial data for private non-financial firms in the United Kingdom,
Zeltin-Jones and Shourideh (2016) documents that private firms finance nearly 80 percent of their
investment using financial markets compared to only 20 percent among listed firms, and private
firms disproportionately account for the transmission of financial shocks to the economy.
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of this life-cycle financing on firm growth and responsiveness to aggregate shocks.
We construct a new data set on firm financing over the life-cycle using balance
sheets of both publicly-traded and privately-held firms matched to the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). We refer to our new data set as
LOCUS, that combines LBD, “L”, with balance sheet data of privately-held firms
from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis, “O”, and publicly-listed firms from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat, “C”, for the United States, “US”. Our new data set, LOCUS, allows
us to compare the relatively understudied behavior of leverage for private firms
with that of the large listed firms, which has been the main focus of the existing
literature. We explore leverage both in cross-section and over time, as a function of
the life-cycle dynamics of firms – proxied by their age and size. Once we establish
these patterns, we focus on the implications of firms’ financing on their growth and
their response to shocks, particularly to the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
The firm dynamics literature has established that, conditional on age, firm
growth is negatively related to the size of the firm. It is also the case that condi-
tional on size, firm growth is negatively related to the age of the firm (e.g. Davis et
al. (1996)). Benchmark models of firm growth, such as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopen-
hayn (1982), cannot account for these conditional dependencies. In such models,
firms of the same age experience the same growth rate independently of their size.
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) show that adding financial frictions to these models
in the form of costly default and equity issuance can account for these life-cycle
dynamics, since financial frictions cause firm size to depend not only on firm’s pro-
ductivity but also on equity. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) can also account
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for the firm dynamics observed in the data, though in their model financial frictions
arise due to imperfect enforceability.
We can test main predictions of these firm dynamics models with financial
frictions using our new U.S. firm-level data, LOCUS. This exercise will lead to two
main contributions that are relevant for the literatures both on firm dynamics and
financial frictions. First, despite having plausible theoretical mechanisms for gen-
erating realistic firm dynamics, there is very little evidence on the role of financial
frictions in these dynamics. Second, models of financial frictions have very different
predictions on how firms of different ages and sizes will borrow, and why. For ex-
ample, the models of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004) predict different relationships between firm size and leverage. The former
model implies that smaller, younger and more productive firms have higher lever-
age, and leverage declines over time as firms increase their equity. Hence, size and
leverage are negatively associated conditional on age and productivity. In contrast,
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) implies that larger and more productive firms
have larger projects financed with long-term debt. Over time as firms’ equity grow,
firms pay down their long-term debt, which relaxes the borrowing constraint on
the short-term debt. Therefore, as firms grow, they incur more short-term debt,
leading to a positive relation between firm size and leverage based on short term
debt. Total leverage (sum of short-term and long-term debt) and size might still be
negatively related. Both of these models also predict a negative relation between
age and leverage since young firms borrow more. There are other models of financial
frictions such as Buera and Moll (2015) that assume that firms operate a constant
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returns technology and hence all firms have the same borrowing limit, and there is
no heterogeneity in firm leverage by firm age and size.
Our results show extensive heterogeneity in leverage by firm age and size
among private firms.3 In the cross section of private firms, larger firms are more
leveraged regardless of the maturity of the debt and they have less equity as a frac-
tion of their assets. Over time, as private firms get older, their leverage decreases,
both in terms of short-term and long-term debt, and their equity increases as a frac-
tion of assets. Small private firms are the least leveraged, but young private firms
are the most leveraged, indicating that size and age have different relationships
with leverage for private firms. The negative relationship between age and leverage
is most likely driven by firms starting out at a size that is below their efficient scale,
and so new firms choose to borrow more than older firms.
For public firms, the relationship between short-term leverage and size is weak
and slightly negative. In contrast, very large public firms have high leverage in terms
of long-term debt. This compositional effect results in no robust relation between
total leverage and size for public firms. At the same time, equity-size relationship
has an inverted U-shape for public firms. Since these firms have access to external
equity via stock issuances, they issue less external equity and turn toward long-term
debt borrowing as they become larger. Compared to private firms, the relation-
ship between age and leverage is far weaker among public firms for all measures
of leverage. Public firms appear to slightly reduce their equity as they age, which
3The relationships between leverage and size (or age) are conditional on all other firm-level
observables that can influence leverage, which we control for in our analysis.
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is consistent with them being leveraged in long term debt as they grow older and
become larger.
What do these result imply for firm growth and response to aggregate shocks?
Borrowing constraints of firms play a critical role in macroeconomic analyses when
there are financial frictions. In the models such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
cash flows determine the constraint, whereas the liquidation value of physical assets
that firms can pledge as collateral is important in models such as Hart and Moore
(1994); Schliefer and Vishny (1992); Bernanke and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), Mendoza (2010), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Moll (2014), Buera
and Moll (2015), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).4
No matter how the borrowing constraint is determined, this literature typically
abstracts from firm heterogeneity and firm dynamics to mainly focus on short-term
borrowing behavior represented by a one-period borrowing constraint that limits
the amount a representative firm can borrow to some linear function of its assets.
The constraint can also include the aggregate price of capital as in Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Virgiliu and Xu (2014).
At the same time, a large body of work in macro and corporate finance lit-
eratures seeks to understand the effect of firm heterogeneity on sales, investment,
and employment responses of firms to aggregate shocks, where these shocks lead
to tightening of credit such as financial crises or contractionary monetary policy.
Models such as Cooley et al. (2004), Khan and Thomas (2013), Gopinath et al.
4Lian and Ma (2015) show that, in a sample of listed firms, large firms’ constraints are deter-
mined by cash flows, whereas small firms are more dependent on asset values.
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(2017), Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Dinlersoz et al. (2017) put
firm heterogeneity at the heart of financial constraints. These constraints play an
important role in the propagation of aggregate shocks. The seminal work by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), shows that adverse shocks are propagated via small firms’ con-
straints in access to capital markets; that is, the financial accelerator mechanism
works via credit constraints for small firms.
The empirical literature is divided on the role of heterogeneity in the trans-
mission of monetary policy. While there are many empirical papers using data on
listed firms from Compustat that show a higher sensitivity of small firms to credit
tightening measured as recessions or monetary policy tightening (e.g. Farre-Mensa
and Ljungqvist (2016), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Whited and Wu (2006)), there
are others that use confidential data on select private firms from QFR database of
Census Bureau and show that large firms respond more in terms of sales, inven-
tories, short-term debt and employment (e.g. Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017), Chari
et al. (2013)).5 Even if small firms are more sensitive to shocks, the difference is
not meaningful economically and also cannot be explained by financial frictions as
shown by Crouzet and Mehrotra (2017). Using aggregate public data from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2012) also find that in the previous recessions, large firms suffered more than small
firms in terms of employment; a finding confirmed by Kudlyak and Sanchez (2017)
for the Great Recession. Fort et al. (2013) argue that this literature fails to separate
5The latter paper shows that greater sensitivity of small firms is not robust to all time periods
and in most recessions since 1950s the response of small and large firms were similar.
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the role of age and size.6 In particular, QFR does not contain measures of firms’ age,
whereas Compustat does not include age and it measures employment using a firm’s
global operations, not just the U.S. domestic employment. LBD and BDS databases
of the Census Bureau, instead, provide both domestic employment and age measures
for all private and public firms in the U.S. This coverage is key since different shocks
(financial versus demand) and different cyclical episodes (monetary policy changes
versus unemployment spells) might affect the response of small and large firms dif-
ferentially conditional on their age. Using BDS and focusing on a longer time span,
Fort et al. (2013) find that young/small business are more sensitive to businesses
cycle shocks.
It has also proven difficult to map firm size to financial constraints via variables
on actual borrowing such as leverage, short-term debt and liquid assets. Crouzet
and Mehrotra (2017) shows that there is no difference by firm size in the behavior of
short-term debt and bank debt as a response to business cycles. On the other hand,
matching listed firms from Compustat to their establishments in LBD data, Giroud
and Mueller (2017) show that firm leverage is important in propagation and when
house prices dropped employment fell significantly more in establishments belonging
to more leveraged listed firms. Jeenas (2018), using listed firms from Compustat,
shows that highly leveraged firms are more responsive to monetary policy shocks in
terms of investment, since they decrease investment more after a monetary policy
contraction. Using Compustat data and similar high frequency identification of
monetary policy shocks, Ottonello and Winberry (2018) find exact opposite result
6For instance, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) does not condition on age.
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that highly leveraged firms are less responsive to monetary policy shocks, that is,
after a monetary policy contraction, these firms invest more. Papers that identify
credit supply shocks directly show that small and young firms are affected more
by such shocks (e.g. Chodorow-Reich (2014), Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2017),
Gilchrist et al. (2018).)
We argue that in order to identify the link between firm size, leverage and
financial constraints, three ingredients are key: First, one has to condition on age.
Second, the dataset has to encompass full size distribution covering the range of
small firms, and third, size should be measured with employment. We believe,
most of the previous findings in the literature reflect differences in the growth and
financing policies of firms at different stages of firms’ lifecycles. Firms’ need for
internal versus external finance will vary with their lifecycle and firms which use
external finance will be more susceptible to credit shocks. In that sense, large firms,
by having a greater access to credit, might be more negatively impacted during
periods of credit crunch. On the other hand, very large firms can also substitute
between bank and market debt. Similarly, very small firms might have limited access
to credit during both normal times and crisis times and hence hard to identify the
effect of shocks on such firms. As a result, higher leverage in terms of short-term debt
may not be mapped directly to being financially constrained and thus coverage of
both small and large firms is essential.7 Our finding that short-term leverage ratios
7Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018), using ORBIS data for private firms for several European coun-
tries, show that firms who entered the crisis with higher leverage in 2009, decreased their investment
more in the aftermath of the crisis. They also show that larger firms, who invest less during nor-
mal times, invested more during the crisis time. This result supports the conjecture that highly
leveraged firms become financially constrained during the crisis when the credit conditions tighten.
Not all large firms are highly leveraged and this allows to identify different roles for leverage and
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are higher in larger “private” firms but lower in larger “public firms” supports this
line of argument. And finally, employment is a better measure of size than assets.
Most papers measure size with assets and typical small firm measure of 25th-30th
percentile in sales or assets will correspond to firms with assets less than 1 billion,
which is not small. In addition depending on whether assets are measured at book
value or at market value, a size measure based on assets will fluctuate more (or
less) than a size measure based on employment even though the firm is actually not
growing or shrinking.
In models of financial frictions, firms sometimes do not borrow because they
operate at an efficient scale, and sometimes because they are unable to access credit.
Our finding that leverage ratios are higher in larger firms may be driven by larger
firms having better and larger projects to finance, and therefore demand more credit,
or lenders may be more willing to lend to larger firms and hence small firms are credit
constrained. We argue that size being an important correlate of leverage for private
firms is at least in part driven by credit constraints that differentially affect small
firms. To test this implication, we use the “Great Recession” as a shock to financial
conditions, which can make financial frictions matter more for already constrained
firms and also for firms who become constrained when credit conditions tighten. In
fact, this is exactly what we find. For private firms, it is not only that small firms
have even lower leverage, but also larger private firms are affected from the crisis
and decrease their borrowing relative to their assets. Short-term leverage is more
size in determining investment, where both large and low leveraged firms invest more when credit
frictions tighten.
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strongly associated with size in the pre-crisis period than during the crisis period,
i.e. the size differential contracts during the crisis. This finding is similar to the
papers that find that larger firms respond more to the episodes of credit tightening.
Our results suggest that some firms might be credit constrained both in normal and
crisis times (small private firms) and some firms might become more constrained
during the crisis times (large private firms) and some firms are never appear to be
constrained (large public firms).8
Our results condition on standard determinants of leverage such as collat-
eral/tangibility and sector-year fixed effects and firm-level profitability in order to
account for sector and firm level demand shocks, which allow us to interpret the vari-
ations in actual amount of borrowing stemming mostly from variations in the max-
imum amount firms can borrow (financial constraints), where this amount changes
across firms of different sizes and ages. In other words, our underlying assump-
tion is that, conditional on observables that can affect demand for borrowing, for
a given firm size (or age) level there are enough financially constrained firms that
the average leverage of firms reflects the underlying borrowing constraint for that
level. We also condition on labor productivity as an additional proxy for growth
potential and underlying productivity of firms. The estimates on firms’ productivity
further supports our access to finance/financial frictions interpretation, since more
productive firms, conditional on age and size, have higher short-term leverage as
predicted, but only if these firms are private firms. There is no relation between
8Using financial data from the universe of firms in Canada, Huynh et al. (2018) obtain results
that are similar to our results from the U.S. They find that private firms have more leverage than
public firms, driven by the fact that private firms rely more on short-term debt compared to public
firms.
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productivity and short-term leverage for public firms. Productive public firms have
higher leverage based on long-term debt, whereas the relationship between produc-
tivity and long-term leverage is insignificant for private firms. These results suggest
that smaller private firms have more difficulty accessing long-term financing, even
if they are productive. The firm fixed effect panel specification that uses “within”
variation show the robust relationship between firm size and short-term leverage,
further supporting our interpretation. This result is noteworthy since in general
the literature using listed firms find very persistent patterns in leverage, where firm
fixed effects specifications lead to insignificant connection between leverage and its
determinants, collateral, profitability and size (e.g. Lemmon et al. (2008).)
Our results in terms of firm growth are as follows. We show that leverage
and firm growth are strongly positively correlated for private firms in the cross
section both during normal times and during the crisis. In the firm fixed effect
panel specifications, this positive result weakens during the crisis, which suggests
that financial constraints might become more binding for a larger set of private firms
during the crisis. If these firms finance their growth with leverage during normal
times and cannot borrow as much during crisis times, then the relation between
growth and leverage should become weaker, when we identify this relation from
within firm variation. By contrast, public firms’ growth is negatively related to
their short-term leverage in normal times and this relation is not affected by the
crisis. This result is consistent with public firms not being financially constrained,
but rather slow-growing large public firms being leveraged. In addition, size has no
differential affect on firm growth during crisis only when we control for short-term
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leverage, which suggest that size is a good predictor of financial constraints that is
captured by short-term leverage.
We proceed as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. Section 2.3 describes
the data and presents detailed statistics on the share of aggregate US economic
activity accounted by listed firms. Section 2.4 describes the empirical methodology
and results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature
In this section, we provide a brief survey of the literatures that our paper
relates to. We start with the literature on firm borrowing and financial constraints
and its implications on how firm age and firm size may be related to both the
borrowing behavior and the financial constraints firms face.
A large number of studies have proposed models in which agents borrow in
order to finance projects. Contributions such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce financial frictions into standard macroeco-
nomic models and demonstrate that financial frictions have substantial ability to
amplify business cycle fluctuations.9 In most models, the borrowing constraint takes
the generic form
bt ≤ θkt (2.1)
where t denotes time, bt is debt, kt is capital (or assets) and θ is a constant
9Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) propose an extension of their representative agent framework in
which only some firms have investment opportunities in any given period while those firms without
investment opportunities will pay down their debts. This extension of their model therefore might
predict a positive relationship between borrowing and size.
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that limits debt to a fraction of assets. Capital can be a function of aggregate prices
(e.g. kt(Pt)), in order to generate the financial accelerator mechanism via valuation
of assets. Another version of this constraint may include interest rate, Rt. In that
case the constraint can be written as
Rtbt ≤ θkt (2.2)
Most of these models abstract from entry, firm growth and exit, and make no
predictions about the relationship between borrowing and firm age. Other contri-
butions in the macro literature, such as Mendoza (2010) and Jermann and Quadrini
(2012), employ representative agent models and do not make cross-sectional predic-
tions about the relationship between size and borrowing behavior. In such models,
the borrowing constraint binds, bt = θkt. Clearly, this class of models will imply
constant leverage in the cross-section of firms. Given the firm-level heterogeneity in
the data, we explore a model in which there is such heterogeneity.
There is a set of models that introduce heterogeneity in productivity among
firms. This heterogeneity leads to a firm size distribution. However, when firms
operate constant returns to scale technologies, firms borrow as much as they can
up to a borrowing constraint. This is the case in models such as Moll (2014) and
Buera and Moll (2015), where firms always borrow as much as they can, implying
that the ratio of borrowing to total assets, and hence leverage, does not vary among
active firms, and the leverage is the same for firms of different sizes. Hence, it is not
possible to obtain predictions about differences in cross-sectional financial frictions
relating to firm size and firm leverage.
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Richer predictions on how borrowing behavior may be related to firm size and
firm age come from the smaller set of studies in which firms operate decreasing
returns to scale technologies. For instance, Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Khan and
Thomas (2013), and Crouzet and Mehrotra (2017) introduce financial frictions into
models of industry dynamics. A decreasing returns to scale technology is also a
common modeling choice in the entrepreneurship and occupational choice literature
as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Buera and Shin (2013), Bassetto et al. (2015), and
Dinlersoz et al. (2017).10 In most of these models, the borrowing constraint a firm
faces is specified again as a short term (one-period) constraint, where borrowing is
limited to some multiple of the entrepreneur’s current capital or assets. The multiple
can be a constant (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006)), as in the above equations, or a more general function of the
firm’s productivity or capital stock (e.g. Virgiliu and Xu (2014), Khan and Thomas
(2013)).11
These models generally imply that entrepreneurs with more productive (larger)
projects take out larger loans than those with less productive (smaller) ones, and
with predictions about borrowing behavior by firms as they age and grow.12 Decreas-
10While some models assume all firms employ a decreasing returns to scale technology, models
such as Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Bassetto et al. (2015), and Dinlersoz et al. (2017) distinguish
between an entrepreneurial sector in which firms are operated by households using a decreasing
returns to scale technology, and a corporate sector which is characterized by a constant returns to
scale technology. In these models, financial constraints apply only to the entrepreneurial sector.
11In Gopinath et al. (2017), although firms operate under CRS, the limit on borrowing is a
convex function of firm’s capital, implying that the constraint on borrowing relaxes as a firm
grows, but at a decreasing rate. This models also implies larger firms are more leveraged.
12In some of these models, there is an important distinction between the predictions on firm size
unconditionally, and conditional on age. Because all firms start out small, the set of large firms
contains many that have paid off their debts. Hence, borrowing declines in firm size in Figure 3
of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) (page 1296). But conditional on age, firms that borrow more are
those that experience better productivity shocks.
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ing returns to scale implies that firms have an optimal size, and as firms approach
this size, the incentive to borrow and the amount borrowed as a fraction of firm’s
assets naturally lessens. A natural prediction of these models is that firm leverage
should be decreasing in age.13
Models in which entrepreneurs operate such decreasing returns to scale tech-
nologies make more ambiguous predictions about how borrowing will vary by firm
size, which also vary with specific modeling choices. In most such models, busi-
nesses with better ideas will want to borrow more than those with worse ideas. In
most cases, this leads to larger businesses having more leverage, at least very soon
after entry. Indeed, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) argue that the vast majority of en-
trepreneurs do not require a large loan to operate their businesses at an efficient
scale and so are not credit constrained. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) reconcile this
finding with this class of models via a calibration in which only the largest businesses
are affected by credit constraints because most business owners provide all needed
finance. The longer term differential depends on the speed of debt repayment. How-
ever, this size-leverage depends on the way that financial frictions are modeled. In
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) financial frictions are modeled via default risk that is
priced with an interest rate differential rather than a borrowing limit. Financial
intermediaries share the costs of default, which in turn induces smaller, riskier busi-
nesses of any age to borrow more. However, when financial intermediaries choose
the size of loans (i.e., have a borrowing limit that is endogenously determined) as
13A similar approach is taken by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). In their framework like many
others with a concave production technology, firms start with a large initial investment pay down
their debts over time. However, heterogeneity among firms is beyond the scope of their study and
so does not offer predictions of borrowing where size is conditional on age.
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in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), more productive businesses may be allowed
a higher leverage ratio than smaller ones since they are further away from the exit
threshold.
A smaller number of studies on financial frictions endogeneize borrowing and
distinguish between short term and long term debt, including Diamond (1991),
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), and Alfaro et al. (2016). The model in Albu-
querque and Hopenhayn (2004) features firm dynamics that is driven by a sequence
of revenue shocks over time, which generates predictions regarding borrowing be-
havior and constraints by firm size and age over the life-cycle of firms. A firm needs
to raise an initial amount of capital to start operation, and may also need to bor-
row in subsequent periods to finance production. Rather than being exogenously
given, borrowing constraints naturally arise due to the limited enforcement of con-
tract between the firm and the lender, and the resulting incentives – the lender does
not necessarily provide all the startup capital to the firm in order to prevent the
entrepreneur from running away with some of that capital. Importantly, the model
distinguishes between short term and long term debt, which are both endogenously
determined and related to each other. As a firm grows, it builds equity, and grad-
ually pays down its debt. The higher a firm’s long term debt, the less capital it is
able to borrow for current production, resulting in a negative relationship between
long term and short term debt. Firms therefore aim to pay their long term debt as
quickly as possible to render short term borrowing constraint non-binding.
The Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) model has several predictions on the
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firm life-cycle dynamics of debt.14 Firms with prospects of better revenue (pro-
ductivity) shocks and growth opportunities are associated with more debt initially,
exhibit lower failure rates, pay off their long-term debt faster, and eliminate their
short-term borrowing constraint quicker. At any point in time, larger firms have
more leverage and long-term debt, conditional on the revenue shock. As the equity
of an entrepreneur grows, debt maturity also changes: short-term debt increases
relative to the long-term debt. In general, short term borrowing constraints relax as
a firm grows, and firms can eventually become non-dependent on external financing
as they continue to pay off long term debt and the accumulated equity becomes
sufficient to finance the firm. Therefore, conditional on the size of the firm, older
firms have lower debt.
Most models in this literature impose a short-term borrowing constraint repre-
sented by a one-period limit on how much a firm can borrow to finance production.
The predictions from models that feature firms with a constant returns to scale
technology and a borrowing limit that is independent of firm size are rather stark
and suggest that firm borrowing behavior should be independent of firm size.
Our paper is also related to a large literature that tries to understand the
determinants of listed firms’ balance sheet structure and its effects on investment
and hiring decisions. The seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1995), using data
14Here, we note the model’s general predictions. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) also
specify a special case in which lenders coordinate on both the availability of credit as well as the
borrowing limit, in which case overall debt can be written as a sequence of short-term contracts, and
the model exhibits dynamics of total debt in which the borrowing constraint can be characterized
by Equation 2.1, where θ is a function of prior borrowing, and the firm’s productivity draw. But
in their more general case, a firm’s level of long-term debt is given by an incentive compatible
sequence of repayments that solve a recursively defined default problem, and only short-term debt
is characterized as in Equation 2.1.
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on non-financial publicly listed firms in G-7 countries in late 1980s, document that
size, profitability, and collateral are the most important determinants of leverage of
firms. More recently, Custodio et al. (2012) document a rising reliance on short-
term debt among U.S. listed firms, particularly driven by small firms who face higher
information asymmetry and choose to issue more public equity. Ajello (2016) finds
that between 1989 and 2008, thirty-five percent of U.S. listed firms’ investment
is funded using financial markets. Similar to Ajello (2016), Covas and Den Haan
(2012) show listed firms finance investment with both debt and equity, and that
both forms of financing are more pro-cyclical for smaller listed firms. Begenau and
Salomao (2015) find that while large firms are able to substitute between debt and
equity over the business cycle, small firms’ debt and equity are both procyclical.
2.3 Data
We argue that a new database is needed that covers the financial accounts of
private firms since listed firms in the U.S., account a small of portion of the economic
activity. Between 2000 and 2013, around 6,600 firms were actively publicly traded
annually, which accounts for a mere 0.13 percent of all firms in the economy.15 Less
clear is the fraction of employment and revenue that these firms account for. This
15The 6,600 figure is arrived at by beginning with Compustat and 1) keeping one observation
per (gvkey, year) pair; 2) keeping (gvkey, year) pairs with a positive security price in the indicated
year or in the years that bracket the indicated year, as in Davis et al. (2006); 3) dropping financial
instruments (ETFs, ADRs, etc), which involves dropping observations with missing NAICS codes
and those with NAICS equal to 525; 4) dropping non-U.S. firms, which involves dropping observa-
tions with simultaneously missing EIN and state information or those with simultaneously missing
EIN and a non-U.S. address; and 5) dropping firms in public administration (NAICS code 92).
The 0.13 percent figure is arrived at by dividing 6,600 by 5,020,309, which is the average number
of firms in the U.S. economy between 2000 and 2013 derived from the Census Bureau’s Business
Dynamic Statistics data.
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section attempts to shed light on this topic by relying primarily on publicly-available
data.
Total U.S. employment is obtained from the Census Bureau’s Business Dy-
namic Statistics (BDS). The BDS is derived from the LBD and covers 98 percent of
private employment. Data are available annually and can be broken down by firm
size, age, location, and sector. This section uses the economy wide and sector tables.
The total employment reported in the economy wide table is used to calculate the
contribution of listed firms to total U.S. employment. The sector table includes 9
broad sectors – agriculture, forestry, and fishing (AGR); mining (MIN); construction
(CON); manufacturing (MAN); transportation, communication and public utilities
(TCU); wholesale trade (WHO); retail trade (RET); finance, insurance, and real
estate (FIRE); and services (SRV). This table is used to calculate the contribution
of non-FIRE listed firms to total non-FIRE U.S. employment by taking the total
employment reported in the economy-wide table and subtracting from it employ-
ment in FIRE reported in the sector table. The second statistic is reported because
this paper focuses on the non-financial sector.16
Total U.S. gross output is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’
Industry Economic Accounts. Gross output measures sales, including those to both
final users and other industries and is measured in current prices.17 Total gross
16This paper excludes only the finance and insurance sectors (NAICS code 52). The BDS groups
finance and insurance (NAICS 52) with real estate, rental and leasing (NAICS 53). As a result,
when calculating the contribution listed firms to employment and revenue in non-financial sectors,
this section excludes FIRE (NAICS codes 52 and 53) from data informing both the numerator
(Compustat) and denominator (BDS and BEA).
17Given the BEA definition of gross output, this measure corresponds to the revenue variable
observed in Compustat. While the BEA provides data on gross output, other sources such as the
BLS do not include this variable.
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output by private industries is used in calculating the contribution of listed firms to
total U.S. gross output. Total gross output by private industries net of the finance,
insurance, real estate, rental and leasing sectors (FIRE) is used in calculate the
contribution of non-FIRE listed firms to total non-FIRE U.S. gross output.
Calculating the contribution of listed firms to U.S. employment and gross
output is not straightforward for two reasons. First, not all firms in Compustat
are actively traded. Following Davis et al. (2006), this paper defines active listed
firms as those with a positive security price in a particular year or in the years that
bracket that year. Second, and more importantly, as noted in Davis et al. (2006),
while the LBD measures the total number of employees that are subject to U.S.
payroll taxes and total domestic revenue, Compustat measures the total number of
employees and revenue of domestic and foreign subsidiaries. These differences in
the concepts give rise to discrepancies between the LBD and Compustat reported
employment and revenue. Similar to Davis et al. (2006), this paper compares the
LBD and Compustat employment and revenue of matched firms. Between 2007
and 2013, LBD employment is only 75 percent of Compustat employment and LBD
revenue is only 79 percent of Compustat revenue. It is therefore important to
adjust the employment and revenue reported in Compustat when calculating the
contribution of listed firms to the U.S. economy because the BDS measures only
domestic employment and the BEA measures only domestic gross output.
To highlight the importance of taking into consideration these two factors, this
paper reports several alternative measures of listed firms’ contribution to the U.S.
economy:
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1. The first version (labeled ”raw” in the figures) sums Compustat reported em-
ployment (variable emp) and revenue (variable revt) across all listed firms and
divides it by total BDS employment and BEA gross output.18
2. The second version (labeled ”active” in the figures) sums Compustat reported
employment and revenue across all actively traded listed firms and divides it
by total BDS employment and BEA gross output.
3. The third version (labeled ”active & adjusted” in the figures) sums Compustat
sums adjusted (by a factor 0.75) employment and adjusted (by a factor 0.79)
revenue across all actively traded listed firms and divides it by total BDS
employment and BEA gross output.
Figure 2.1 reports the contribution of listed firms to private sector employ-
ment. The left panel depicts the contribution of listed firms to total private sector
employment and the right panel depicts the contribution of non-FIRE listed firms
to non-FIRE private sector employment. Note first that in both the left and right
panels the contribution has remained quite stable over the entire period 2000-2013.
In the left panel, Compustat firms appear to account for around 37% of private
sector employment on average when no adjustments are made for active trading
and foreign employment. This average falls to 34% if only actively-traded firms are
considered and falls further still to 26% when the domestic employment of actively
18The listed firms that are included are obtained by starting with Compustat and 1) keeping one
observation per (gvkey, year); 2) dropping financial instruments (ETFs, ADRs, etc)which involves
dropping observations with missing NAICS codes and those with NAICS equal to 525; 3) dropping
non-U.S. firms, which involves dropping observations with simultaneously missing EIN and state
information and those with simultaneously missing EIN and a non-U.S. address; and 5) dropping
firms in public administration (NAICS code 92).
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traded firms is considered. The right panel focuses on the non-FIRE private sector
and here non-FIRE, actively traded listed firms account for around 25% of annual
non-FIRE private sector employment.































Notes: The left figure plots the contribution of listed firms to private sector employment.
The right figure plots the contribution of non-FIRE listed firms to non-FIRE private sector
employment. Listed firm employment is obtained from Compustat (revt variable) and private
sector employment is obtained from the Census Bureau’s BDS tables. In each figure the dashed
grey line depicts the raw Compustat employment for listed firms over BDS employment; the
dashed red line depicts the raw Compustat employment for actively traded listed firms over
BDS employment; and the solid blue line depicts the adjusted (by a factor of 0.75) Compustat
employment for actively traded listed firms over gross BDS employment.
Figure 2.2 reports the contribution of listed firms to private sector gross output.
The left panel depicts the contribution of listed firms to total private sector gross
output and the right panel depicts the contribution of non-FIRE listed firms to non-
FIRE private sector gross output. Similar to the employment contribution depicted
in the previous figure, in both the left and right panels the contribution of listed
firms is fairly stable over time. In the left panel, Compustat firms appear to account
for around 63% of private sector gross output on average when no adjustments are
made for active trading and foreign employment. This average falls to 56% if only
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actively-traded firms are considered and falls further still to 44% when the domestic
gross output of actively traded firms is considered. The right panel focuses on the
non-FIRE private sector and here non-FIRE, actively traded listed firms account for
around 46% of annual non-FIRE private sector gross output. Both figures confirm
that publicly-traded firms account for an important share of the U.S. economy, but
that privately-held firms account for the majority of employment (74%) and gross
output (56%).



































Notes: The left figure plots the contribution of listed firms to private sector gross output. The
right figure plots the contribution of non-FIRE listed firms to non-FIRE private sector gross out-
put. Listed firm gross output is obtained from Compustat (revt variable) and private sector gross
output is obtained from the BEA’s Industry Economic Accounts tables. In each figure the dashed
grey line depicts the raw Compustat gross output for listed firms over BEA gross output; the
dashed red line depicts the raw Compustat gross output for actively traded listed firms over BEA
gross output; and the solid blue line depicts the adjusted (by a factor of 0.79) Compustat gross
output for actively traded listed firms over gross BEA output.
The U.S. Census Bureau’s LBD has comprehensive data on firm age, em-
ployment and, as of recently, revenue, for the entire universe of private firms, but
lacks information on firm balance sheets.19 Thus, to study the financing behavior
19While listed firms are legally required to disclose their financial statements, private firms
are not. As a result, Compustat, which covers the universe of listed firms in the U.S., has been
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of private firms in the U.S. and to verify predictions arising from the literature on
financial frictions, we construct a new data set by matching LBD data to Orbis and
Compustat using both national firm-level identifiers and an iterative probabilistic
name and address matching procedure.20 From the LBD we obtain information on
firm employment, revenue, age, industry, and legal form. Our financial data on
listed firms come from Compustat, and our financial data on private firms come
from the Orbis database. Both sources contain detailed firm-level balance sheets,
income statements, and profit and loss accounts. Orbis is compiled by Bureau van
Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD), a Moody’s company. Firm-level administrative
data is first collected by local Chambers of Commerce and the business register. The
data are then relayed to BvD through 40 different information providers. Although
private company reporting is voluntary in the U.S., we show that LOCUS covers
more firms than other data sets provided by alternative private vendors.
Research on the financing behavior of private firms has thus far relied on two
types of data. The first type includes SDC VentureXpert and CapitalIQ, which focus
on private equity issuances and buyouts. As a result, they provide no information
on bank debt, and only include the very small sample of firms that raise private
equity.21 The second type of data used to study private firms focuses on very small
and very young businesses. The Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) is a
extensively relied upon in the literature to study firm financial structure and aggregate implications
of financial frictions.
20Please refer to appendix B.2 for additional details on the matching procedure.
21Bernstein et al. (2016b) uses VentureXpert to analyze how monitoring by venture capitalists
affects the innovation and growth of 23,000 venture-backed companies between 1977 and 2006.
Davis et al. (2014) use CapitalIQ to track changes in jobs and productivity among a sample of
3,200 firms targeted for leveraged buyouts between 1980 and 2005.
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cross-sectional survey conducted in four waves between 1987 and 2003 by the U.S.
Federal Reserve. The 2003 survey, for instance, sampled under 5,000 firms from a
target population of non-financial firms with less than 500 employees.22 Similarly,
the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) focuses on the experience of young firms. It
tracks a single cohort of 5,000 firms born in 2004 through 2011.23 All these data
cover select set of private firms that are not representative of the US economy and
not span the full firm age and size distributions.
Two exceptions that cover a larger set of private firms over time are the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) survey and Sageworks. The
QFR covers the mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade and select
service sectors. Each quarter it surveys about 4,600 large corporations in these
sectors, in addition to a select sample of approximately 5,000 small and medium
sized firms in the manufacturing sector. It therefore contains detailed balance sheet
information for several thousand private and listed firms across the age and size
distributions in the manufacturing sector. Two features distinguish our data LOCUS
from the QFR. First, LOCUS encompasses a large sample of small and large firms
beyond just the manufacturing sector.24 Second, the QFR can only be linked to
22The SSBF has been used to study borrower-lender relationships as in Petersen and Rajan
(2002) and the capital structure decisions of single-owner corporations as in Ang et al. (2010) and
Cole (2013). Using the 1993 survey, Berger and Udell (1998) show that due to a high degree of
informational opacity, small businesses depend more on funding provided by insiders and receive
external funding primarily from private equity and debt markets, as opposed to the public market.
By linking loan-level data from the Small Business Administration with the LBD, which covers
only very small firms, Brown and Earle (2017) shows that when local credit conditions are weak,
access to SBA loans is associated with job growth.
23Robb and Robinson (2012) use the survey to document the importance of external financing,
such as bank financing, for startups.
24Appendix B.1 shows how the QFR coverage compares to the manufacturing sector in the
LBD, Compustat and our LOCUS data using both revenue and total assets.
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the LBD in Census years to obtain firm employment and age information, which
hinders annual analysis and a full assessment of the representativeness of the QFR
sample as opposed to LOCUS data.
Another proprietary database, Sageworks, contains panel data on over 220,000
listed and private firms. Similar to LOCUS, Sageworks includes information from
firm balance sheets and income statements, as well as industry classification and
geographic location. In contrast to our LOCUS, Sageworks anonymizes firms (Asker
et al., 2015). This feature prevents matching the data to other sources, such as
the LBD, that contain information on age and size (employment), both of which
are thought to be theoretically and empirically crucial for the relationship between
financial constraints and firm dynamics. Additionally, due to inability to match
the data to census, a full assessment of how representative firms in the sample are
relative of the whole U.S. economy cannot be performed.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper that uses ORBIS data for
the U.S. is by Nikolov et al. (2017). However these authors do not match the ORBIS
data to Census data. They show that private firms in ORBIS have higher leverage
relative to the listed firms in Compustat, and are more profitable.
2.3.1 LOCUS Data
In all, our matched LBD-Orbis-Compustat data on U.S. firms (LOCUS) con-
tains over 180,000 unique firms, 97 percent of which are privately held. Our matched
sample covers around 31 percent of U.S. employment, 35 percent of payroll, and 38
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percent of U.S. non-farm, non-financial revenue. Privately held firms in our sample
consistently account for about 10 percent of the U.S. economy. What is perhaps
most striking is how vastly different listed and private firms are. On average, listed
firms in our sample have 34 times larger employment (6,200 employees versus 170
employees) and 64 times higher revenue ($293 million versus $7.7 million) than
privately held firms in our sample.
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Notes: This figure compares the distribution of firm-level employment, obtained from the LBD,
among non-financial employer businesses in 2010 that are in LOCUS (contains both private and
listed firms), Compustat (listed firms only), and LBD. The distributions are generated using kernel
density estimation and the top and bottom tails have been removed to comply with disclosure
requirements
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Notes: This figure compares the distribution of firm-level revenue, obtained from the revenue-
enhanced LBD, among non-financial employer businesses in 2010 that are in LOCUS (contains
both private and listed firms), Compustat (listed firms only), and LBD. The distributions are
generated using kernel density estimation and the top and bottom tails have been removed to
comply with disclosure requirements
Using employment from LBD and revenue from the revenue-enhanced LBD,
figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that our LOCUS data vastly improve the coverage of small
and medium sized firms both in terms of employment and revenue relative to the
sample of listed (Compustat) firms on which the finance and macro-finance liter-
atures are built. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 also illustrate that our LOCUS data is not
representative of the whole U.S. economy. The average employment in LOCUS is
525 versus just 20 in the LBD; and the average age is 21 in LOCUS versus 11 in
the LBD. Additionally, we determine that LOCUS firms have higher employment
growth rates, are more likely to own multiple establishments, and are more likely
to be nonprofits than firms in the LBD. This selection is driven by the fact that
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our sample contains only privately-held firms that report their financials. The non-
representativeness of LOCUS is a concern because we believe that firm financing
decisions are influenced by factors such as age, size, growth and legal form. If we
naively run regressions using the raw, unweighted LOCUS data, we will misrepre-
sent the strength of the relationship between leverage and firm characteristics such
as age and size for the average firm in the economy because the average firm in our
raw data is older, larger and grows faster than the average firm in the U.S. economy.
We are able to address this selection head-on because we matched Orbis to
the LBD, which contains private firms spanning the entire firm age and size distri-
butions. To do so, we run a series of logistic regressions similar to Haltiwanger et al.
(2017) for private firms.25 Our dependent variable is reporting status and is equal
to one for the firm-year observations in LOCUS. To account for the possibility that
selection into our matched data varies for firms continuing, entering and exiting the
universe of employer-businesses, we estimate separate models for each of these cat-
egories. Our regressors are firm employment (log(empi)), age (agei), indicator for
firms 16 years or older (D16i), employment growth rate (EGi, 7 categories) for firm
i, and a series of fixed effects for 3-digit NAICS industry (ind), multi-unit status
(mu), and legal form (lfo, 3 categories).26 The models we estimate in each year
2005 through 2012 for continuers, entrants and exiters are specified below:
25We exclude listed firms from the logistic regressions and assign them a weight of one in our
subsequent analysis because they are required to report financials. As a result, LOCUS include all
identifiable listed firms in the LBD.
26Legal form is divided into three categories – 1) corporation, 2) sole-proprietorship, partnership,
and S-corporation, and 3) non-profits and other legal forms.
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1. Employment continuers:
Rit = α+γ1log(empi) +γ2agei +γ3D16i +γ4EGi + ind+mu+ lfo+ εi (2.3)
2. Employment births:
Rit = α + β1ln(empi) + ind+mu+ lfo+ εi (2.4)
3. Deaths
Rit = α + δ1log(empi) + δ2agei + δ3D16i + ind+mu+ lfo+ εi (2.5)
We use the resulting predicted values to construct propensity scores, which we
use as weights in the remainder of our analysis. As figures 2.5 through 2.7 and tables
2.1 and 2.2 show, this approach substantially decreases the observable differences
between financial reporting and non-reporting privately-held firms once weights are
applied.27 Most noticeably, the weights reduce the over-representation of old, large
and multi-unit firms in the unweighted LOCUS data. The approach also addresses
the over-representation of non-profit firms, which we expect make different financing
decisions than sole-proprietorships, partnerships and corporations.
In table 2.3, we compare the weighted means and standard deviations of key
variables for the public and private firms in LOCUS. In constructing our analysis
data, we winsorize all financial variables – collateral, profitability, equity over total
assets and all leverage variables – at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Listed firms
are 62 times larger than private ones and twice as old. Listed firms also are more
profitable, and have higher collateral, total leverage and financial leverage. When we
decompose leverage into short-term and long-term, private firms have higher short-
27In the figures the height of each bar and in the tables the share reported is the share of each
sample employment accounted for by each group.
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term leverage, while public firms have higher long-term leverage. Private firms also
have higher equity over total assets, could reflect their higher reliance on internal
equity relative to listed firms.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of Firm Age Distributions (% of emp)
Notes: This figure compares the share of sample firm-level employment accounted for by each
age group. The first bar represents all private, non-financial employer businesses in the LBD. The
second bar represents the weighted LOCUS sample of private firms, where the weights are derived
from estimating equations (3) through (5). The third bar represents the unweighted LOCUS
sample of private firms, where each firm gets equal weight.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of Firm Employment Distributions (% of emp)
Notes: This figure compares the share of sample firm-level employment accounted for by each
size group. The first bar represents all private, non-financial employer businesses in the LBD. The
second bar represents the weighted LOCUS sample of private firms, where the weights are derived
from estimating equations (3) through (5). The third bar represents the unweighted LOCUS
sample of private firms, where each firm gets equal weight.
Figure 2.7: Comparison Firm Employment Growth Distributions (% of emp)
Notes: This figure compares the share of sample firm-level employment accounted for by each
employment growth group. The first bar represents all private, non-financial employer businesses
in the LBD. The second bar represents the weighted LOCUS sample of private firms, where the
weights are derived from estimating equations (3) through (5). The third bar represents the
unweighted LOCUS sample of private firms, where each firm gets equal weight.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Multi-unit Status Distributions (% of emp)
LOCUS (unweighted) LOCUS (weighted) LBD
Single-unit 20.73% 46.09% 53.93%
Multi-unit 79.27% 53.91% 46.07%
Notes: This table compares the fraction of sample firm-level employment accounted for by single-
and multi-unit firms. Each column represents a different sample. The first column represents all
private, non-financial employer businesses in the LBD. The second column represents the weighted
LOCUS sample of private firms, where the weights are derived from estimating equations (3)
through (5). The third column represents the unweighted LOCUS sample of private firms, where
each firm gets equal weight.
Table 2.2: Comparison of Legal Form Distributions (% of emp)
LOCUS (unweighted) LOCUS (weighted) LBD
Corp. 42.29% 46.22% 47.31
S-Corp., Sole-prop. & Part. 12.41% 43.71% 36.47
Other 45.3% 10.08% 16.22
Notes: This table compares the fraction of sample firm-level employment accounted for by each
legal form group. Each column represents a different sample. The first column represents all
private, non-financial employer businesses in the LBD. The second column represents the weighted
LOCUS sample of private firms, where the weights are derived from estimating equations (3)
through (5). The third column represents the unweighted LOCUS sample of private firms, where
each firm gets equal weight.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics table
Private Public
mean stdev mean stdev
employment 100 6,200
age 11 24
log(employment) 1.8 1.6 6.3 2.4
log(age) 1.9 1.2 3.0 0.7
collateral 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.23
profitability 0.13 0.40 0.22 0.34
total leverage 0.46 0.38 0.56 0.36
financial leverage 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.24
short-term leverage 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.08
long-term leverage 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.21
equity/total assets 0.48 0.38 0.44 0.36
Notes: This table compares the mean and standard deviation of key variables for private and
public firms. The means and standard deviations are weighted, where the weights are derived
from estimating equations (3) through (5). Employment measures firm-level total employment.
Age measures the firm age. Collateral is measured as tangible fixed assets over total assets.
Profitability is net income over total assets. Total leverage is total liabilities over total assets.
Financial leverage is short-term debt plus long-term debt over total assets. Short-term leverage
is short-term debt over total assets. Long-term leverage is long-term loans over total assets.
Equity/total assets is total shareholder funds over total assets.
2.4 Empirical Methodology and Results
Now that we have accounted for selection and reweighed observations in LO-
CUS, we can proceed with a standard leverage regression of the form:
LEVit =α + (ωs × λt) + β1 log(EMPit) + β2AGEit + β3COLLATit+
β4PROFITit + β5PRODit + εit
(2.6)
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where i is the firm and t is time, measured in years. (ωs×λt) are sector×year
fixed effects, where sector is at the 3-digit level. These fixed effects will account
for any time varying sectoral selection effects. Notice that this regression identifies
from between firm variation since we do not include firm fixed effects. Inclusion
of these fixed effects will render the firm age variable irrelevant since its effect will
be absorbed by firm fixed effects and time dummies. Since we are interested in
the effect of firm age we will run this regression first and afterwards we drop firm
age and introduce firm fixed effects and run a panel version of this regression that
identifies from within variation.
The above regression is a standard firm leverage regression with firm collateral
(COLLATit) and profitability (PROFITit), where we add log(EMPit) and age
(AGEit) as regressors to capture life-cycle characteristics of firms as determinants
of firms leverage. The corporate finance literature also controls for size but mostly
using log(assets) as a proxy for size. Given the valuation effects, employment is a
more appropriate measure of size since book value of assets will not reflect true size
and market value of assets may not reflect true firm growth. The literature also uses
cash flow and Tobin’s Q as measures of productivity and growth potential. Adding
cash flow does not change any of our results. Since 97 percent of our sample is
composed of private firms we will not have a Tobin’s Q measure. Instead, we use
labor productivity (PRODit) to control for growth potential.
We focus on three standard measures of leverage as dependent variables: fi-
nancial debt, short-term debt and long-term debt, each divided by total assets.
Both collateral, and profitability are also normalized by assets. In particular, we
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construct tangible fixed assets to total assets ratio for collateral and net income to
total assets ratio for profitability.28
We run regressions separately for listed and private firms. As shown in table
2.4, among both listed and private firms collateral is positively related to leverage
and profitability is negatively related. These results mimic the results in the previous
literature. The only exception is the negative sign on collateral for the private
firms’ short-term borrowing. This is due to a compositional effect. Total leverage
for private firms, measured as financial debt to total assets, is positively related
to collateral. What may drive the negative coefficient for short-term borrowing is
private firms with a lot of collateral switching from short to long term debt.
The new results here are on firm size and age. As previously mentioned, models
of financial frictions generally focus only on short-term debt, so let us distinguish
between total, short-term and long-term leverage in discussing our results. We
find that firm size, measured as log employment, is positively correlated with firm
leverage for private firms for all forms of debt. A one standard deviation increase
in size is associated with a 24% rise in overall leverage, a 37% rise in short-term
leverage, and a 19% rise in long-term leverage. In contrast, public firms’ size is
negatively correlated with leverage based on short-term debt. In fact, a one standard
deviation increase in size is associated with a 13% decline in short-term leverage
among public firms.
If we focused on only the listed firms, we would conclude that our results
28profits to total assets is the standard measurue of profitability, but the ORBIS data contains
many missing records for profits. Net income over total assets is used instead and for the subsample
for which both profits and net income is available, we verify that there is a high correlation between
profits over total assets and net income over total assets.
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Table 2.4: Leverage Regressions for Private & Listed Firms (2005-2012)
(FD/TAit) (STL/TAit) (LTL/TAit)
Listed Private Listed Private Listed Private
log(EMPit) 0.0178
∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006)
AGEit 0.0007
∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
COLLATit 0.2321
∗∗∗ 0.1861∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗ 0.2023∗∗∗ 0.2118∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0021) (0.0102) (0.0045)
PROFITit -0.1928
∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0688∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗ -0.1178∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0019) (0.0076) (0.0030)
PRODit 0.0061
∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0000
(0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0009)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wgts (logit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 20,000 320,000 20,000 320,000 20,000 320,000
R2 0.2299 0.1525 0.1164 0.0882 0.2275 0.1523
Notes: We consider unbalanced samples of private and publicly-listed firms separately between
the years 2005 and 2012. The dependent variables are financial debt/total assets (FD/TAit) in the
first two columns, short-term debt/total assets (STL/TAit) in the next two columns, and long-
term loans/total assets (LTL/TAit) in the last two columns. The main regressors are log(EMPit)
to measure firm size; AGEit to measure firm age; COLLATit to measure tangible fixed assets over
total assets; PROFITit to measure net income over total assets; and PRODit to measure log labor
productivity. All regressions include a full set of 3-digit industry-year fixed effects. All observations
are weighted to adjust for selection into the LOCUS sample, as detailed in section 2.3. Standard
errors are robust. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,respectively.
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contradict the existing financial frictions literature since this literature (the papers
with firm heterogeneity) predicts small firms have lower short-term leverage and
larger firms have higher short-term leverage. But private firms, which account for
over 60 percent of the economy, tell a different story. The positive correlation
between leverage and size supports models featuring decreasing returns to scale and
models with explicit heterogeneity in borrowing constraints as a function of size and
contradicts models featuring constant returns to scale and a standard borrowing
constraint, which predict no relationship between size and leverage. We interpret
our finding as showing that size is a measure of financial constraints for private
firms but not for listed ones since small private firms cannot borrow short-term
while small listed firms can borrow short-term.
Turning to firm age, we find that it plays no significant role for public firms’
short-term leverage and a slightly positive role in long-term leverage, which is in-
consistent with the theoretical literature predicting a negative relationship. A one
standard deviation increase in listed firm age is associated with roughly a 3% rise
in long-term leverage. Here again, the experience of private firms is crucial. Private
firms borrow more and have higher leverage when they are young. The relation-
ship negative relationship is particularly strong for long-term leverage. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in age is associated with about a 12% decline in short-term
leverage and a 20% decline in long-term leverage. This is consistent with financial
frictions models, which predict, conditional on size, that firms pay down long-term
debt as they age. Once more, these results show that age is not a good proxy for
financial constraints, but rather size appears to be a more appropriate proxy of such
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constraints.
We now verify whether our firm size results hold beyond the cross-sectional
setting. To do so, we drop age as a regressor, lag all regressors by one period, and
introduce firm fixed-effects. That is we run:
LEVit =αi + (ωs × λt) + β1 log(EMPit−1) + +β2COLLATit−1+
β3PROFITit−1 + β4PRODit−1 + εit
(2.7)
We focus on a balanced sub-sample of firms for which we have data over the pe-
riod 2005 through 2011, and run regressions separately for private and listed firms.29
From the theoretical financial frictions literature, we would anticipate that leverage
rises as firms grow due to loosening financial constraints. Since these models pri-
marily focus on short-term lending, we are particularly interested in the relationship
between short-term leverage and size. As table 2.5 shows, we do find that leverage
and employment are positively related in a longitudinal panel setting. This finding
is noteworthy since in the leverage regression upon inclusion of fixed effects, no de-
terminant remains significant in general. As expected, in our case, results are driven
by private firms, which are subject to more financial frictions than listed firms, and
short-term leverage, which is precisely the focus of financial frictions models.
29Orbis coverage of firms in 2012 is limited because it is the end of the data collection period
and there are reporting and data gathering lags. We therefore restrict ourselves to the period
2005–2011 in constructing our balanced sample.
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Table 2.5: Balanced Panel (2005-2011)
(Listed) (Private)
FD/TAit STL/TAit LTL/TAit FD/TAit STL/TAit LTL/TAit
log(EMPit−1) 0.0072 0.0024 0.0025 0.0101 0.0066
∗∗ 0.0027
(0.0057) (0.0024) (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0033) (0.0061)
COLLATit−1 0.1199
∗∗∗ 0.0097 0.1134∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ -0.0019 0.0495∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0156) (0.0333) (0.0141) (0.0101) (0.0148)
PROFITit−1 -0.0516
∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0091 -0.0001 0.0123
(0.0098) (0.0056) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0034) (0.0097)
PRODit−1 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0033 -0.0027 0.0017 -0.0039
(0.0049) (0.0014) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0026) (0.0048)
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wgts (logit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,000 10,000 10,000 19,000 19,000 17,000
R2 0.8637 0.5542 0.8410 0.7720 0.6271 0.7904
Notes: We consider balanced samples of private and publicly-listed firms separately between the
years 2005 and 2011. The dependent variables are financial debt/total assets (FD/TAit), short-
term debt/total assets (STL/TAit), and long-term loans/total assets (LTL/TAit) in the last two
columns. The main regressors are log(EMPit−1) to measure firm size; COLLATit−1 to measure
tangible fixed assets over total assets; PROFITit−1 to measure net income over total assets; and
PRODit−1 to measure log labor productivity. All regressions include a full set of 3-digit industry-
year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All observations are weighted to adjust for selection into
the LOCUS sample, as detailed in section 2.3. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * indicates
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,respectively.
2.4.1 Nonlinear Relationships
To explore possible non-linearities in the relationship between leverage, size
and age we run a series of quadratic regressions. We run the regression specified
in the previous section separately for public and private firms, and introduce a
quadratic term for employment (figures 2.8 through 2.10) or age (figures 2.11 through
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2.13).30 Since financial debt is primarily composed of long-term loans financial
leverage behaves as long-term leverage does. As a result, we only report figures
associated with financial debt over total assets and short-term loans over total assets.
We also consider total equity over total assets to get a sense of how firms might be
substituting between debt and equity financing.
We run the following regressions to estimate the non-linear relation between
size and leverage and age and leverage:
LEVit =α + (ωs × λt) + β1 log(SIZEit) + β2 log(SIZEit)2 + β3AGEit+
β4COLLATit + β5PROFITit + β6PRODit + εit
(2.8)
LEVit =α + (ωs × λt) + β1AGEit + β2AGE2it + β3 log(SIZEit)+
β4COLLATit + β5PROFITit + β6PRODit + εit
(2.9)
Focusing first on the figures with quadratic employment, we see that size is
more strongly positively associated with debt financing (both overall and short-
term) among private firms than public ones (figure 2.8 and 2.9). In fact, there is
no relation between size and short-term leverage for listed firms. This finding is
consistent with private firms facing more financial frictions than listed ones. Note
also that there is a logarithmically convex relationship between long-term leverage
and size for private firms, but the short-term leverage and size relationship appears
more logarithmically concave. Moreover, among private firms there is a strong
negative relationship between total equity over total assets and employment (figure
2.10). One interpretation is that as financial constraints ease, private firms choose
30Each figure plots the predicted values of the dependent variable as a function of the indepen-
dent variable of interest (size or age), holding all other variables at their sample means.
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debt financing over internal equity.
The equity-size relationship has more of an inverted U-shape for public firms.
Since these firms have access to external equity via stock issuances, one interpreta-
tion is that small and medium sized listed firms complement long-term debt with
external equity. As they become larger, they issue less external equity and turn
toward long-term debt borrowing.














Financial Debt/Total Assets (quadratic in log employment)
Notes: Use unbalanced samples of private and public firms between the years 2005 and 2012.
The dependent variable is financial debt/total assets. Each line shows the conditional relationship
between firm size and leverage, where we allow for some flexibility by introducing a quadratic term
for employment. The figures condition on firm age, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and
a full set of 3-digit industry-year FE. LOCUS propensity weights are used.
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Short Term Loans/Total Assets (quadratic in log employment)
Notes: Use unbalanced samples of private and public firms between the years 2005 and 2012. The
dependent variable is short-term loans/total assets. Each line shows the conditional relationship
between firm size and leverage, where we allow for some flexibility by introducing a quadratic term
for employment. The figures condition on firm age, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and
a full set of 3-digit industry-year FE. LOCUS propensity weights are used.














Total Equity/Total Assets (quadratic in log employment)
Notes: Use unbalanced samples of private and public firms between the years 2005 and 2012.
The dependent variable is total equity/total assets, where total equity includes both internal and
external equity. Each line shows the conditional relationship between firm size and leverage, where
we allow for some flexibility by introducing a quadratic term for employment. The figures condition
on firm age, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and a full set of 3-digit industry-year FE.
LOCUS propensity weights are used.
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Turning now to figures that are quadratic in age. Private firms appear to
draw down short-term leverage as they age, which is consistent with theories in
which entrepreneurs borrow to start their businesses and then pay off their loans
as they age (figures 2.11 and 2.12). This is consistent with what we see in figure
2.13 where private firms raise internal equity as they age, while paying down their
short-term loans. The relationship between age and leverage is far weaker and quite
flat among public firms in all measures of leverage. Public firms appear to slightly
reduce their equity as they age. This behavior is consistent with large public firms
being leveraged in long term debt – as they grow older, they also become larger.
Though confidence intervals are not very tight for these relations for listed firms.















Financial Debt/Total Assets (quadratic in age)
Notes: Use unbalanced samples of private and public firms between the years 2005 and 2012.
The dependent variable is financial debt/total assets. Each line shows the conditional relationship
between firm age and leverage, where we allow for some flexibility by introducing a quadratic term
for age. The figures condition on firm size, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and a full
set of 3-digit industry-year FE. LOCUS propensity weights are used.
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Short Term Loans/Total Assets (quadratic in age)
Notes: Use unbalanced samples of private and public firms between the years 2005 and 2012. The
dependent variable is short-term loans/total assets. Each line shows the conditional relationship
between firm age and leverage, where we allow for some flexibility by introducing a quadratic term
for age. The figures condition on firm size, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and a full
set of 3-digit industry-year FE. LOCUS propensity weights are used.



















Total Equity/Total Assets (quadratic in age)
Notes: Use unbalanced samples of private and public firms between the years 2005 and 2012.
The dependent variable is total equity/total assets, where total equity includes both internal and
external equity. Each line shows the conditional relationship between firm age and leverage, where
we allow for some flexibility by introducing a quadratic term for age. The figures condition on firm
size, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and a full set of 3-digit industry-year FE. LOCUS
propensity weights are used.
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2.4.2 Response to Shocks: Evidence from Great Recession
Since LOCUS spans the Great Recession, we can investigate whether the life-
cycle patterns we observe change during the financial shock of 2009–2012. Again,
we decompose financial leverage into short-term and long-term leverage in table
2.6. Focusing on the pre-crisis period (2005–2008), we see similar results as before,
where the experience of private firms is consistent with financial frictions models
with decreasing returns to scale. Larger firms are less financially constrained and
therefore have higher leverage. The relationship is stronger for short-term leverage
than long-term leverage. A one standard deviation increase in size during this period
is associated with a 43% increase in short-term leverage and a 16% increase in long-
term leverage. Older firms pay down their long-term debt, resulting in a negative
relationship between long-term leverage and age. The relationship is stronger, as
predicted in theory, for long-term leverage. A one standard deviation increase in age
is associated with a 9% decline in short-term leverage and a 20% decline in long-term
leverage. Listed firms are less leveraged in terms of both short-term and long-term
debt than private firms. Moreover, since these listed firms are likely less affected by
financial frictions their experience is inconsistent with theory. In particular, we do
not find a positive relationship between public firms’ size and short-term leverage
and age is positively correlated with leverage.
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Table 2.6: Pooled Regressions: Short-term leverage & Long-term leverage
(2005-2012) (2005-2008) (2009-2012)
STL/TAit LTL/TAit STL/TAit LTL/TAit STL/TAit LTL/TAit
log(EMPit) 0.0117
∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0009)
AGE -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
COLLATit -0.0296
∗∗∗ 0.2118∗∗∗ -0.0335∗∗∗ 0.2425∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗ 0.1732∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0064)
PROFITit -0.0290
∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0405∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0045)
PRODit 0.0088
∗∗∗ -0.0000 0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0001 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0013)
PUBLICi -0.0236
∗∗∗ -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.1040∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0088) (0.0043) (0.0095)
log(EMPit) x PUBLICi -0.0129
∗∗∗ 0.0004 -0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗ -0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0014)
AGEit x PUBLICi 0.0006
∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
COLLATit x PUBLICi 0.0507
∗∗∗ -0.0081 0.0535∗∗∗ -0.0594∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0093) (0.0058) (0.0128) (0.0061) (0.0134)
PROFITit x PUBLICi -0.0376
∗∗∗ -0.0782∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗ -0.0800∗∗∗ -0.0408∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0111) (0.0076) (0.0119)
PRODit x PUBLICi -0.0114
∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0033 -0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0038
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0028)
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 340,000 340,000 160,000 160,000 180,000 180,000
R2 0.0882 0.1523 0.0864 0.1478 0.0931 0.1307
Notes: We consider a pooled unbalanced samples of private and publicly-listed firms between
the periods 2005-2012 in the first two columns, 2005-2008 in the next two columns and 2009-
2012 in the last two columns. The dependent variables are short-term loans/total assets and
long-term debt/total assets. The main regressors are firm size, firm age, collateral, profitability,
labor productivity, a publicly-listed dummy, and a full set of interaction terms. The coefficients
on the uninteracted regressors denotes the marginal effect of each regressor on leverage among
the privately-held firms. The interacted terms indicated the extra boost (or dampening) effect of
being publicly traded. All regressions include a full set of 3-digit industry-year fixed effects. All
observations are weighted to adjust for selection into the LOCUS sample, as detailed in section
2.3. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels,respectively.
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However, during the crisis (2009–2012), when both public and private firms are
likely to be affected by financial frictions the differences between them are dampened.
Listed firms remain less leveraged than private firms. Older public firms pay down
their long-term leverage, similar to private firms. A one standard deviation increase
in age is associated with 15% decline in short-term leverage among private firms
and a 2% decline among listed firms. Even during the crisis listed firms remain
relatively less financially constrained than private firms since there is even a negative
relationship between size and short-term leverage. A one standard deviation increase
in size among private firms is associated with a 32% increase in short-term leverage
and a 9% decline among public firms.
2.4.3 Nonlinear Relationships During the Great Recession
In the previous sections we argued that size (employment) is an informative
correlate of financial constraints. We found that listed firms are less affected by
financial constraints than private firms both before and after the financial crisis. In
this section, we dig further into the relationship between leverage and size during
the Great Recession.
In figures 2.14 and 2.15 we plot the quadratic relationship between size and
short-term leverage for private (figure 2.14) and listed (figure 2.15) firms before the
crisis in 2006 and during the crisis in 2009. To generate this figure and the next,
we run a regression of short-term leverage on size, size squared and industry fixed
effects for private firms (figure 2.14) and listed firms (figure 2.15) separately for 2006
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and 2009.
STLEVi = α + ωs + β1 log(SIZEi) + β2 log(SIZEi)
2 + εi (2.10)
where STLEVi is short-term debt over total assets, ωs captures industry fixed
effects, and SIZEi is measured by either employment or total assets. This specifi-
cation is a close empirical counterpart to the size-dependent collateral constraints
arising in macroeconomic models with financial frictions where constraints are a
function of firm size or models with decreasing returns to scale. 31
In the left panel of figure 2.14, we measure size by employment and in the
right panel by total assets. Consistent with our prior results, for private firms there
is a positive correlation between size (employment and total assets) and short-term
leverage in both years. The relationship becomes flatter during the crisis (2009).
When size is measured by employment, the relationship between size and leverage
is significantly weaker in 2009 than it was in 2006. The pattern is consistent with
private firms becoming more financially constrained in 2009 or demanding less bank
financing during this period.
In contrast, figure 2.15 shows that for listed firms the relationship between
leverage and size is negative in both 2006 and 2009 and when size is measured by
employment and total assets. Moreover, we do not observe a significant difference in
the size-leverage relationship in 2006 and 2009. These results are consistent with our
previously reported regression results and suggest that listed firms are less affected
31In section B.3 of the appendix, figures B.3 and B.4 show the results when, in addition to
industry fixed effects, we control for labor productivity, collateral, profitability and age. The figures
are qualitatively consistent with the figures presented in the main text without the additional
controls.
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by financial frictions both before and during the Great Recession. The results also
highlight the importance of data on private firms since not only is the relationship
between leverage and size weaker for public firms, it also has the opposite sign.
Figure 2.14: Relationship b/w ST leverage and size for private firms (2006 & 2009)
Notes: Use unbalanced sample of private firms for 2006 and 2009. The dep. variable is short-term
leverage. Each line shows the relationship between leverage, size (measured by employment in the
left panel and total assets in the right figure) and size squared, controlling only for a full set of
3-digit industry FE. LOCUS propensity weights are used.
Figure 2.15: Relationship b/w ST leverage and size for public firms (2006 & 2009)
Notes: Use unbalanced sample of public firms for 2006 and 2009. The dependent variable is
short-term leverage. Each line shows the between leverage, size (measured by employment in the
left panel and total assets in the right figure) and size squared, controlling only for a full set of
3-digit industry FE. LOCUS propensity weights are used.
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2.4.4 Firm Growth During Normal Times and the Great Recession
These results have important implications for the aggregate economy as long as
financial frictions affect real outcomes. In this section, we complement our analysis of
the relationship between leverage and firm life-cycle characteristics with an analysis
of the relationship between leverage and revenue growth. We first consider the
following cross-sectional regression (first three columns of table 2.7).
RGit =α + (ωs × λt) + β1STLEVit−1 + β2(STLEVit−1 × PUBLICi)+
β3(STLEVit−1 × CRISISt) + β4(STLEVit−1 × PUBLICi × CRISISt)+
Γ′Zit−1 + εit
(2.11)
where RG is revenue growth, measured as REVit−REVit−1
0.5(REVit+REVit−1
; (ωs × λt) cap-
tures industry-year fixed effects and STLEVit is short-term debt over total assets.
STLEVit is interacted with a dummy equal to one if the firm is publicly-listed
(PUBLICi), a dummy equal to one during the financial crisis (2008 and 2009),
and both PUBLICi and CRISISt. Zit−1 includes firm age (AGEit−1), log revenue
(log(REVit−1)), profitability (PROFITit−1), and labor productivity (PRODit−1).
Each of these additional controls is included on its own, interacted with PUBLICi,
interacted with CRISISt and interacted with both PUBLICi and CRISISt. In
addition to the cross-sectional specification, we also report results using firm fixed
effects (last three columns of table 2.7):
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RGit =αi + (ωs × λt) + β1STLEVit−1 + β2(STLEVit−1 × PUBLICi)+
β3(STLEVit−1 × CRISISt) + β4(STLEVit−1 × PUBLICi × CRISISt)+
Γ′Zit−1 + εit
(2.12)
Table 2.7 reports the results of the cross-sectional specification in the first
three columns and the firm fixed effects specification in the last three columns. The
first and fourth columns do not include any interaction terms and show that there
exists a positive relationship between short-term borrowing and revenue growth,
though the significance is weaker in column (4) with firm fixed effects. The fifth
and sixth columns explain why this is the case. The second and fifth columns
introduce interactions with PUBLICi and highlight that the positive relationship
between firm growth and leverage is driven entirely by private firms. In fact, the
relationship between short-term leverage and growth is negative for listed firms.
This negative relationship may be indicative of listed firms relying more heavily
on different forms of financing, such as long-term debt, than private firms. In
columns three and six, we focus on the crisis period (CRISISt). The negative
relationship between leverage and growth for public firms is independent of crisis.
The relationship between short-term leverage and growth also does not change in the
cross section of private firms but becomes weaker during crisis in the firm fixed effect
specification for the private firms. When we calculate the total effect of leverage on
growth for private firms during crisis, we find that this effect is basically insignificant.
We observe no difference between private and public firms during crisis periods
in terms of their growth-leverage relationship as shown with triple interaction in
119
columns three and six.
Our analysis of the relationship between revenue growth and leverage further
highlights the importance of using data on private firms since the relationship be-
tween growth and short-term leverage differs substantially between private and listed
firms. Overall our empirical analysis using LOCUS dataset indicates that to obtain
a more complete picture of the implications of financial frictions for the broader
economy, it is important to take into account, in addition to public firms, private
firms that account for over half of the employment and revenue in the U.S. economy.
The findings also caution testing of theories incorporating financial frictions at the
firm level using data on publicly traded firms only. The stark differences in the
life-cycle leverage patterns exhibited by public versus private firms point to a need
for a more nuanced approach to modeling financial frictions for these two types of
firms. In addition, the differences between the two groups of firms matter for macro
models that study the interaction between financial frictions and aggregate shocks.
Both groups are clearly large enough to be influential in macro outcomes, and the
differential response of the two groups to shocks should be taken into account when
studying the consequences of aggregate shocks.
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Table 2.7: Growth Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growthit Growthit Growthit Growthit Growthit Growthit
STLEVt−1 0.1013
∗∗∗ 0.1023∗∗∗ 0.0829∗∗∗ 0.0524∗ 0.0530∗ 0.0802∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0255) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0292)
STLEVt−1 × PUBLICi -0.3588∗∗∗ -0.3650∗∗∗ -0.2726∗∗∗ -0.3546∗∗∗
(0.0814) (0.0968) (0.0824) (0.0964)
STLEVt−1 × CRISISt 0.0536 -0.0793∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0351)
STLEVt−1 × PUBLICi × CRISISt 0.0291 0.2215
(0.1721) (0.1575)
log(REV)t−1 -0.0122
∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0056∗ -0.4923∗∗∗ -0.4933∗∗∗ -0.4959∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0159)
log(REV)t−1 × PUBLICi 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0046 0.1839∗∗∗ 0.1895∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0297) (0.0296)
log(REV)t−1 × CRISISt -0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0059
(0.0057) (0.0039)
log(REV)t−1 × PUBLICi × CRISISt 0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0027
(0.0074) (0.0040)
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000 144,000
R-sq 0.0759 0.0760 0.0804 0.6140 0.6142 0.6144
private 0.0000 0.0012 0.0563 0.0062
public 0.0009 0.0028 0.0029 0.0025
private-crisis 0.0002 0.9822
public-crisis 0.0834 0.6823
Notes: We consider a pooled unbalanced sample of publicly listed firms between the periods 2005-
2012. The dependent variable is the firm-level revenue growth rate. The first three columns are
cross-sectional and the last three control for firm-fixed effects. The main regressors are short-term
leverage, revenue, firm age, profitability, and labor productivity. All regressors are lagged and
interacted with a public dummy, crisis dummy, and the interaction of the two. All regressions
include a full set of 3-digit industry-year fixed effects. All observations are weighted to adjust for
selection into the LOCUS sample, as detailed in section 2.3. Standard errors are robust. ***, **,
and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,respectively. The last four lines of the
table report the p-value of the total effects for: 1) private firms in normal times (private); 2) listed
firms in normal times (public); 3) private firms in the financial crisis (private-crisis); and 4) listed
firms in the financial crisis (public-crisis).
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2.5 Conclusion
We construct a new data set, LOCUS, that provides information on financials
of private firms in the U.S. to study the firm life-cycle dynamics of firm financing,
and its implications on firm growth and responsiveness to aggregate shocks. To
provide a broad picture for both public and private firms, we match financial data
for privately-held firms in Orbis and publicly-listed firms in Compustat to U.S.
Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database. This match allows us to account
for selection in Orbis, and to also include administrative data on employment - a
key variable that is not available in Orbis.
Our results indicate that, conditional on firm age and other observables that
can affect firm borrowing, small private firms may be more financially constrained
given the strong positive correlation between firm size and short term leverage, both
in cross-section and over time, whereas leverage of public firms is largely independent
of their size. The relationship between size and short-term leverage is non-linear and
slightly concave for private firms, whereas for public firms it is flat. Firm age, after
controlling for firm size and other observables, turns out not to be a proxy for
financial constraints, since young firms tend to borrow more and pay down their
debt as they grow older. We find that very large public firms stay highly leveraged
in terms of long term debt, even when they get older, while private firms switch
from debt to equity financing, as they age.
Using Great Recession as an aggregate shock, we show that, the positive and
non-linear relationship between size and short-term leverage becomes more linear
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during the recession, as large private firms reduce their leverage more. For public
firms, the relation between short-term leverage and size does not change during the
crisis and stays flat. This finding supports our interpretation that public firms are
never constrained, while small private firms are constrained during normal times,
and large private firms might also get constrained during crisis times. These findings
might also have a different interpretation based on demand shocks that can reduce
borrowing by firms. It might be the case that demand shocks that are relevant for the
period 2007 and after might have a disproportionate effect on larger private firms.
We control for firm-level profitability and sector-year fixed effects to account for
such shocks though we still cannot rule out fully the effects of firm-level unobserved
demand shocks.
The implications of life-cycle leverage on firm growth are as follows. Private
firms finance their growth mainly through short-term debt during normal times.
During the Great Recession, the strong positive relation between short-term leverage
and private firm growth stays in the cross-section but gets weaker during crisis when
we use firm fixed effects. If these fixed effects capture unobserved and time invariant
firm-level low demand during crisis years, then private firms which entered the crisis
with higher short-term leverage grow less during crisis, which might be due to a
deleveraging effect. It may also be the case that these firms were affected more from
time varying negative demand shocks. Again, for public firms there is no effect of
crisis in terms of the relation between leverage and firm growth.
Our results for private firms are consistent with some theories of firm dynamics
and financing, whereas the behavior of listed firms is substantially different and
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cannot be explained by the existing models. Since most of the existing models rely
on full firm size distribution, it is not surprising that the results for listed firms
do not square with these models. An important implication of our results is that
macro-finance models should not be relying solely on data moments extracted from
listed firm samples for their calibration exercises.
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Chapter 3: Sudden Stops, Misallocation and Aggregate Productivity
3.1 Introduction
Over the past 30 years emerging economies have periodically experienced sud-
den stops, including the Mexican peso crisis in 1995, the East Asian financial crisis
in 1997, the Russian default in 1998 and most recently, the Great Recession.1 All of
these events are characterized by large capital outflows and spikes in the real inter-
est rate. During these crises output, investment and productivity fall. For instance,
when Russia partially defaulted on its debt in 1998 the credit spreads of the seven
largest countries in Latin America rose threefold within a matter of weeks, despite
the fact that these countries had few financial or trading ties to Russia. As a result,
output in these countries fell by an average of 3.5%, investment by 10% and total
factor productivity (TFP) by 4% relative to pre-crisis levels.
The existing small open economy literature cannot fully explain the short-
run fluctuations in productivity observed during these episodes.2 I ask whether
fluctuations in the credit spread can simultaneously explain the decline in output,
1Calvo et al. (2006) identify sudden stop when the fall in a country’s capital flows exceeds two
standard deviations from the mean and its country spread (measured by the JP Morgan EMBI
spread) rises by more than two standard deviations from the mean.
2Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), and Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2011) show how interest rate fluctuations impact output and investment, but cannot explain the
fall in productivity unless it is exogenously imposed.
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investment and productivity during sudden stops. When the interest rate rises or
interest rate volatility increases, firms facing partially irreversible investment and
hiring costs become less responsive to their productivity and demand shocks. This
fall in responsiveness raises misallocation of resources across firms, which contributes
to a fall in aggregate productivity. I explore how much of the decline in productivity
observed following shocks to the level and volatility of the interest rate can be
explained by this channel.
In order to do so, I focus on the experience of Chile. Using firm-level data, I
document that during the 1998 sudden stop the dispersion in the marginal product
of capital and labor rose by nearly 8%. This finding is consistent with a rise in
resource misallocation wherein firms become less responsive to their productivity
shocks due to capital and labor adjustment frictions. The share of firms delaying
investment/disinvestment rose from 32% prior to the crisis to 43% by 2000.
Because the direct effect of interest rate fluctuations on dispersion in marginal
products and productivity is difficult to identify empirically, I take a structural
approach in order to quantify the the contribution of capital and labor adjustment
frictions to the fall in productivity when interest rates are high and volatile. I
extend a standard heterogeneous firm model with partially irreversible investment
and hiring costs, as well as a stochastic interest rate process that is subject to level
and volatility shocks.
Consider how investment responds to these shocks. When the interest rate
rises some growing firms halt their expansion in anticipation of lower future interest
rates; other firms hold on to too much capital because it can only be sold at a
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fraction of its purchase price and they anticipate wanting to invest in the future
when interest rates fall. An increase in interest rate volatility makes firms more
uncertain about the costs of financing investment in the short to medium term,
since the shocks are only temporary. This uncertainty increases the firm’s incentive
to delay investment decisions until aggregate conditions become more clear. In
both cases resource misallocation rises, which has detrimental effects on aggregate
productivity.
I calibrate the model using firm-level data from Chile; subject the economy to
shocks to the interest rate; and assess the effect of these shocks on output, invest-
ment, hiring, aggregate productivity, and the dispersion of marginal products. Both
interest rate level and volatility shocks lead to declines in output, investment, and
hiring. These shocks also generate an increase in the dispersion of marginal product
of capital and labor, which is consistent with the firm-level data from Chile. The
model generates an endogenous fall in aggregate productivity, but the magnitude of
the decline is only a small fraction of that observed in the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized into seven sections. Section 3.2 briefly
discusses how this paper intersects with the existing literature. Section 3.3 in-
troduces Chile’s firm-level data and documents the evolution of the dispersion in
marginal products; and presents evidence of adjustment frictions. Section 3.4 briefly
discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the adjustment friction channel. Section
3.5 presents the heterogeneous firm model and discusses calibration. Section 3.6




This paper belongs at the intersection of the small open economy and mis-
allocation literature. It aims to understand the effect of large fluctuations in the
level and volatility of the real interest rate on productivity in emerging economies.
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) are most successful in
explaining the impact of interest rate shocks on output, investment and labor when
they assume that interest rate fluctuations are induced by exogenous productivity
shocks. In these models, when interest rates are uncorrelated with productivity
shocks the countercyclicality of interest rates is only half that observed in the data.
Yet, Uribe and Yue (2006) find that external conditions, rather than domestic fun-
damentals, explain 80% of changes in emerging market real interest rates. My con-
tribution to this literature is in showing how interest rate shocks can simultaneously
explain the fall in productivity, output, investment, and hiring once the increase in
resource misallocation that arises in response to these shocks is taken into account.
My work is not alone in trying to explain how interest rate fluctuations af-
fect productivity. Queralto (2018) and Ates and Saffie (2016) focus on the effect
of higher interest rates on firm entry, while Pratap and Urrutia (2012) emphasize
resource misallocation across sectors and Meza and Erwan (2007) highlight falling
factor utilization. Along with Oberfield (2010), I focus on a complementary channel,
capital and labor adjustment frictions. Whereas the firm entry channel generates
medium- to long-run fluctuations in productivity, the adjustment frictions channel
primarily generates short-run dynamics. Adjustment frictions also imply misallo-
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cation of resources across firms within a sector, as opposed to the misallocation of
resources between sectors emphasized in Pratap and Urrutia (2012) or the within
firm variation arising from utilization emphasized in Meza and Erwan (2007).
The adjustment frictions channel has empirically testable implications for the
degree of dispersion in marginal products of capital and labor, which connects my
work to the misallocation literature. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) interpret high levels
of dispersion in productivity and marginal products as indicative of distortions.
As in Bartelsman et al. (2013), I assume dispersion arises from both frictions and
distortions, and focus on how much of this dispersion is explained by adjustment
frictions alone. Similar to Buera and Moll (2015) and Gopinath et al. (2017) I also
emphasize the evolution of productivity and dispersion following an aggregate shock.
Whereas Buera and Moll (2015) explore the implications of credit tightening and
Gopinath et al. (2017) focus on a permanent fall in the interest rate, I highlight
the impact of transitory interest rate fluctuations associated with sudden stops in
emerging economies.
My approach in quantifying the effect of interest rate shocks is closely akin to
Bloom (2009). I use an industry equilibrium model with risk-neutral firms and labor
and capital adjustment frictions and augment it with a stochastic interest rate pro-
cess. I introduce the insights of Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), who show that
periods of high interest rates also feature high interest rate volatility, into a heteroge-
neous firm model. Doing so allows me to extend the results of Fernandez-Villaverde
et al. (2011) by showing how interest rate volatility shocks impact aggregate pro-
ductivity.
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3.3 Evidence of Falling Productivity, Rising Dispersion and Adjust-
ment Frictions
This section uses Chile’s experience during the 1998 sudden stop, triggered
by Russia’s default in August of that year, to document evidence of rising resource
misallocation across firms, and the relevance of the adjustment frictions channel. I
chose to focus on Chile’s experience for two reasons. First, the shock the Chile’s
interest rate was exogenous. The country had few trade or financial ties to Russia,
and prior to the crisis was experiencing a period of strong growth and sound macroe-
conomic fundamentals. Second, I have access to plant level data during this period,
which allows me to directly show evidence of fluctuating productivity, misallocation
and adjustment frictions.
3.3.1 Chile’s Experience in the Aftermath of Russia’s Default
Russia’s default in 1998 precipitated a sharp increase in Chile’s cost of external
financing. The real interest rate rose by over 4.5 percentage points between 1997
and 1998. Higher borrowing costs caused the private sector to deleverage by reduc-
ing investment, which contributed to a sharp fall in output. Figure 3.1 shows the
evolution of Chile’s real interest rate between 1995 and 2007, along with deviations
of detrended real GDP, investment and productivity from 1997 levels. The fall in
all three measures in response to the sudden stop is large and persistent. Detrended
output, investment and productivity remained below pre-crisis levels in 2007.
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Notes: Figures plot the deviation of the real interest rates (top-left), detrended real GDP (top-
right), investment (bottom-left), and productivity (bottom-right) from pre-crisis (2007) levels.
Real interest rate data are constructed using U.S. Treasury Bill rates and the JP Morgan’s EMBI
spread. Real GDP, investment and TFP series are obtained from the Penn World Tables. These
series are detrended using an HP filter and are presented as deviations from detrended 1997 levels.
The grey vertical line denotes the onset of the 1998 sudden stop.
The response of output and investment during sudden stop has been exten-
sively studied, but fluctuations in aggregate productivity have yet to be fully ex-
plained. In the remainder of this section, I use establishment-level data covering the
manufacturing sector in Chile between the years 1980 and 2007 to explore whether
there is evidence of rising misallocation and adjustment frictions during the sudden
stop. The data are collected annually by Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE )
through a survey of establishments employing ten workers or more. A detailed
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description of the data is available in appendix C.1.
3.3.2 Measuring Productivity and Misallocation
In this paper, I proposed that when interest rate are high and/or volatile
the presence of capital and labor adjustment frictions contributes to falling pro-
ductivity. In the presence of these frictions firms become less responsive to their
productivity/demand shocks, which manifests itself as a rise in the dispersion of
productivity and marginal products. In this section, I adopt the Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) framework to assess whether the establishment-level evidence is consistent
with this story.
3.3.2.1 Hsieh and Klenow framework
The underlying economic structure in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) is as follows:
each industry s is composed of Nst intermediate goods producers operating a Cobb-
Douglas production function; and total industry output is produced via a CES
aggregator. As such, each firm i, in sector s, in year t faces an isoelastic demand for
its output. In each period firms earn profits equal to production ((1− τ yist) pistyist)
net of labor and capital payments (wlist+
(
1 + τ kist
)
(rt + δ)kist). In each period, the
firm chooses pist (price), list (labor) and kist (capital) to maximize profits. Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) interpret the terms (1− τ yist) and
(
1 + τ kist
)
as distortions. Sub-
sequent work by Bartelsman et al. (2013) and Asker et al. (2014) show that frictions,
including adjustment frictions and time to build also generate wedges between the
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marginal product of inputs and their marginal cost. I therefore consider the terms
(1− τ yist) and
(
1 + τ kist
)
as reduced form measures that capture the presence of fric-
tions.
The marginal product of labor (MRPL) and marginal product of capital
(MRPK) derived from this framework are given by (3.1) and (3.2).3



























where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties and is assumed
to be equal to 4, as in Gopinath et al. (2017). Throughout this section I assume
that αs = α = 1/3. In appendix C.2 I show that the evolution of dispersion in
TFPR is insensitive to the use of a constant cost share by comparing the results
reported here to those obtained using sector-specific U.S. cost shares, as is done in
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), as well as to an alternative approach in which produc-
tivity is estimated using the Wooldridge (2009) extension of Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003). The term pistyist represents firm nominal value added, kist its capital stock
and list total employment adjusted for the number of days worked. Under this
framework, plant-level TFPR is proportional to the geometric average of marginal
products. As a result, variation in TFPR across firms only arises in the presence
of frictions/distortions.
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In the absence of frictions and/or distortions, the MRPL of all firms is equal
to the wage rate and MRPK is equal to the cost of capital. Consequently, re-
sources are allocated toward firms that are more productive and/or face higher
demand and there is no dispersion across firms in either measure. The presence
of frictions/distortions generates wedges between the return and cost of labor and










. These wedges create dis-
persion in the marginal products of labor and capital, and are indicative of allocative
inefficiencies.
To capture how the dispersion in marginal products and TFPR evolves over
time, I calculate the standard deviation of each measure across firms i in industry s in
year t . Aggregate dispersion is the weighted average of dispersion in each industry
s, where the weights are time-invariant and reflect the share of each industry’s






where S is the total number of sectors in the economy, ωs is the time-invariant
industry weight, and SDs (Xist) is the standard deviation of X across all firms i, in
sector s, in year t.
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3.3.2.2 Productivity and Dispersion
Figure 3.2 shows that among this sample of firms productivity fell sharply
during the sudden stop and did not return to pre-crisis levels until the late 2000s.
I focus on a balanced sample of firms to facilitate a mapping between the data
and the model I present in the next section, which abstracts from entry and exit.
The evolution of productivity in the microdata is consistent with that observed
in the aggregate data. The dispersion in the productivity (TFPR) rose by more
than 9 percent between 1997 and 2004. The sharp increase in dispersion observed
between 2005 and 2007 is outside the scope of my analysis and is likely driven by
the commodity boom during this period.4 Copper prices appear to play a lesser
role in explaining dispersion dynamics prior to 2005. Between 1995 and 2005, the
correlation between copper prices and dispersion in TFPR is −0.17 , while it is
−0.29 between the real interest rate and dispersion.5
4The commodity boom was driven by a sharp increase in copper prices in the mid-2000s.
Between 2005 and 2006 the average copper price per pound rose from US$1.67 to US$3.05 (Chile,
COCHILCO, Annuario 1987-2006).
5The correlation between copper prices and dispersion in TFPR between 1980 and 2007 is
0.05. The correlation between copper prices and dispersion in MRPK (MRPL) between 1995
and 2005 is 0.078 (−0.13), while the correlation between the real interest rate and dispersion in
MRPK (MRPL) is −0.44 (−0.21) during this same period.
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Figure 3.2: Productivity and Dispersion of TFPR among Continuing Firms
Notes: Author’s calculations based on ENIA manufacturing sector data. Both figures are pre-
sented for a balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The left
figure plots the deviation of productivity from the pre-crisis (1997) level. The right figure plots
the deviation of the dispersion of productivity from the pre-crisis (1997) level. Dispersion is cal-
culated as the standard deviation across firms in a particular industry-year and aggregated using
time-invariant employment shares. The grey vertical line denotes the onset of the 1998 sudden
stop.
To get a better sense of what drives the rise in TFPR dispersion, I consider the
the weighted within-industry standard deviation of MRPL and MRPK between
1995 and 2007. Figure 3.3 suggests that the allocation of both factors was adversely
affected by the crisis. Dispersion in MRPK rose less than MRPL, but their evo-
lution is similar; both experience a persistent rise in dispersion during the period of
high interest rates. This rise in dispersion and concurrent fall in productivity is sug-
gestive of deteriorating allocative efficiency. Since the dispersion in both marginal
products rose, the evidence also points to the presence of distortions affecting both
factors of production. In the next section, I explore whether there is evidence that
adjustment costs associated with investment and labor may be playing a role.
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Figure 3.3: Dispersion in Marginal Products
Notes: Manufacturing Census (ENIA) and author’s calculations. Both figures are presented for
a balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The left figure
plots the deviation of the dispersion of MRPK and the right figure plots the deviation of the
dispersion of MRPL from the pre-crisis (1997) level. For each variable, dispersion is calculated
as the standard deviation across firms in a particular industry-year and aggregated using time-
invariant employment shares. The grey vertical line denotes the onset of the 1998 sudden stop.
3.3.3 Adjustment Frictions
I emphasize the central role of adjustment frictions in contributing to fluctu-
ations in productivity during sudden stop episodes. In particular, I propose that
interest rate fluctuations interact with non-convex capital and labor adjustment
costs by raising the fraction of firms that choose to delay investment and/or hir-
ing during periods of high and volatile interest rates. As Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) note, investment irreversibility may arise because secondary markets for cap-
ital goods are missing or weak. These types of markets tend to be less developed in
emerging economies. Moreover, in Chile, labor regulations are cited as the top ob-
stacle to doing business, according to the World Bank Enterprise Survey. Since these
types of capital and labor adjustment frictions influence resource misallocation, they
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may be an important propagation mechanism of aggregate shocks on productivity.
To ascertain whether these adjustment frictions are in fact empirically relevant in
Chile, I follow Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) in documenting plant-level evidence
of non-convexities and irreversibilities associated with capital and labor adjustment.
I use investment rate and labor growth rate data for a balanced sample of firms
between 1980 and 1997, which is the pre-crisis period I use to calibrate my model.6
Moreover, focusing on this period shows that adjustment frictions are present even
prior to the crisis. The investment rate distribution reported in figure (3.4) has a
large mass around zero and is highly skewed to the right. The labor growth rate
distribution also has a spike around zero, albeit far smaller than the one observed
in investment rate distribution, and has a more symmetric distribution.
























−2 −1 0 1 2
Labor Growth Rate
L Growth Distribution
Notes: Manufacturing Census (ENIA) and author’s calculations. Both figures are presented for
a balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The left figure is
a histogram of the investment-capital ratio and the right figure is a histogram of the labor growth
rate. The y-axis of both figures is the fraction of firms that fall into each histogram bin.
The summary statistics in table (3.1) illustrate a few key points. First, nearly
6Additional information on the construction of the investment rate and growth rate is available
in the appendix C.1.
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35% of (plant, year) observations report an investment rate less than 1% in absolute
value and 11% report labor growth rate inaction. The high frequency of no invest-
ment in Chile contrasts to the far lower frequency in the United States (around 8%,
reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). These periods of inaction, particularly
in the case of capital, are accompanied by high investment episodes, termed here
as episodes in which investment or labor growth exceed 10% in the case of positive
spikes and -10% in the case of negative spikes. Positive investment spikes account
for nearly 40% of observations while positive labor growth rate spikes account for
30% of observations. In the case of investment and labor growth, negative spikes are
less common. They occur in less than 2% of observations in investment and 19% in
labor growth. The rarity of disinvestment is indicative of limited liquidity in capital
resale markets, a feature that Chile likely shares with other emerging economies.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Investment Rate Labor Growth Rate
Average rate 13.3% 2.3%
Inaction rate 34.6% 11.1%
% Obs with negative value 3.1% 36.7%
Positive spike rate 39.1% 30.1%
Negative spike rate 1.4% 19.4%
Notes: Manufacturing Census (ENIA) and author’s calculations. The summary statistics are
presented for a balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The
summary statistics are similar to those reported in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) as evidence of
adjustment frictions in the capital and labor markets.
These summary statistics, along with the full investment rate and labor growth
rate distributions are indicative of non-convex adjustment costs affecting labor and
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even more strongly, capital. The data on investment rates are consistent with
a model featuring asymmetric non-convex adjustment costs, such as partial irre-
versibility. The data on labor growth rated are consistent with symmetric non-
convex adjustment costs such as linear hiring/firing costs. I use several of the
moments in this section (inaction rate, and positive and negative spike rate) to
calibrate the industry equilibrium model described below.
3.4 Brief Theoretical Interlude
Throughout this paper I emphasize the interaction between changes in the
level and volatility of the interest rate and adjustment frictions. The channel relies
on a rise in the level or volatility of the interest rate leading more firms to de-
lay investment/disinvestment and hiring/firing (i.e. an increase in inaction among
firms). In this section, I review two results from the adjustment cost literature that
demonstrate how changes in the interest rate affect the degree of investment inaction
among firms.7
The Dixit (1995) framework can be used to show how a rise in the level of
the interest rate generate an incentive to delay investment in the presence of fully
(or partially) irreversible investment. Calcagnini and Saltari (2000) and Alvarez
(2010) use a similar framework to show how interest rate volatility creates the same
incentive. In both cases, a continuous time framework is used to derive closed
form comparative statics. In this section I review the framework and present the
7In this section I focus on the investment margin, but the results would be similar for the
hiring margin.
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comparative static results, leaving the full re-derivation of results from Dixit (1995)
and Calcagnini and Saltari (2000) to appendix C.3.
Consider the problem faced by a single firm. In one case, the firm faces transi-
tory productivity/demand shocks and a constant interest rate. In the second case, it
is characterized by permanent productivity and transitory interest rate fluctuations.




Where dW zt is a Wiener process with zero mean and unit variance. The firm
is risk neutral, as it is in the quantitative model, and therefore discounts future
net revenue at the riskless interest rate rt. When the interest rate is stochastic, it






The process (3.6) is convenient because it facilitates the derivation of analytical
results. These results are consistent with those derived numerically by Alvarez and
Koskela (2006) for a continuous time version of the AR(1) process. The law of
motion for capital is given by
dKt = Itdt (3.7)
which assumes zero depreciation. I assume that investment if fully irreversible







η < 1 (3.8)
The firm maximizes its present discounted value of net profits







t r(u)du (Πt − It)
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(3.9)
This framework abstracts from the time-to-build assumption I include the the
quantitative model. Here, investment becomes immediately productive and absent
any adjustment costs MRPKt = rt.
Assume first that the the interest rate is constant (rt = r). In this case, the
firm’s investment decision is fully characterized by a threshold Z̄t, which denotes











where sn captures the real option value of delaying investment that arises from

































In (3.12) there are two effects at play. The interest rate affects the threshold
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directly through the user cost of capital (r) and indirectly through the option value.
The direct effect pushes the inaction threshold higher because the incentive to invest
falls with higher costs. The indirect effect is negative and pushes the threshold lower
because when firms discount the future at a higher rate, the option value of waiting
to take action falls. Here the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, which results
in an expansion of the inaction region.
Now consider an alternative scenario in which firm-level productivity is con-
stant and the interest rate is stochastic (Zt = Z). In this case, the firm’s investment











1/4 + 2/σ2r (3.14)
A firm characterized by (Zi, Kt) invests only if the interest rate is below r̄.
















Equation (3.15) shows that as interest rate volatility rises, the threshold value
of the interest rate at which firms are willing to invest falls (i.e. firms require a lower
interest rate before they are willing to invest). One the one hand, when interest rate
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volatility rises firms want to invest more because the gains from low realizations of
the interest rate will outweigh the losses from high realizations (direct effect). On
the other hand, higher interest rate volatility raises the opportunity cost of investing,
thus generating an incentive to delay investment (indirect effect). Since the indirect
effect dominates in this case, a rise in interest rate volatility lowers r̄.
From the point of view of a firm that is characterized by (Zi, Kt) a single
interest rate r prevails in the economy. When deciding whether or not to invest,
each firm checks whether this r lies below or above r̄. The result in the section
shows that keeping the level of r constant and raising σ2r will cause more firms to
fall into the investment inaction region.
When the interest rate rise and/or interest rate volatility increases, more firms
in the economy delay investment. In an economy with heterogeneous firms, this in-
crease in the unwillingness of the firms to invest/disinvest will increase resource
misallocation. These theoretical results also carry over to the case of labor adjust-
ment frictions
3.5 Modeling the Effect of Interest Rate Shocks
I evaluate the effect of interest rate shocks using a model of risk neutral firms
who face non-convex adjustment costs and are subject to transitory aggregate and id-
iosyncratic productivity/demand shocks and interest rate level and volatility shocks.
Adjustment costs interact with the time varying interest rate level and volatility to
generate time varying incentives to delay investment and hiring. Changes in the
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share of firms delaying investment and hiring contribute to fluctuations in output,
dispersion of marginal products and aggregate productivity.
3.5.1 Production, Adjustment Costs and Stochastic Processes
The economy consists of a continuum of risk neutral firms facing a downward




where Bt denotes the aggregate demand component, djt the idiosyncratic de-












where Ãt denotes aggregate productivity, z̃jt idiosyncratic productivity, and
kjt is capital stock and ljt is labor hours. Combining (3.17) and (3.18) obtains the
firm’s revenue function:
























jt κ+ λ < 1 (3.20)
Under this formulation At combines aggregate productivity and demand, and
zjt combines idiosyncratic productivity and demand. I assume that the logarithm
of At and zjt follow an AR (1) process.
log (At) = ρAlog (At−1) + σAεat εA ∼ N (0, 1) (3.21)
log (zjt) = ρzlog (zjt−1) + σzεzt εz ∼ N (0, 1) (3.22)
where εA is assumed to be i.i.d over time and εz is assumed to be i.i.d. across
firms and time. In addition to stochastic aggregate productivity/demand (At), the
economy also faces exogenous fluctuations in the level and volatility of the real
interest rate. Real interest rate levels evolve according to the following AR (1)
process:




+ ρRlog (Rt−1) + σRt−1εRt εR ∼ N (0, 1) (3.23)
where R̄ captures the long run real interest rate. I allow the standard deviation
of innovations to Rt (σR) to change over time according to an AR (1) process:
σRt = (1− ρσ) σ̄σ + ρσσRt−1 + σσεσ εσ ∼ N (0, 1) (3.24)
where σ̄σ denotes the long-run volatility. One assumption associated with
(3.23) is worth noting. According to the timing assumption in (3.23), firms know
one period in advance whether the distribution of shocks that determine the interest
rate is changing in the next period. This is meant to capture the notion that firms
146
understand the volatility of future financial conditions.
The firm enters each period (t) with a capital stock (kjt), chosen in the previous
period but not yet used in production, and labor hours (ljt−1), chosen in the previous
period and used in production in that period. If the firm chooses to purchase or
sell capital and/or increase or decrease labor hours, it faces non-convex costs of
adjustment. I adopt the adjustment cost structure of Bloom et al. (2018). A firm’s
capital stock evolves according to the standard law of motion
kjt+1 = (1− δk) kjt + ijt (3.25)
where δk denotes the depreciation rate of capital and ijt is current period




consist of partial irreversibility associ-
ated with disinvestment. This features captures the notion that firms can only sell
capital at a fraction of the purchase price.
ACkjt = Pk|ijt|I (ijt < 0) Pk < 1 (3.26)
Labor hours also evolve according to a law of motion
ljt = (1− δl) ljt−1 + hjt (3.27)
where δl denotes the exogenous loss in hours worked arising from exogenous
quits, retirement, sick leave, etc. The component hjt captures the net change in
hours worked, which could arise from hiring/firing workers or adjusting hours for




consist of linear variable costs
denoted as a fraction of wages (wPl), which arise from hiring, training and/or firing
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costs.8
AC ljt = wPl|hjt| Pl < 1 (3.28)
3.5.2 The Firm Problem
The continuum of risk-neutral firms described above exists in an infinite-
horizon, discrete time, small open economy. V (kj, lj,−1, zj;A,R, σR) denotes the
firm’s value function. At any point in time, the firm is characterized by its capi-
tal stock, stock of labor hours, idiosyncratic productivity, aggregate productivity,
the real interest rate and the current value of interest rate volatility. Firms choose





to maximize their present dis-
counted value of revenue net of investment costs, wage bill and adjustment costs.
Note that in the remainder of this section I drop the firm subscript (j).
Firms first choose whether or not to undertake any adjustment in capital or
labor hours.
V (k, l−1, z;A,R, σR) = max
i,h
(V a, V n) (3.29)
In the case of no adjustment, both i = 0 and h = 0. Firms produce using k
and (1− δl) l−1, pay the wage bill of labor hours used in production (w (1− δl) l−1)
and carry depreciated capital ((1− δk) k) and the stock of labor hours ((1− δl) l−1)
to the next period.
8A simple example is labor hours costs associated with new employee orientation.
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st.: ỹ = Azkκ ((1− δl) l−1)λ κ+ λ < 1
In the case of any adjustment, either i 6= 0 and/or h 6= 0. Firms choose i
and h at the beginning of the period, and subsequently produce using k and l, the
latter of which incorporates any net change in labor hours (h). They also pay wages,
investment cost (in the case of non-zero investment) and additional adjustment costs.
V a (k, l−1, z;A,R, σR) = max
i,h
{
ỹ − wl − i− ACk − ACn + 1
R
EV (k′, l, z′;A′, R′, σ′R)
}
(3.31)
s.t: ỹ = Azkκlλ κ+ λ < 1
k′ = (1− δk) k + i
l = (1− δl) l−1 + h
ACk = Ps|i|I (i < 0) Pk < 1
AC l = wPl|h| Pl < 1
Firms discount profits at the real interest rate (R). As a consequence, in this
model interest rate shocks are equivalent to discount rate shocks. As I discussed
in the previous section, and will discuss in more detail shortly, fluctuations in the
interest rate interact with the adjustment costs firms face and affect their incentive to
delay investment and/or hiring decisions. In particular, when interest rates are high
and/or volatility, more firms will find it optimal to delay hiring and investment.
Resource misallocation rises temporarily as inaction among firms grows and as a
consequence, aggregate productivity falls.
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3.5.3 Parametrization and Solution
The model is solved using value function iteration, the details of which are
available in appendix C.4. The complete set of parameters I calibrate is:
{δkδl, w, κ, λ, ρA, σA, R̄, ρR, σR, σ̄σ, ρσ, σσ, Pk, Pl, ρz, σz}
I divide these into three categories based on my parametrization strategy. One
set of parameters is chosen using values found in the literature {δk, δl, w, κ, λ, ρA, σA}.
The second set of parameters
{
R̄, ρR, σR, σ̄σ, ρσ, σσ
}
, associated with the interest
rate and volatility process, is chosen using real interest rate data for Chile. The
last set of parameters {P, Pl, ρz, σz}, associated with the idiosyncratic productivity
process and capital and labor adjustment costs, is chosen to be consistent with
features of firm-level data.
I calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency.9 Since the firm-level data
are only available at an annual frequency, I aggregate observables obtained from
an unconditional simulation of my model to compare model moments with data
moments when setting the last set of parameters. The parameter values are reported
in table (3.2).
9I do so because real interest rate data for Chile is only available between 1995 and 2015. I
therefore need to use the quarterly data to calibrate the stochastic interest rate process.
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Table 3.2: Parameter Values
δk δl κ λ w ρA 100σA R̄ ρR 100σR 100σ̄σ ρσ 100σσ Pk Pl ρz 100σz
2.5% 8% 0.25 0.50 1 0.95 1.75 1.015 0.84 0.32 0.32 0.455 0.30 0.38 0.266 0.765 0.17
Notes: The parameter values are reported for the baseline model. The model is calibrated at a
quarterly frequency.
3.5.3.1 Parameters from the literature
The depreciation rate of capital (δk) is set at 2.5%, or 10% annually. This value
is a few percentage points higher than the 8% annually reported by Bergoeing et
al. (2002), which is done for computational convenience.10 I use the average annual
turnover rate of 32% (or 8% quarterly) in Chile between 1995 and 2000 to calibrate
(δl), based on Vergara (2005). I choose κ = 0.25, which corresponds to a capital
cost share of α = 1/3 and a 33% markup (η = 4).
I set wages (w) as the numaire. Setting wages as a parameter is justified in
the small open economy literature by assuming that there is a perfectly competitive
tradeable sector in the economy that operates a constant returns to scale technology
using only labor as an input. Fixing real wages could be problematic if there is
evidence that they fluctuate cyclically. This does not seem to be a concern in Chile
during this period. According to Gambetti and Messina (2014), real wages in the
manufacturing sector in Chile during the mid- to late-1990s were mostly acyclical.
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) set ρA = 0.95 and σA = 0.0175 in the version of
10Lower depreciation rates increase the number of grid points needed for computation. I ran
the unconditional simulation using a 8% depreciation rate and the unconditional moments are not
greatly affected.
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their model with independent aggregate productivity and country risk shocks. I use
this parametrization, despite the fact that their model is calibrated using data from
Argentina, because no similar parameterization exists for Chile.11
3.5.3.2 Interest rate and volatility process
The real interest rate series for Chile, constructed using the J.P. Morgan EMBI
spread and the U.S. T-Bill rate between 1998:Q1 and 2015:Q4, is used to calibrate{
R̄, ρR, σR, σ̄σ, ρσ, σσ
}





while the latter informs {σ̄σ, ρσ, σσ}.
The average quarterly interest rate (r̄) between 1998:Q1 and 2015:Q4 is 1.5%,
which yields R̄ = 1.015. Estimating an AR(1) process for the interest rate yields
a persistence (ρR) of 0.84 and a standard deviation of innovations (σR) equal to
0.0032. To parametrize the interest rate volatility process I take advantage of daily
real interest rate data. I generate the quarterly series of realized volatility as the
within-quarter real interest rate range. A similar method is used in Alizadeh et al.
(2002) in constructing a volatility estimator using stock trading data. The resulting
series yields σ̄σ = 0.0032, and an AR(1) estimation of the process yields a persistence
(ρσ) of 0.455 and a standard deviation of innovations (σσ) equal to 0.0030.
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the interest rate level and realized volatility
series. It captures that the period 1998:Q3 through 2002:Q4 is characterized by high
interest rates, and that the Great Recession triggered a less persistent increase in
11In the future I will calibrate these parameters to match moments of Chile’s GDP growth rate
series.
12Additional details on how the interest rate series is constructed are located in the appendix
C.5.
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interest rates. Interest rate volatility spikes in 1998:Q3, rises in for a few periods
in 2002:Q2, as well as during the Great Recession. The correlation between the
interest level and volatility series is positive and high (0.61). The model currently
imposes zero correlation between these shocks in order to isolate the independent
effect of interest rate level and volatility shocks on endogenous fluctuations in the
dispersion of marginal products and productivity.13













































1998q1 2002q3 2007q1 2011q3 2016q1
Interest Rate Level Interest Rate Volatility
Notes: The real interest rate series for Chile is constructed using the JP Morgan EMBI speak
and the US T-bill rate. The interest rate level is plotted in blue and the realized volatility series
is plotted in dashed red. The realized volatility series is constructed using a similar method to
Alizadeh et al. (2002).
3.5.3.3 Idiosyncratic productivity and adjustment costs
The remaining four parameters are chosen to be consistent with several mo-
ments from the micro-level data. I compute moments in the model by simulating a
13I leave it to future extensions to allow for correlated shocks that are more consistent with the
data.
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panel of 1,000 firms for 5,000 periods. Since each period corresponds to a quarter,
I generate panel of annual data using the last 120 period (or 30 years). Output,
investment and hiring are summed across four quarters, while labor is determined in
the first quarter and capital in the last quarter. This timing is consistent with the
idea that labor is used in production within the period (now a year) and capital is
only used in production in the subsequent period. I then compare the moments gen-
erated by the model with moments constructed using firm-level data and a balanced
sample of firms during the pre-crisis period (1980-1997).
The two adjustment costs parameters (Pl, Pk) are chosen to be consistent with
key moments from the investment rate and labor growth rate distributions. In
particular, I target the serial correlation, inaction rate, and positive and negative
spike rates. In choosing ρz and σz, I first estimate the productivity process at the



















where Ẑist is calculated to be consistent with the corresponding object ob-
tained in the model. As such, κs and λs are defined as κs = αs (1− 1/η), λs =
(1− αs) (1− 1/η), and αs = α = 1/3 , as in the empirical section above. I use ρD
to calibrate ρz, and the time series average of the industry-weighted cross-sectional
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from regression 3.32 to calibrate σz. In
appendix C.6 I consider two alternative ways of measuring 3.33 – using U.S. cost
shares for αs and using estimated elasticities (κs and λs) – in order to evaluate
the sensitivity of ρD and σD to these approaches. The estimates of ρD and σD are
similar across the three methods.
Table 3.3 summarizes the targeted moments and the corresponding model
moments based on the parameters in table 3.2. The model does reasonably in
capturing some of the regularities in the data. As Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
note, the idiosyncratic shock process interacts in important ways with adjustment
frictions. Spikes in investment and hiring are associated with the variability and
persistence of these shocks. For instance, there is a tradeoff between matching
the serial correlation of output and and the serial correlation of hiring. As the
persistence of the idiosyncratic process rises, so does the serial correlation of hiring,
which turns positive. As a result, my choice of ρz contributes to a negative serial
correlation in hiring. Higher idiosyncratic volatility (σz) lower inaction and raises
positive/negative spikes, particular for labor growth. The current parametrization
imposes a high volatility, but is still only able to capture half of the very high
idiosyncratic volatility observed in the data.
Pk is set to 0.4 and Pl is set to 0.38. The choice of Pk is in line with the
estimates reported by Fuentes et al. (2006) for Chile. I do not have estimates to
compare my choice of Pl, but it implies that hiring and firing costs equal 6.65%
of annual wages. There is some evidence that hiring/firing costs are high in Chile,
though this evidence cannot speak directly to whether the costs imposed here are
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accurate. Petrin and Sivadasan (2013) note that during the 1990s the maximum
severance package, which is increasing in tenure, was raised from five to eleven
months’ wages. Further, the World Bank reports that the average severance pay, in
salary weeks, for workers in Chile is 43.3. For comparison, the same figure in the
United Kingdom is 4 weeks. Less information is available regarding hiring costs, but
according to the World Bank Enterprise Survey around 58% of firms offer formal
training in Chile, while only 45% of firms in the OECD do.
Given these parameters, the model captures the positive serial correlation in
the investment rate and the negative serial correlation in the labor growth rate. It
does well in generating inaction in labor growth, but produces very large positive
spikes in labor growth, but does better in generating negative spikes. On the other
hand, the model generates too much inaction in investment, which has been noted
by Khan and Thomas (2008) and Fuentes et al. (2006) as a common feature of these
models. The model does reasonably well in predicting positive spikes in investment,
but does not generate any negative spikes.
For comparison, the last column of table 3.3 reports the statistics for an econ-
omy without adjustment costs (Pk = Pl = 0). The two economies differ particularly
when it comes to investment. For instance, serial correlation of investment is nega-
tive in a model without adjustment costs. Unsurprisingly, the model with no adjust-
ment costs is completely inconsistent with the lumpiness of firm-level investment.
Overall, the results suggest that a model with adjustment costs is more consistent
with the data than a model in which these costs are absent.
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Table 3.3: Adjustment Costs: Micro and Model Moments
Variable Data Baseline Frictionless
Persistence of Ẑist 0.42 0.41 0.52
Standard Deviation of Ẑist 0.40 0.21 0.19
Serial correlation (I) 0.14 0.07 -0.21
Serial correlation (H) -0.16 -0.11 -0.22
Inaction rate (I) 34.6% 58.3% 0.14%
Inaction rate (H) 11.1% 10.9% 0.93%
Positive spike rate (I) 39.1% 32.5% 52.2%
Positive spike rate (H) 30.9% 66.5% 61.6%
Negative spike rate (I) 1.4% 0.0% 37.7%
Negative spike rate (H) 19.4% 10.3% 30.1%
Notes: The table reports the targeted moments (column 1) and corresponding model moments for
the full model (column 2) and a frictionless model (column 3). The data moments are generated
from the ENIA data using a balanced sample of firms that is present in the data between 1980
and 2007.
3.6 Responding to interest rate shocks
In this section I present the results of the model and the economy’s response
to an interest rate level and volatility shock.
3.6.1 Adjustment costs, interest rate and the firm’s decision
Figure 3.6 shows how labor and capital adjustment frictions distort hiring and
investment relative to a frictionless economy. In the absence of adjustment costs
firms with that get low productivity draws lower labor hours and disinvest, while
those with high draws expand. The discontinuity in the price of capital arising from
partial irreversibility generates an incentive to delay investment. Similarly, linear
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labor adjustment frictions create an option value of waiting to hire/fire. Firms with
low enough productivity will still find it optimal to scale down labor hours and
those with sufficiently good conditions will want to hire. However, because hiring
and firing is costly, some firms will find that the value of waiting for better (or
worse) times is greater than the current returns to adjustment. The same intuition
applies for investment. The right panel of figure (3.6) shows that Pk = 0.38 implies
full irreversibility.14 Firms will never find it optimal to disinvest, and when firms do
invest, they do so at a rate below their counterparts in the frictionless economy.







































Notes: Hiring (left panel) and investment (right panel) decisions in the baseline model with
adjustment frictions and a version of the model in which Pk = Pl = 0. Depicted are the decisions
of when A = 1.12, R = 1.02 and interest rate volatility is low. The capital labor ratio is fixed
(K/L = 10). The specific capital labor ratio is chosen because it represents nearly 1% of firm density
in the ergodic steady state.
14Fuentes et al. (2006) find in their estimation that any sale price below 0.70 will imply complete
irreversibility. Their results are comparable to my own since they too use manufacturing sector
data from Chile.
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As shown in section 3.4, these adjustment frictions interact with both the
interest rate level and volatility. Focusing on the firm’s investment decision, figure
3.7 compares the level of investment (solid and dashed line, left y-axis) when interest
rates are low or high (left panel) and when volatility is low or high (right panel). The
figure also includes the cross-sectional density of firms (dotted line, right y-axis).
These are drawn for a particular capital-labor ratio that accounts for nearly 1% of
firms in the stochastic steady state distribution.
Figure 3.7: Interest Rate and the Firm’s Investment Decision










































































Notes: Both figures depict investment decisions for agents at a fixed capital labor ratio (K/L = 10)
and fixed aggregate productivity at ergodic mean of 1. The chosen capital labor ratio repre-
sents nearly 1% of firm density in the ergodic steady state. In the left panel uncertainty is set
to be low and Rlow = 1.012 and Rhigh = 1.028. The aggregate state corresponding to Rlow(
A = 1, Rlow = 1.012, σR = σ
L
)
accounts for 25% of the states in the unconditional simulation of
5, 000 periods. The aggregate state corresponding to Rhigh accounts for 7% of the states in the
simulation. In the right panel the interest rate is set to R = 1.012 and uncertainty is either
low or high. The aggregate state corresponding to σL accounts for 25%of the states and that
corresponding to σH accounts for 1% of states in the unconditional simulation.
159
Figure 3.7 indicates that the incentive to delay adjustment rises with the inter-
est rate level and volatility. When interest rates are high and volatile, firms become
less responsive to their productivity shocks. Only firms with the highest productiv-
ity still find it optimal to invest, albeit at a lower rate. For this capital-labor ratio,
the reported distribution suggests that a rise in the interest rate level or volatility
will induce a non-trivial fraction of firms to halt investment. Suppose instead the
distribution was heavily concentrated at log (Z) ≤ 0, then the investment behavior
of firms with this particular capital labor ratio would be unaffected. In short, the
greater the fraction of firms concentrated around the inaction threshold as it ex-
pands, the greater will be the impact of changes in the level and volatility of the
interest rate on investment behavior.
3.6.2 Economic Response to Interest Rate Shocks
I now consider the response of the model economy to an interest rate volatility
and interest rate level shock. To produce the impulse responses I simulate two
versions of 2, 000 economies for 100 periods. In each of these economies a shock hits
the first version of the economy in the 45th period, but does not hit the second. All
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks before and after this period are randomly drawn
according to the stochastic processes described in section 5. The IRFs reported
below are the cross-economy average percent difference between the shocked and
unshocked simulations. More formally, the impulse response (xt) of a series X at













where e represents the economy, XS represents the version of the economy
that experiences the shock, and XN represents the version of the economy that does
not. The series I consider are output, investment rate, hiring rate, share of firms
with zero investment, cross-sectional standard deviation of the marginal product
of capital and labor and aggregate productivity. I calculate aggregate productivity
as Y
KκLλ
to be consistent with the series reported in figure 3.1, where Y , K and L
represent aggregate output, capital stock and labor.
3.6.2.1 Interest Rate Volatility Shock
First consider the response to an interest rate volatility shock. Figure 3.8 shows
the impulse that drives the results. Quarter zero represents the period in which the
shock hits, and the vertical axis represents the average percent rise in volatility
experienced across economies. The rise is lower than 100 percent because some of
the economies already had high volatility when the shock hit. On average the shock
increases volatility by 65% and begins to dissipate relatively quickly thereafter since
it has low persistence. As the left panel shows, I am considering the response of the
economy when the level of the interest rate is left unaffected by the volatility shock
so as to capture the isolated effect of an increase in the interest rate volatility.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse: Interest rate volatility shock











































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs for the interest rate level (left) and interest rate volatility
(right) shocks. In this simulation, only the interest rate volatility is shocked. To produce the IRFs
two versions of two economies are simulated for 100 periods each. In each of these economies, in
one version the shock hits in the 45th period and in the second it does not. The IRFs are the
cross-economy average percent differences between the shocked and unshocked simulations.
Figure 3.9 plots the response of aggregate output, investment and hiring. It
shows a persistent fall in output that bottoms out in the second quarter after the
shock and begins to recover thereafter. Investment plummets by over 60% on impact
and rebounds within three quarters. The sharp fall in investment is in part a result
of the partial equilibrium setting, as can be seen in Bloom et al. (2018). The effect of
interest rate volatility on hiring is similar to investment, though weaker. Hiring falls
by less than 5% and takes longer to rebound than investment. As seen in figure 3.7,
an interest rate volatility shock expands the range of investment inaction and lowers
investment demand. Both of these effects contribute to the initial fall in investment.
As the shock dissipates the share of firms completely freezing investment falls. As
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these firms address their pent up demand for capital, investment rebounds and
overshoots. The same dynamics explain the behavior of hiring.
Figure 3.9: Response to a Volatility Shock: Output, Investment and Hiring





























































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs in response to an interest rate volatility shock for output (left),
investment (middle) and hiring (right). To produce the IRFs two versions of two economies are
simulated for 100 periods each. In each of these economies, in one version the shock hits in the 45th
period and in the second it does not. The IRFs are the cross-economy average percent differences
between the shocked and unshocked simulations.
Consider now the effect of a volatility shock on productivity. Here I focus on
the role of capital since it plays a larger role in driving the aggregate response of
output. First, a rise in volatility triggers firms to freeze investment. This manifests
itself as an increase in investment inaction, which rises by nearly 12 percent on
impact; a similar rise in inaction is observed for hiring. This increase in the share
of firms freezing investment activity is short-lived given the temporary nature of
the shock. Since capital takes on period to become productive, the increase in
investment inaction on impact will translate to a rise in the dispersion of marginal
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product of capital beginning one period after the shock, as can be seen in the second
panel from the left in the figure below.
The initial fall in dispersion ofMPK may seem puzzling at first, but it is driven
by the fact that capital is predetermined when the shock hits while labor adjusts
within the period. The time to build assumption on capital means that firms choose
capital based on their expectations of future productivity, interest rate and labor.
The fall in dispersion on impact is indicative of too much capital adjustment ex
ante, given the pause in hiring in response to the shock ex post.15 The third panel
shows that dispersion in marginal product of labor rises when the shock hits and
falls in subsequent periods. Since the rise in dispersion of MPL exceeds the fall in
dispersion of MPK, productivity (seen in the last panel below) falls on impact.16
Productivity reaches its trough in the first period after the shock, which also
coincides with the period in which dispersion in MPK reaches its peak. Note further
that the overshoot in productivity beginning in the fifth period after the shock arises
because as the shock dissipates firms begin to address their pent up demand for
hiring and investment, as evidenced by the falling dispersion in marginal products.
In fact, the overshoot in productivity coincides closely with the period in which
dispersion in MPL falls sharply below zero.
15If I turn off labor adjustment frictions completely the initial fall in dispersion of MPK disap-
pears. Additionally, if I assume that labor also faces a one period delay before becoming productive,
the initial fall in MPK dispersion also disappears. The initial fall is therefore driven by the fact
that labor faces adjustment frictions and that there is a difference in timing of capital and labor
decisions.
16I have verified through various experiments that productivity will rise on impact if dispersion
in MPK falls by more than the dispersion in MPL rises when the shock hits the economy.
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Figure 3.10: Response to a Volatility Shock: I Inaction, Misallocation & Productiv-
ity
































































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs in response to an interest rate volatility shock for investment
inaction (first from the left), MPK dispersion (second), MPL dispersion (third), and productivity
(fourth). To produce the IRFs two versions of two economies are simulated for 100 periods each.
In each of these economies, in one version the shock hits in the 45th period and in the second it
does not. The IRFs are the cross-economy average percent differences between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.
The response of the model economy is consistent with Chile’s experience during
the sudden stop. The volatility shocks triggers a freeze in investment, a rise in
dispersion of marginal products and a fall in productivity. During the downturn
the fall in output is far larger than he fall in productivity. While the response
of the economy is qualitatively consistent with the response observed in the data,
quantitatively the effect is small.
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3.6.2.2 Interest Rate Level Shock
The response of the economy to an interest rate shock is quite similar to its
response to a volatility shock. Figure 3.11 depicts the impulse, which increases the
real interest rate by one percentage point. To put this into context, at the onset of
the sudden stop Chile’s real interest rate rose by 0.9 percentage points between the
second and third quarters of 1998. The shock introduced in the model is therefore
capturing the response of the economy to a shock of similar magnitude to that
which hit Chile at the end of 1998. The one percentage point increase corresponds
to around a 3 standard deviation shock to the interest rate level, which satisfies the
definition of a sudden stop in Calvo and Talvi (2005).
The economy responds more strongly to the interest rate level shock than it
does to the volatility shock. This reflects the fact that an increase in the interest
rate creates stronger incentives to delay investment and hiring. The fall in output is
more persistent and reaches its trough around one and a half years after the initial
shock. This response is consistent Calvo et al. (2006) who find that across the 22
sudden stop episodes considered, average output falls by 7 percent within two years
and recovers thereafter, albeit more quickly than in the model economy. The higher
persistence in output, as well as other series, also reflect the the higher persistence
of interest rate level shocks.
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Figure 3.11: Impulse: Interest rate level shock














































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs for the R level (left) and R volatility (right) shocks. In this
simulation, only the interest level is shocked (a one percentage point increase). To produce the
IRFs two versions of two economies are simulated for 100 periods each. In each of these economies,
in one version the shock hits in the 45th period and in the second it does not. The IRFs are the
cross-economy average percent differences between the shocked and unshocked simulations.
The figure also makes clear that investment and hiring fall slightly more than
they do in response to an interest rate level shock, and recover at a slower rate. The
same forces that drive an overshoot in investment and hiring following a volatility
shock are present here, but simply take longer to take effect. Moreover, as is clear
in the second panel in the figure below, the model again overpredicts the response
of investment, which is due to a combination of strong investment frictions and the
partial equilibrium setting.17
17For comparison, in the partial equilibrium exercise in Bloom et al. (2018), investment falls by
100 percent.
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Figure 3.12: Response to a R Level Shock: Output, Investment and Hiring



























































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs in response to an interest rate level shock (one percentage
point) for output (left), investment (middle) and hiring (right). To produce the IRFs two versions
of two economies are simulated for 100 periods each. In each of these economies, in one version
the shock hits in the 45th period and in the second it does not. The IRFs are the cross-economy
average percent differences between the shocked and unshocked simulations.
The effect of interest rate shocks on investment inaction, dispersion in marginal
products and aggregate productivity are qualitatively the same and quantitatively
stronger than the effect of a volatility shock. Namely, the shock leads to an immedi-
ate freeze in investment, which raises investment inaction on impact. This slowdown
in in investment raises the dispersion in the marginal product of capital beginning
one period after the shock. Since labor does not face the same kind of time-to-build
friction, labor adjustment freezes and generates a rise in the dispersion of marginal
product of labor in the same period that the interest rate rises. The fall in the
dispersion in MPK in the period that shock hits arises from the difference in the
timing associated with investment and hiring. Moreover, the fall in dispersion in
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MPK is outweighed by the rise in dispersion of MPL, which leads to an initial fall
in productivity.
Here again the fall in out is far larger than the fall in productivity, the later of
which falls by only a small fraction (about one-thirteenth) of what is observed in the
data. To put these effects into context, I consider a version of the model in which
the interest rate is constant and aggregate productivity shocks drive the economy.
Appendix C.7 reports the results of an alternative experiment in which I impose a
1.6 percentage point increase in the interest rate in order to generate the 4 percent
decline in aggregate output observed in the data. Under this scenario productivity
falls by 0.46%, or 1/9 of the decline observed in the data.
Figure 3.13: Response to a R Level Shock: I Inaction, Misallocation & Productivity

























































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs in response to an interest rate volatility level shock (one
percentage point) for investment inaction (first from the left), MPK dispersion (second), MPL
dispersion (third), and productivity (fourth). To produce the IRFs two versions of two economies
are simulated for 100 periods each. In each of these economies, in one version the shock hits in
the 45th period and in the second it does not. The IRFs are the cross-economy average percent
differences between the shocked and unshocked simulations.
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3.6.2.3 Comparison to the Data
The model predicts that aggregate productivity falls in response to a rise in
the interest rate level or volatility because these shocks raise the value of waiting
to invest/disinvest and adjust labor hours. As firms become less responsive to their
own productivity shocks the dispersion in marginal products rises, signaling an
increase in resource misallocation. Section 3.3 shows that during the 1998 sudden
stop dispersion rose and productivity fell among firms in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 3.14 complements these findings with evidence that during the same period,
the share of firms delaying investment rose by around 8 percentage points between
1998 and 2000, which is consistent with the behavior of the model economy. Overall
the model qualitatively captures important features of the firm-level data during
the sudden, including the fall in output, investment, rise in resource misallocation
and fall in productivity, but misses the mark quantitatively.
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Productivity
Notes: Manufacturing Census (ENIA) and author’s calculations. All figures are presented for a
balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The top-left figure
plots investment inaction, the top-right figure plots the dispersion of MRPKR, and the botton
figure plots productivity. All figures are plotted ad the deviation from the pre-crisis (1997) level.
The grey vertical line denotes the onset of the 1998 sudden stop.
3.6.2.4 Exploiting Cross-Industry Variation
One prediction arising from the model is that interest rate shocks will generate
larger fluctuations when many firms are at the investment and hiring thresholds than
when many firms already find themselves in the inaction region. This arises from
the fact that a rise in the interest rate level or volatility expands the inaction region.
The more firms there are near this threshold when the shock hits, the more of them
will respond by freezing investment and hiring, which triggers a rise in resource
misallocation. On the other hand, if there are many firms already inside of the
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inaction region then they will simply continue to delay investment and hiring in
response to the shock, which generates a weaker response.
Figure 3.15 demonstrates this prediction. For this exercise, I simulate the
model response to a one percentage point interest rate level shock for two different
initial conditions. The first simulation (depicted as the solid line in the figure below)
has a large mass of firms near the investment and hiring thresholds. The second
simulation (depicted as the dashed line) has a large mass of firms already inside of the
inaction region. Output falls over twice as much and productivity falls nearly twice
as much in the simulation with many firms at the threshold. Moreover, investment
inaction and fluctuations in misallocation, measured as the rise in dispersion of
MPK, are far stronger in the first simulation.
Currently, I identify the effect of interest rate fluctuations using only time
variation in the data. Using the prediction of the model described here, in the future
I can exploit differences across industries in the degree of investment hysterisis prior
to the crisis to help me identify how adjustment frictions interacted with interest rate
shocks to generate fluctuations in resource misallocation and productivity during the
sudden stop.
172




























































































Notes: The figures depict the IRFs of output (first to the left), investment inaction (second),
MPK dispersion (third), and productivity (fourth) in response to a one percentage point shock to
the level of the real interest rate. The economy represented with solid red line has a large mass of
firms near the investment and hiring thresholds at the onset of the crisis. The economy represented
with the dashed blue line has a large mass of firms already in the inaction region.
3.7 Conclusion
Given the close connection between output and productivity observed during
sudden stops in emerging economies we need a better understanding of what drives
the fall and recovery of productivity during these crises. Several channels, including
entry and exit and capacity utilization have been explored in the literature. The
former channel helps explain the long-run effects of sudden stops, while the lat-
ter emphasizes variation in measured productivity at the firm level. I focus on a
complementary channel associated with short-run fluctuations in productivity and
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allocative efficiency within industries.
In particular, I ask whether resource misallocation arising from adjustment
frictions contributes to fluctuations in aggregate productivity during sudden stops.
As interest rates rise and the volatility of these rates increases firms freeze investment
and hiring until interest rate conditions normalize. As a consequence firms become
more unresponsive to their individual productivity and demand conditions, which
in turn contributes to worsening allocative efficiency within industries. This rise in
resource misallocation triggers a fall in aggregate productivity. Because spikes in the
interest rate and volatility are temporary, the adjustment cost channel contributes to
worsening misallocation in the short-run. After rates and volatility fall, firms begin
to invest and adjust labor hours, which triggers a fall in resource misallocation and
a rebound in productivity.
Using Chile’s experience following Russia’s default in 1998, I assess the rele-
vance of the adjustment cost channel. Using manufacturing-sector firm-level data I
show evidence of worsening allocative efficiency during the sudden stop. In partic-
ular, I show that declines in aggregate productivity coincide with a period in which
the dispersion of marginal products was on the rise. Moreover, there is ample evi-
dence that adjustment frictions are relevant given the high frequency of periods of
no investment and hiring in the data.
To isolate the aggregate implications of interest rate fluctuations, I use a struc-
tural approach. I modify a standard heterogeneous firm investment model with
with non-convex investment and labor adjustment costs and a stochastic interest
rate that is subject to level and volatility shocks. The model is calibrated using the
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real interest rate and firm-level data from Chile. I find that in response to a rise in
the interest rate level or volatility, firms freeze hiring and investment temporarily,
which generate a rise in the dispersion of marginal products and a fall in aggregate
productivity. The effect of these shocks is temporary and as conditions normalize
firms begin to address their pent up investment and labor demand, which generates
a strong rebound and mild overshoot.
While the model is qualitatively consistent with the evolution of output, in-
vestment, misallocation and productivity observed in the data during the crisis, it
only explains a very small fraction of fluctuations during the sudden stop. The evi-
dence suggests that adjustment frictions may contribute to aggregate fluctuations,
but other channels play a role. In future research I plan to exploit industry-level
variation to assess whether the model’s prediction that industries with a large mass
of firms near the investment and hiring thresholds are more affected by interest rate
shocks than industries in which there is already little investment and hiring. Since
the adjustment cost channel explains only a portion of the economy’s response to
interest rate shocks, I would like to incorporate additional channels to assess the
relative importance of the adjustment costs emphasized here. In doing so I plan
to incorporate firm heterogeneity and non-convex adjustment costs into a standard
small-open economy general equilibrium model with an entry and exit margin to see
whether adjustment frictions remain an relevant in propagating aggregate shocks.
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A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Probabilistic Name and Address Matching Procedure
This paper combines ownership data obtained from BvD with firm-level data
from the Business Register (BR) using EIN and probabilistic name and address
matching. The LBD is derived from BR and information from both sources is used
in the matching procedure. Both the BR and BvD data contain firm name, employer
identification number (EIN), street address, city, state, zip code, and industry. While
BR records generally have complete information on all variables, BvD records often
have information on a subset of them.
BvD does not track EIN, name, and address information for entities over time.
Instead, it provides a single record per entity. As a result, the matching is done for
the entire period (2007-2013), rather than annually. As a first step, annual BR
records dating back to 1976 are pooled to create a data set containing all unique
EIN, firm name, and address records, along with identifiers indicating the years for
which these records are valid. Similarly, the BvD firm name, address and EIN data
are linked to the ownership data to identify the years in which entities are active. In
the second step, the pooled BR and BvD data are cleaned to standardize firm name
and address variables. Each standardized string variable (name, street address, and
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city) is then parsed to create a match code that will be used for probabilistic name
and address matching.
The third step implements a ten-stage matching procedure, similar to McCue
and Jarmin (2005). In the first stage, BvD records that contain EIN information
are matched with BR records on this variable. In the second stage, all records that
contain firm name and location information are matched based on fuzzed name,
street address and city, and and exact 2-digit state code.1 All remaining unmatched
records are then matched in the third stage based on the fuzzed name and city
and exact 2-digit state and 5-digit zip code. Remaining records are then iteratively
matched based on different combinations of firm name and location information.
Stages 4 through 6 use fuzzed entity name and different combinations of two location
variables. Stages 7 through 9 use fuzzed entity name and different combinations of
one location variable. In the tenth stage all records, including those matched in
previous stages, are matched only on fuzzed name.2
As a consequence of probabilistic matching, a single BvD record can be linked
to multiple BR records at the conclusion of the third step. The fourth step involves
several stages aimed at disambiguating multiple matches. The first stage keeps
matched records where the matched LBD firm and BvD entity are active in the
1The term fuzzed refers to matching on the match code for each variable generated in the
second step.
2Note that all BvD records are considered for matching in stage 1 (EIN), stage 2 (name and full
address), and stage 10. This is done because BvD does not report the dates for which the EIN and
address variables are valid. A firm with multiple establishments may acquire new EINs and/or
change the EIN used for reporting wages, or change the headquarter address over its lifetime.
Reconsidering all firms for matching in stages 1, 2, and 10 is a flexible way of accounting for this
reporting uncertainty, and various techniques are used in step 4 to identify the best (most accurate)
match.
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same years. Among remaining records, the second stage keeps those matched in the
lowest stage (most strict criteria) in step three. The third stage creates a composite
match quality score for each record based on firm name, city, state, and zip code
(both 5-digit and 3-digit). The proximity of string variables (firm name and city)
is determined using the Jaro-Winkler score. Records with the highest composite
match quality score are kept. Among remaining multiple matches, those in which
the LBD and BvD firms are active in the same industry are kept. The last stage
drops records for which the best match has a sufficiently low composite score and
records that could not be sufficiently disambiguated.
A.2 Two-Period Model
This section presents a two-period single-agent model of risky productivity-
enhancing investment. This stylized model rationalizes the positive relationship
between diversification and risky investment, and extends the model presented in
section 1.5 by endogenizing the degree of diversification.
A.2.1 Setup
There are two periods, denoted by t = 1, 2 and the second period is composed
of two sub-periods. Consider an owner who enters the first period (t = 1) with a0
initial assets. The owner is assumed to be risk-averse with log utility. In the first
period, the owner chooses how much to save (a1) at an exogenous real interest rate
(r), and how many firms (n) to operate. He pays nθ to operate these firms, where
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θ is the entry cost per firm. These firms are not divisible and the owner holds 100%
of the each firm’s equity. It is assumed that firms become operational in the second
period so that at the end of the first period, the owner consumes his remaining
assets (c1 = a0 − a1 − nθ).
The owner enters the second period (t = 2) with savings chosen in the first
period (a1) and the n firms he controls. Each firm held by the owner produces via
the following production function:
y = q(1−α)lα (A.1)
where q is a measure of productivity and l is labor demand, which has a per
unit cost of ω. In the second sub-period of t = 2, productivity (q) is known, labor




(1 + x) w/ prob. λ
(1− x) w/ prob. (1− λ)
(A.2)
where x is a choice variable reflecting risky investment and λ is a parameter
denoting the probability of success. Investments are chosen in the first sub-period
of t = 2, and are restricted to x ε [0, 1] to ensure positive output (y). First, the
outcome of investment is uncorrelated across firms. Second, consistent with the
notion of risky investment, higher investment is associated with higher potential
returns, and a larger gap between productivity in the case of success versus failure.
To highlight the role of diversification, it is assumed that there is no additional cost
associated with implementing risky investment x.
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Given each owner’s initial assets (a0), he chooses the number of firms to operate
(n), savings (a1), and the labor input (l2i) and investment (x2i) in each firm i ε [1, n]
that he owns to maximize his expected utility.
EU = log(c1) + βE log(c2) (A.3)
s.t. c1 = a0 − a1 − nθ










(1 + x2i) w/ prob. λ
(1− x2i) w/ prob. (1− λ)
where β is the owner’s discount factor, θ is the entry cost per firm, r is the
exogenous real interest rate, α is the decreasing returns to scale parameter, ω is the
per unit labor cost, and λ denotes the probability of success.
Two versions of this problem are solved. In the first version, the owner faces
no additional constraint. As shown below, this results in owners borrowing in the
first period to purchase the maximum number of firms, which enables them to
diversify idiosyncratic risk in the second period. Under this first version, there is no
heterogeneity in diversification. The second version imposes the following additional
constraint:
a1 ≥ 0 (A.4)
Constraint (A.4) imposes that owners cannot borrow. This extreme assumption
prevents owners from borrowing to open the maximum number of firms. It generates
variation in the degree of diversification across owners. Admittedly, the assumption
of no borrowing is quite extreme.
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A.2.2 Solution
Across the two versions of the model, the underlying solution steps remain
the same. The owner’s problem is solved by starting in the second period (t = 2).
Assuming that this period is split into two sub-periods separates the investment and
labor decisions. In the second sub-period, a1 is determined, q2i is known and the








2i − wl2i] + (1 + r)a1
)
(A.5)







When x2i is chosen in the first sub-period of t = 2, the owner’s expected utility
is:
EU = E log
( n∑
i=1
[πq2i] + (1 + r)a1
)
(A.7)




1−α . Because π is common to all firms, the owner chooses
x2i = x2 for the firms he controls. Using the fact that the probability of success
follows a binomial distribution, define P(k, n, λ) as the probability of observing k
successes in a binomial process with n trails and success probability λ:






In the first sub-period of t = 2, the owner chooses x2 to solve:
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P(k, n, λ) ln(π[k(1 + x2) + (n− k)(1− x2)] + (1 + r)a1) (A.9)
In the first period, the owner enters with initial assets (a0) and no firms. He
first chooses the number of firms (n) and then at the end of the period chooses
savings (a1) to solve:
V1(a0, 0) = max
a1,n
ln(a0 − a1 − nθ) + βV2(a1, n) (A.10)
A.2.3 Results
The two-period single-agent model described in the previous section cannot
be solved analytically. The two versions of the model are solved numerically using










Notes: This table reports the parameter values used in the numerical solution of the model
described in section A.2. α denotes the decreasing returns to scale parameter, ω denotes the per
unit cost of labor, and λ denotes the probability that investment will be successful, θ is the per
firm entry cost, β is the owner’s discount factor, r is the real interest rate, and n is the maximum
number of firms each owner can control.
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In the table, α denotes the decreasing returns to scale parameter, ω denotes
the per unit cost of labor, and λ denotes the probability that investment will be
successful, θ is the per firm entry cost, β is the owner’s discount factor, r is the real
interest rate, and n is the maximum number of firms each owner can control.
A.2.3.1 Unconstrained
Starting off with the unconstrained model is useful to highlight the relation-
ship between investment, diversification, and savings. Figure A.1 shows the owner’s
second period optimal investment (x2) decision. Consistent with the empirical re-
sults and static model in section 1.5, the left panel of figure A.1 shows that across
different levels of savings (a1), optimal investment is increasing in diversification.
This first result arises from owners finding safety in variety when firms are subject
to idiosyncratic investment risk. The right panel of figure A.1 shows further that
across different levels of diversification (n), optimal investment is increasing in sav-
ings. This second result shows that owners with higher savings are also able to use
these savings to insure themselves against idiosyncratic risk.
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Figure A.1: Investment, Diversification (left panel) and Savings (right panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






























































Notes: The figure in the left panel plots optimal investment (x2) on the y-axis against diversifi-
cation (n) on the x-axis, an each line represents a different level of savings (a1). The figure in the
right panel plots optimal investment (x2) on the y-axis against savings (a1) on the x-axis, an each
line represents a different level of diversification (n). In this version of the model, the owner faces
no additional constraints.
While the savings and diversification decisions are made simulataneously in
the first period, it is useful to show how savings moves with initial assets and di-
versification separately. Figure A.2 shows the owners optimal savings (a1) decision.
For a given level of initial assets (a0), savings are decreasing in diversification since
opening more firms requires a higher start-up cost paid in the first period. For
a given level of diversification (n), savings are increasing in initial assets. This
arises because with higher initial assets, less borrowing is required to open the same
number of firms.
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Figure A.2: Savings, Diversification (left panel) and Initial Assets (right panel)
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Notes: The figure in the left panel plots optimal savings (a1) on the y-axis against diversification
(n) on the x-axis, an each line represents a different level of initial assets (a0). The figure in the
right panel plots optimal savings (a1) on the y-axis against initial assets (a0) on the x-axis, an
each line represents a different level of diversification (n). In this version of the model, the owner
faces no additional constraints.
Figure A.3 reports the owner’s diversification (n) and savings (a1) decisions as
a function of initial assets (a0), while figure A.4 reports the resulting second period
risky investment (x2) and expected value. Figure A.3 makes clear the implications
of not imposing a borrowing constraint. Owners open the maximum number of firms
(left panel) in order to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk arising from investment
in the second period. Those with low initial assets borrow (right panel) in order to
finance these firms. Only the wealthiest owners are able to finance the purchase of
all firms out of their initial wealth and still save.
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Figure A.3: Initial Assets, Diversificataion (left panel) and Savings (right panel)











































Notes: The figure in the left panel plots savings (a1) on the y-axis against initial assets (a0) on
the x-axis. The figure in the right panel plots the number of firms (n) on the y-axis against initial
assets (a0). In this version of the model, the owner faces no additional constraints.
The left panel of figure A.4 documents a positive relationship between initial
assets and risky investment. This positive relationship is entirely driven by the pos-
itive relationship between savings and investment documented in the right panel of
A.1. Intuitively, because higher initial assets are associated with higher investment
and output, the right panel of figure A.4 shows that owner’s expected value is also
increasing in initial assets. The next section explores how imposing a borrowing
constraint gives rise to differences in optimal diversification and generates a role for
the risk-sharing channel observed in the data.
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Figure A.4: Initial Assets, Investment (left panel) and Expected Value (right panel)

















































Notes: The figure in the left panel plots optimal investment (x2) on the y-axis against initial
assets (a0) on the x-axis. The figure in the right panel plots the resulting expected value on the
y-axis against initial assets (a0) on the x-axis. In this version of the model, the owner faces no
additional constraints.
A.2.3.2 Constrained
The two versions of the model with borrowing constraints hinder the owner’s
ability to open the maximum number of firms in the first period. Since this bor-
rowing constraint affects the owner’s first period decision, this section highlights
differences in the owner’s optimal diversification and savings decisions as a function
of his initial assets in the first period and his subsequent investment decision.
Figure A.5 shows the relationship between initial assets and diversification for
the three models. In the no constraint model (solid green line), regardless of initial
assets owners choose the maximum number of firms. Under no borrowing (dashed
blue line) or constrained borrowing (dotted red line) owners with higher initial assets
choose a higher degree of diversification. Intuitively, while the no constraint model
represents one extreme and results in the highest diversification, the no borrowing
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model represents another extreme and results in the lowest diversification. In the no
borrowing model, only owners with initial assets above 1.8 are unconstrained and
choose the maximum number of firms. In the constrained borrowing model, owners
become unconstrained above initial assets of 0.8 and below this point can afford to
open fewer than the maximum number of firms.
Figure A.5: Initial Assets and Diversification




























Notes: The figure shows the optimal diversification (n, y-axis) policy as a function of initial assets
(a0, x-axis) for three versions of the model. The solid green line represents the no constraints model,
the dashed blue line represents the no borrowing model, and the dotted red line represents the
model in which the owner’s borrowing is constrained to a fraction of his expected returns.
Figure A.6 plots the owner’s savings decision as a function of his initial assets.
In the unconstrained model owners withe lower initial assets borrow heavily to open
the maximum number of firms. Only owners with the highest initial assets are able
to open these firms and save. The constraints introduced in the no borrowing and
constrained borrowing models force the owners to save more (borrow less) than they
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otherwise would. In the no borrowing model most owners choose neither to borrow
nor save. Note the small increases in savings at a0 = 0.60. When initial assets lie
between 0.48 and 0.60 owners have sufficient assets to open three firms, but not to
cover the fixed cost of opening a fourth firm. An owner with a0 = 0.60 therefore
saves the remaining initial assets. An owner with slightly higher initial assets of 0.64
can finance the purchase of a fourth firms, but due to the additional expense cannot
save. This same logic explains other small spikes in the savings decision of owners in
the no borrowing model. In the constrained borrowing model, the declining savings
in the range of initial assets associated with constrained owners arises because as
initial assets rise owners are opening more firms and as the left panel of figure A.2
shows, there is a negative relationship between savings and diversification. When
initial assets surpass 0.8 owners become unconstrained, open the maximum number
of firms, and make the same savings decisions as in the no constraint model.
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Figure A.6: Initial Assets and Diversification





















Notes: The figure shows the optimal savings (a1, y-axis) policy as a function of initial assets (a0,
x-axis) for three versions of the model. The solid green line represents the no constraints model,
the dashed blue line represents the no borrowing model, and the dotted red line represents the
model in which the owner’s borrowing is constrained to a fraction of his expected returns.
Figure A.7 documents the optimal risky investment in each of the three mod-
els. In the no constraint model the positive relationship between initial assets and
investment arises because savings is increasing in initial assets and investment is in-
creasing in savings. Diversification plays no role since all owners hold the maximum
number of firms in this model. In the no borrowing model, the positive relationship
between initial assets and investment is driven almost entirely by the positive rela-
tionship between investment and diversification since regardless of the level of initial
assets savings is very close to zero. In the constrained borrowing model, the positive
relationship between investment and initial assets is driven both by diversification
when initial assets are below 1 and owners hold fewer than the maximum number of
190
firms and by savings when initial assets are above 1 and owners hold the maximum
number of firms.
Figure A.7: Initial Assets and Diversification


























Notes: The figure shows the optimal investment (x2, y-axis) policy as a function of initial assets
(a0, x-axis) for three versions of the model. The solid green line represents the no constraints
model, the dashed blue line represents the no borrowing model, and the dotted red line represents
the model in which the owner’s borrowing is constrained to a fraction of his expected returns.
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B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Comparison of LOCUS and QFR data
Although QFR surveys both small and large firms in the manufacturing sec-
tor, LOCUS has better coverage of small firms. To be consistent with figures 2.3
and 2.4, we focus on the year 2010. Since coverage in the QFR is greatest in the
manufacturing sector, we also focus on this sector in the LBD, Compustat, and LO-
CUS. In the figure B.1, we plot the distribution of real revenue, which is available
for all four data sources. The three non-LBD data sources have a greater mass of
large firms than the LBD. While QFR contains smaller firms than Compustat, the
LOCUS distribution of real revenue is closer that of the LBD than QFR.
In figure B.2, we plot the distribution of log real total assets for the three data
sources where this variable is available – Compustat, LOCUS and QFR. Again, we
see that while QFR’s coverage of small firms is better than Compustat, it is worse
than LOCUS. Moreover, LOCUS contains data on both small and large firms in
sectors outside of manufacturing, while QFR surveys only large firms outside of
manufacturing.
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Figure B.1: Comparison of Revenue Distributions (2010, Manufacturing Sector)
Notes: This figure compares the distribution of firm-level revenue in the manufacturing sector
across four samples in 2010. The first sample contains firms in the LBD, the second contains
LOCUS (both private and public firms), the third contains Compustat firms (public firms), and
the last are firms in the Quarterly Financial Report (QFR). The distributions are generated using
kernel density estimation and the top and bottom tails have been removed to comply with disclosure
requirements.
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Figure B.2: Comparison of Total Assets Distributions (2010, Manufacturing Sector)
Notes: This figure compares the distribution of firm-level total assets in the manufacturing sector
across three samples in 2010. The first sample contains firms in LOCUS (both private and public
firms), the second contains only Compustat firms (public firms), and the last contains firms in the
Quarterly Financial Report (QFR). The distributions are generated using kernel density estimation
and the top and bottom tails have been removed to comply with disclosure requirements.
B.2 Matching Procedure
Orbis and Compustat contain entity name, employer identification number
(EIN), city, state and zip code; Compustat additionally contains street address in-
formation. LBD records can be linked to the business register, which contains firm
name, EIN, street address, city, state and zip code. The LBD/SSEL is linked to Or-
bis and Compustat separately and annually using a multi-stage probabilistic match-
ing procedure similar to that used in McCue (2003) to construct the Compustat-
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SSEL bridge that is available through 2005.
In all, there are nine stages to our matching procedure. In the first stage, Orbis
and Compustat records that have EIN information are matched to the LBD/SSEL
based on this variable. All remaining unmatched records, along with those that
do not contain EIN but contain location information, are then matched based on
fuzzed entity name, address, city, and exact state and zip code.1 For Compustat the
second stage matches records based on fuzzed name street address, city and exact
state. This second stage cannot be implemented for Orbis because street address
is unavailable. The third stage matches records based on fuzzed name and city,
and exact state and zip code. Stages 4 through 6 rely on different combinations
of fuzzed entity name and two location identifiers. Finally, stages 7 through 9 use
fuzzed entity name and one location identifier. In contrast to McCue (2003), we do
not base any matches solely on fuzzed entity name.
Due to the probabilistic nature of the matching, one Orbis/Compustat record
will initially be linked to multiple records in the LBD/SSEL. First, we clean the
annual matched data. Each potential match is evaluated based on the similar-
ity in location (zip code, city and state), name, and industry code between the
Orbis/Compustat record and its match in the LBD/SSEL. We rely on the Jaro-
Winkler distance to measure the similarity between each matched name and city.2
For each Orbis or Compustat record, only the highest quality match is retained.
This first stage of cleaning results in a data set in which each record, corresponding
1The term fuzzed refers to our use of the DQMATCH procedure implemented in SAS.
2We thank Mark Kutzbach at the U.S. Census Bureau for giving us access to the Jaro-Winkler
comparator code.
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to a firm-year observation, in Orbis/Compustat is matched to just one record in
LBD/SSEL.
We further clean our matches to obtain a panel cross-walk between Orbis/
Compustat entities and firms in the LBD/SSEL by taking advantage of the in-
formation on matches over time. First, if an Orbis/Compustat entity consistently
matches with only one LBD/SSEL firm, but a match was not achieved for all the
years for which we have records, the LBD/SSEL firm identifier is imputed. Second,
if an Orbis/Compustat entity matched to multiple firms over time, we keep the
firm(s) that were matched with the strictest criteria. Third, if an Orbis/Compustat
entity still matches to multiple firms over time based on the same criteria, we keep
the firm(s) with the highest overall match score. One additional imputation is done
for Compustat. A key difference between Orbis and Compustat is that the entity
name and location variables in Compustat are static over time and represent infor-
mation provided by the entity in its latest filing. As a result, for Compustat firms
if multiple firm matches remain after the previous steps have been implemented, we
take the latest match and impute it backwards.
As a final check, we bring in firm employment and age information from the
LBD. For records in which we imputed the LBD/SSEL firm due to multiple firm
matches over time, we only consider the imputation valid if we observe firm employ-
ment or age in the year the imputation was made. We revert to the original firm
match if the imputation is considered invalid. After this step is implemented we
still have cases where one Orbis/Compustat entity is matched to multiple firms over
time. This could be picking up firm-level reorganization and/or mergers and acqui-
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sitions. In order to ensure that multiple matches are not driven by the probabilistic
nature of our matching, we drop cases where an Orbis/Compustat entity matched
with more than three LBD firms. Very few observations are dropped by this criteria,
and our implicit assumption is that in the 11 years used in our matching we don’t
expect a firm to go through more than three reorganizations. Finally, we drop cases
where a firm matches with more than two entities and the matches are based on
fuzzed name and less than three location criteria.
After these steps have been implemented, we end up with two data sets. Our
Orbis-LBD/SSEL data which contains nearly 78 percent of underlying Orbis entity-
year observations, corresponding to 70 percent of entities in the underlying Orbis
data. 76 percent of these matches are based on EIN, while an additional 18 percent
are based on name, zip code, city and state. Our Compustat-LBD/SSEL data con-
tains 84 percent of underlying Compustat entity-year observations, corresponding
to 79 percent of entities in the underlying Compustat data. The match rate at the
firm-level is consistent with the match rate of Compustat firms reported in McCue
(2003) once we take into account that none of our matches are made solely on fuzzed
name. 75 percent of these matches are based on EIN, while an additional 6 percent
are based on name and full address information.
As a final step in constructing LOCUS, we combine Orbis-LBD/SSEL and
Compustat-LBD/SSEL matched datasets to ensure that we do not double count
any publicly-listed firms that are in both data sets. We begin by matching the two
data sets. If a firm appears in both matched data sets, we give preference to the
the data source (Orbis or Compustat) with the longest sample period. Since all
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Compustat financial statements are consolidated, we expect that only one Compu-
stat entity matches to a LBD firm in each year. In a very limited number of cases
more than one Compustat entity matches to one LBD firm in a year, and in all
of these cases the match is based either on EIN or fuzzed name and three location
variables. Because these matches are of high quality, they most likely represent
a reorganization. A visual inspection of the balance sheet in these cases leads us
to favor summing financial variables across the Compustat entities in the year we
observe the reorganization. Orbis entities file unconsolidated financial statements.
As a result, we expect that several Orbis entities may match to a single LBD firm
in one year. Since we are interested in tracking firm performance over time, we may
be concerned about changes in the composition of Orbis entities reporting balance
sheets for the same firm over time. To address this concern, we only keep the set of
Orbis entities associated with a particular firm that consistently report their balance
sheets. The sample from which we draw on for our regression analysis consists of
nearly 198,000 unique firms, 97 percent of which are privately held.
B.3 Conditional Nonlinear Relationships During the GR
The figures in this section are generated by regressing short-term leverage on
size, size squared, age, collateral, profitability, labor productivity and industry fixed
effects separately for private and listed firms in 2006 and 2009.
STLEVi =α + ωs + β1 log(SIZEi) + β2 log(SIZEi)
2 + β3AGEi+
β4COLLATi + β5PROFITi + β6PRODi + εi
(B.1)
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where STLEVi is short-term debt over total assets, ωs captures industry fixed
effects, SIZEi is measured by either employment or total assets, AGEi is firm age,
COLLATi is total fixed assets over total assets, PROFITi is net income over total
assets, and PRODi is total employment over revenue.
The results for private firms are reported in figure B.3 and for listed firms in
figure B.4. In both figures, the left panel uses log employment as the measure of
size and the right panel uses log total assets.
Consistent with our findings in section 2.4.3, the figures here show a positive
relationship between short-term leverage and size among private firms that becomes
significantly weaker during the Great Recession when size is measured by employ-
ment. In contrast, the relationship between leverage and size is negative among
listed firms and we do not find a significant change in the strength of that relation-
ship between 2006 and 2009, regardless of whether size is measured by employment
or total assets.
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Figure B.3: Conditional Relationship between short-term leverage and size for pri-
vate firms (2006 & 2009)
Notes: Use unbalanced sample of private firms separately for 2006 and 2009. The dependent
variable is short-term leverage (STLEV). Each line shows the conditional relationship between
leverage, size (measured by employment in the left panel and total assets in the right figure), size
squared, firm age, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and a full set of 3-digit industry fixed
effects. All observations are weighted to adjust for selection into the LOCUS sample.
Figure B.4: Conditional Relationship between short-term leverage and size for public
firms (2006 & 2009)
Notes: Use unbalanced sample of public firms separately for 2006 and 2009. The dependent
variable is short-term leverage (STLEV). Each line shows the conditional relationship between
leverage, size (measured by employment in the left panel and total assets in the right figure), size
squared, firm age, collateral, profitability, labor productivity, and a full set of 3-digit industry fixed
effects. All observations are weighted to adjust for selection into the LOCUS sample.
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C: Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Firm Level Data (ENIA)
C.1.1 Panel Construction
I use data from the Encuesta Nactional Industrial Anual (ENIA), which is an
annual survey of manufacturing establishments conducted by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadisticas (INE). Since there is no information identifying whether establish-
ments belong to multiunit firms, all of my analysis is done at the plant level. The
survey includes all manufacturing plants that employ ten individuals or more; and
collects information on industry, sales, intermediate inputs, employment, depre-
ciation, and investment. My unbalanced panel contains on average 5,000 unique
observations per year.
I have access to two vintages of the data. The first panel covers the period 1980
through 1999 and the second covers the period 1995 through 2007. Importantly, the
firm identifiers differ across these two panels. In order to form the complete panel
for 1980 through 2007, I use value added, gross value of production, total revenues,
total employment, industry classification, number of days worker per year and region
to match firms across the two panels in the overlapping years (1995 through 1999).
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During the overlapping period (1995-1999) there are 6,946 unique establishments
in the 1980-1999 panel and 7,399 unique establishments in the 1995-2007 panel.
I identify around 99% of the establishments from the earlier panel and 92% of
establishments in the later panel.
In total, there are 635 firms that appear in the new panel between 1995 and
1999 that I cannot identify in the old panel. I drop 314 of these firms from my
sample because they appear in 1995 and therefore I cannot identify their age. The
remaining firms are born (or appear in the new panel) in 1996 or after, and as such, I
do not drop them. To ensure that the empirical evidence I report in the main text is
not overly influenced by the inclusion of these firms, I performed several robustness
checks. I generated figures for the dispersion of productivity and marginal products
using only the old panel, then only the new panel, and using both. The trends
evolution of all these measures is qualitatively similar in all cases. In particular,
I consistently observe falling dispersion in the late 1980s to mid/late-1990s, rising
dispersion in 1997/1998 and a slight decline in dispersion after 2001/2002.
C.1.2 Variable Construction
To construct the measures, I use industry classification, value added, labor
input and capital stock. I assume that industries correspond to their three-digit
ISIC revision 2 classification. Some firms switch industries, but it is possible that
some of this switching reflect errors rather than real product changes. To take this
possibility into account, I follow Oberfield (2013) and assign each plant its modal
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industry. The value added is reported in nominal terms, and where necessary I use
three-digit industry price deflators to obtain real value added. I follow Oberfield
(2013) and Greenstreet (2007) and measure labor input as total workers adjusted
for number of days worked (list = (totworkersist)(days/365)). Since I do not observe
the number of hours directly, list is the closest I get to a measure of labor hours. The
capital stock series presents a challenge. In 1980, 1981 and 1992-2007 the survey
asks respondents to report their capital stock. Because it is unclear whether firms
adjust these stocks for inflation each year, it is standard in the literature to generate
the capital stock series using the perpetual inventory method instead.
ENIA breaks down the capital stock into buildings, machinery, vehicles and
land. Consistent with the literature I incorporate only buildings, machinery and
vehicles into the capital stock series. For firms that are born in 1980, 1981 or 1992-
2007, I can use the first observed capital stock to initialize the series. However, for
the many firms not born in these years I have to initialize the series in a different
manner. Because the approach I use to initialize the capital stock of these firms
is also applicable to firms born in any year, I choose to initialize the capital stock
of all firms using the Greenstreet (2007) approach described below. I verified that
this method of initialization didn’t affect my results by calculating all dispersion
measures using a mixed initialization approach (ie: when possible I initialized the
series using the first reported capital stock and using Greenstreet (2007) otherwise).
All of the results are qualitatively the same.
As mentioned, I use Greenstreet (2007) approach to initialize the capital stock
using reported depreciation for each type of capital.
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KXi0 = (1− δ) [(Di0/δ)− (I
X
i0/2)] + IXi0 (C.1)
where KXi0 denotes the stock of capital type X at establishment age zero; δ
is the depreciation rate (5% for buildings, 10% for machinery and 20% for vehicles,
following Liu (1993)); Di0 is the reported depreciation at age zero for capital type
X; and IXi0 is investment. Subsequently, just as in the case where the initial capital
stock is reported, I use the perpetual inventory method to construct the full capital
stock series for each type of capital.
KXit = (1− δ)KXit−1 + IXit (C.2)
I do not have industry-specific investment price deflators for each category.
The best I can do is use a country-specific investment prices from the World De-
velopment Indicators to deflate the capital stock series. Since most of my focus is
on within-industry dispersion using a country-specific investment deflator will not
affect my results.
In 1980, 1981 and 1992-2007 firms report their capital stock. I compare the
capital stock series generated by the perpetual inventory method with this reported
capital stock series for the balanced sample of firms in two ways.
1. Capital type contribution: In the reported capital stock series, machines
account for 69% of total capital stock, structures for 27%, and vehicles for
4%. The perpetual inventory capital stock breakdown is 70% machines, 27%
structures and 3% vehicles.
2. Correlations: the correlations between the reported and generated capital
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stock series for machines is 0.81, for structures is 0.85, and for vehicles is 0.27.
C.1.3 Data Cleaning
As a final step in the data construction, I drop establishment-year observations
if capital stock, total labor, labor payments, days worked, sales, or value added are
missing or non-positive. I also drop observations if reported depreciation is negative;
and firms exit and reenter the panel more than once. I drop industries with very
few firms or who belong to highly regulated industries, which leaves me with 20 out
of 29 industries. Although the survey is intended to cover establishments with 10
employees or more, about 5% of observations report below this threshold. I only drop
establishments (not establishment-year) if the reported employment never exceeds
over 10 workers. I also drop observations in the 0.1st and 99.9th percentiles of value
added, capital stock and total workers.
C.1.4 Investment Rate and Labor Growth Rate
I construct investment separately for three types (X) of capital structures







it + V I
X
it − SUXit (C.3)
where PN is the purchases of new capital, PU is the purchase of used capital,
RI denotes reforms and improvements made by third parties, V I denotes the value









For the labor growth series I use total labor adjusted for for number of days
worked:
Lit = (totworkersit)(days/365) (C.5)





and the labor growth rate is:
GLit =
Lit − Lit−1
0.5 (Lit + Lit−1)
(C.7)
C.2 Alternative Cost Shares & Dispersion in Estimated Productivity
C.2.1 Alternative Cost Shares
When reporting the dispersion of TFPR in figure 3.2 I assume that αs = α =
1/3 . This is done because Chile does not have data on industry-specific cost shares.
Admittedly, the assumption is an extreme one because industries in Chile will have
different cost shares. To make sure that the evolution of dispersion is not driven
by this assumption I instead follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and set αs as one
minus the U.S. labor share for each industry. This assumption is also an extreme
one since it is unlikely that industries in Chile have the same cost shares as those
in the United States. The comparison is merely meant to show that the dispersion
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measures are not strongly affected by how αs is set across industries because the
measure captures within-industry variation across firms.
The results reported earlier hold (see figure C.1). Under sector-specific cost
shares, dispersion in TFPR rises during the period of high interest rates, and
remains persistently high during the mid-2000s. Moreover, under sector-specific
shares, the rise in dispersion is smaller than that obtained using common cost shares.
The spike in dispersion post-2005 is likely driven by the positive copper price shock
experienced during this period.


























1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Common cost shares US sector−spec. cost shares
Notes: Author’s calculations based on ENIA manufacturing sector data. Data is used for a
balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The blue line
depicts dispersion in productivity calculated common cost shares across sectors (αs = α = 1/3.
The dashed red line depicts the dispersion in productivity using industry-specific cost shares (αs
is one minus the U.S. labor share for each industry. In each case, dispersion is calculated as the
standard deviation across firms in a particular industry-year and aggregated using time-invariant
employment shares. The grey vertical line denotes the onset of the 1998 sudden stop.
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C.2.2 Dispersion in estimated productivity
The dispersion measures reported thus far are based on the Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) framework, which assumes constant returns to scale. Here I report the evo-
lution of dispersion in productivity using the Wooldridge (2009) extension of the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure. The estimation procedure is described in
depth later in this section of the appendix. In short, the procedure uses GMM to
estimate factor elasticities, and then uses these elasticities to obtain a measure of
revenue productivity, which is distinct from the TFPR measure reported earlier:





where s denotes the industry, zist is the estimated productivity, yist is value
added, list workers, kist is capital and β̂ls and β̂ks are the estimated elasticities.
Figure C.2 shows that dispersion in WLP rises during the period of high interest
rates and remains persistently high through the mid 2000s. Again, the rise in
dispersion in WLP is more pronounced than the corresponding rise in dispersion of
TFPR. It appears that the rise in dispersion in productivity is not sensitive to the
assumption of common cost shares or the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework.
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1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Common cost shares WLP estimated productivity
Notes: Author’s calculations based on ENIA manufacturing sector data. Data is used for a
balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The blue line
depicts dispersion in productivity calculated common cost shares across sectors (αs = α = 1/3.
The dashed red line depicts the dispersion in productivity using productivity estimated through
the Wooldridge (2009) extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). In each case, dispersion is
calculated as the standard deviation across firms in a particular industry-year and aggregated
using time-invariant employment shares. The grey vertical line denotes the onset of the 1998
sudden stop.
C.2.3 Cost Shares and Production Function Estimation
The primary difference between the measures presented above and those in
figure 3.2 are the elasticities used in deriving productivity. Table C.1 shows the
factor elasticities used across the three approaches. Note first that I calculate all
measures at the two digit industry level because the coverage of several three-digit
industries is very thin when using the balanced sample of firms.
First, note that the weighted average estimated labor revenue elasticity is
0.52 and the capital revenue elasticity is 0.20. If I assume that the elasticity of
substitution arising from downward sloping demand is equal to 4, as I do in my
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model, then these elasticities correspond to 1 − α̂ = 0.69 and α̂ = 0.27, which are
closer to the common elasticities I use in the empirical section than the U.S. cost
shares. Further, while not exact, the estimated elasticities are quite close to the
elasticities currently used in the model.
Table C.1: Cost Shares & Estimated Elasticities
Common US cost shares Estimated
Industry 1− α α 1− αUSs αUSs β̂sl β̂sk
31 0.67 0.33 0.18 0.82 0.50 0.20
32 0.67 0.33 0.38 0.62 0.51 0.19
33 0.67 0.33 0.41 0.59 0.45 0.21
34 0.67 0.33 0.34 0.66 0.54 0.19
35 0.67 0.33 0.28 0.72 0.52 0.16
36 0.67 0.33 0.38 0.62 0.58 0.16
38 0.67 0.33 0.37 0.63 0.52 0.25
Notes: Author’s calculations based on ENIA manufacturing sector data. Data are used for a
balanced sample of firms that are present in the data between 1980 and 2007. The table reports
the labor and capital elasticities using common cost shares, US industry-specific cost shares, and
elasticities estimated through the Wooldridge (2009) extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
C.2.4 Estimation: Wooldridge Extension of Levinsohn and Petrin














as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009)), I also estimate the productivity process using the
Wooldridge (2009) extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The estimation code
is available online on Petrin’s website and I implement it with the slight modifi-
cation that I incorporate year fixed effects as suggested in Gopinath et al. (2017).
The basic procedure is described below. Note that below I describe the estimation
210
for one industry s, but I implement the procedure for each industry so that the
estimated elasticities are sector-specific.
Initial choices:
1. I first choose the form of the production function.
yit = α + βllit + βkkit + zit + εit (C.9)
All of the variables are in log, and yit is value added, lit is labor, and kit is
capital
2. Choose proxy variable: I choose mit, which is materials.
3. Lags for the instrumental variable: I choose a one period lag
I’m going to describe the method/psuedo-code for the case described above
1. The production technology is assumed to be:
yit = α + βllit + βkkit + zit + εit (C.10)
2. Let’s suppose that materials is the proxy variable for kit . Then the equation
above can be rewritten as
yit = βllit + h (kit,mit) + εit (C.11)
where h (kit,mit) = α + βkkit + g (mit, kit)
3. g (mit, kit) is assumed to be well approximated by a third-order polynomial
(this was first done in LP and it seems that is has become standard):
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In the code each component of that sum is generated as a new variable.
4. The term, f [g (kit−1,mit−1)] is related to the following equations:









t + eit (C.13)
and













5. From the above all of the coefficients are estimated using GMM. The code
ends up being just one line using ivreg2.
• The dependent variable is real value added
• The exogenous variables are the components of g (mit, kit)
• The endogenous variable is just lit
• And the instrumental variable is just lit−1 (it’s an instrument for the
endogenous variable).
• Specify that GMM is being used and cluster at the firm level and include
year fixed effects.
• The regression is run by industry so you end up with estimates for βl and
βk by industry.
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6. After the estimates have been obtained, the productivity for each firm i at
time t is obtained as the residual





C.3 Rederivation of Dixit (1995) and Calcagnini and Saltari (2000)
C.3.1 Setup
The following setup is common to both cases I consider:
1. Assume that there is a continuum of risk-neutral firms that differ in their
productivity Zit. When I consider interest rate level, Zit represents transitory
fluctuations in idiosyncratic productivity. When I consider stochastic interest
rates, Zit = Zi for all i. In this latter case, Zi should be thought of as
permanent productivity.





where dW zt is a Wiener process with zero mean and unit variance. The process
is an extreme one that assumes there is no persistence or drift in the transitory
shock, but is appropriate here because I am only interested in the volatility of
the process.
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3. Firms discount net revenues at the riskless interest rate rt. In the first case,







where dW rt is also a Wiener process with zero mean and unit variance. The
process (C.17) is chosen because it allows me to derive analytical results. It is
also used in Calcagnini and Saltari (2000).
4. The law of motion for capital is given by:
dKit = Iitdt (C.18)
This formulation assumes no depreciation, which enables me to obtain analyt-
ical results in the case of stochastic interest rates.
5. Investment is assumed to be fully irreversible. Formally, I impose:
Iit ≥ 0 (C.19)
This is an extreme case of partial irreversibility. I choose it because it allows
me to solve for one threshold instead of two, and the results are qualitatively
similar to those I would obtain with partial irreversibility.1
6. The firm’s reduced form profits are given by:
1Abel and Eberly (1996) show that when investment is partially irreversible, the investment
policy is characterized by two thresholds – one below which firms disinvest and the other above








Where η < 1. As in the previous section, (C.20) should be thought of as
representing a firm operating a constant returns to scale production technology
and facing a downward sloping demand curve.
7. Each firm i maximizes the present discounted value of its net profits:







t r(u)du (Πit − Iit)
]
(C.21)
In this section I characterize the investment policy of an individual firm. As
a result, firm heterogeneity only matters in as much as firms with different
values of Zit will either lie below or above the investment threshold.
8. Note that for this analysis I abstract from the time-to-build assumption, which
means that investment becomes immediately productive. As a result, in the
absence of any adjustment costs the firm’s problem is equivalent to static profit
maximization. In this case, as Jorgenson (1963) establishes, MRPKit = r.
C.3.2 Case 1: Interest Rate Level
In case 1 the interest rate is deterministic and uncertainty only arises from
fluctuations in idiosyncratic productivity.Applying Ito’s Lemma to the (C.21) I ob-
tain:
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Firms that invest satisfy the following standard first order condition:
Vk = 1 (C.23)
The irreversibility assumption generates a region of inaction in which firms












Equation (C.24) is a Cauchy-Euler non-homogenous second-order differential
equation. The solution takes the standard form:
V = Vp + Vc (C.25)
Let’s start by finding the particular solution (Vp), which represents the firm’s
expected present value of net profits in the absence of frictions or any future invest-
ment. Using guess and verify:






































η (η − 1)
(C.28)















Notice that since Vp is concave in Zit and η < 1, an increase in σz lowers Vp
and therefore lowers desired investment. When σz is high, the probability of very
low and very high realizations of Zit increases. Since Vp is concave in Zit, the cost
of low realizations of Zit outweigh the benefits of high realizations. Further, an
increase in r also lowers Vp because it raises the cost of capital, and therefore also
lowers desired investment. Next, I findVc, which captures the effect of the lower
bound on investment. Technically, it is the solution to the characteristic equation
of the second order differential equation (C.24):
Vc = Cp (Kit)Z
sp
it + Cn (Kit)Z
sn
it (C.30)
Note that in (C.30), the coefficients Cp and Cn are functions of Kit; sp and sn
are the positive and negative roots, respectively, of the characteristic equation:





















I can simplify (C.30). Since irreversible investment represents a one-sided


















Recall that the first term represents the present value of net profits in the
absence of future investment, while the second term represents the effect of the
irreversibility friction.
Equation (C.33) contains two unknowns: Cp and a threshold Z̄it at which the
firm is indifferent between investing and not investing. To solve for the unknowns













+ CpK (Kit) Z̄
sp







η (η − 1)
+ spCpK (Kit) Z̄
sp−1
it = 0 (C.35)
(C.34) states that at Z̄it the value of not investing (LHS) and investing (RHS)
must be equal. (C.35) states that the two value functions must join smoothly at
Z̄it. Since I am only interested in the value of the threshold Z̄it, I multiply both
sides of (C.35) by Z̄it and solve for CpK (Kit) Z̄
sp
it . Plugging the result into (C.34)













Expression (C.36) can be simplified further using the insight of Abel and
Eberly (1996). Observe the following





















r (η − sp) (η − sn)
spsn
= f (η) (C.40)










This threshold denotes the value of Zit below which firms do not invest. Above
Z̄it firms satisfy (C.42). Since sn is negative, it is clear that irreversibility raises the
















Next I explore how the threshold (C.41) responds to changes in the interest rate
r. For concreteness, I consider numerical examples in which I assign the following
parameter values:
• K = 2; η = 0.5
• I vary the interest rate r from r1 = 10% to r2 = 20%
In deriving ∂Z̄
∂r




































There are two opposing forces at play. The interest rate affects the threshold
directly through the Jorgenson (1963) user cost of capital (r) and indirectly through
the option value. The direct effect pushes the threshold higher because the incentive
to invest falls with higher costs. The indirect effect is negative and pushes the
threshold lower because when firms discount the future at a higher rate, the option
value of waiting to take action falls. The direct effect dominates the indirect effect.










Notes: Through a numerical exercise, the last column shows that as interest rates rise (first
column) the threshold for investment increases (last column).
C.3.3 Case 2: Interest Rate Volatility
In the second case I impose that Zit = Zi (i.e. that each firm’s productivity
is permanent), and that the stochastic interest rate follows (C.17). Applying Ito’s
Lemma to (C.21) results in the following Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation:







− Iit + IitVk (Zi, Kit, rt) +
σ2r
2
r3Vrr (Zi, Kit, rt)
}
(C.44)
Just as in case 1, the presence of irreversibility induces some firms to delay
investment. Firms that do invest (Iit > 0) satisfy Vk = 1. For firms that do not
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The general solution to (C.46) takes the form:
V = Vp + Vc (C.47)
To solve for Vp I use guess and verify:













































The particular solution captures the present discounted value of the firm’s net












If investment were fully irreversible V = Vp and MRPK could be expressed
as:










As σ2r approaches zero, MRPK approaches the standard Jorgenson (1963)
user cost r. The presence of σ2r lowers MRPK and raises desired investment. High
interest rate volatility raises the probability of very low and very high realizations
of the interest rate; and the convexity of Vp in r means the benefits from the low
realizations offset the costs from the high realizations.
Returning now to the general solution, I solve for Vc:
Vc = Cp (Kit) r
sp + Cn (Kit) r
sn (C.53)
Note again that the coefficients Cp and Cn are not constants, but depend on
Kit and parameters (which in the case of permanent productivity also includes Zi).
sp and sn are the positive and negative roots of the characteristic equation:







s+ 1 = 0 (C.54)
the solution of which is given by:
sp/n = 1/2+/−
√
1/4 + 2/σ2r (C.55)
Since irreversible investment represents a one-sided barrier, and the firm’s






r (1− σ2r) (1− η)
+ Cn (Kit) r
sn (C.56)
The second term in (C.56) represents the option value of future investment
opportunities. To find Cn and the threshold r̄ I use the value-matching and smooth-
222






+ CnK (Kit) r






+ snCn (Kit) r
sn−1 = 0 (C.58)
(C.57) states that at r the value of not investing (LHS) and investing (RHS)
must be equal. (C.58) states that at the threshold r̄ the two value functions must
join smoothly. Solving the system I obtain the following r̄:








A firm characterized by (Zi, Kit) invests only if the interest rate r is below r̄.























> 1, irreversibility raises MRPK and lowers desired
investment relative to the frictionless case (C.52). Next I look at how the threshold
r̄ responds to changes in σ2r . Note that interest rate volatility affects the threshold
(C.59) directly through σ2r and indirectly through sn. The direct effect is positive,
meaning that firms are willing the invest at a higher interest rate. The indirect is
negative, meaning that firms require a lower interest rate to invest. Below I show
that the negative effect dominates.2 For concreteness I fix the following parameters
2The negative effect does not always dominate. Alvarez and Koskela (2006) shows that if
the interest rate process evolves according to the Cox et al. (1985) model – drt = (a− brt) dt +
σ
√
(rt)dWt– the effect of interest rate volatility is ambiguous. Importantly, when he considers a
mean reverting process (which is similar to a discrete-time AR(1) process that we generally use)
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and verify some of the results below numerically:
• K = 2; η = 0.5; and zPi = 1
• I vary the volatility parameter σ2r from σ2r = 0.06 to σ2r = 0.08
In deriving ∂r̄
∂σ2r












> 0 Therefore, an increase in interest rate volatility raises the













































(C.62) can be simplified by referring to the definition of sn:
1− σ2r =
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2 (1− sn)
(C.67)
– drt = art (1− brt) dt + σrtdWt– the negative effect of interest rate volatility on the threshold
dominates.
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Equation (C.69) indicates that as interest rate volatility rises, the threshold
value of the interest rate at which firms are willing to invest falls (i.e. firms require
a lower interest rate before they are willing to invest). One the one hand, when
interest rate volatility rises firms want to invest more because the gains from low
realizations of the interest rate will outweigh the losses from high realizations (direct
effect). On the other hand, higher interest rate volatility raises the opportunity cost
of investing, thus generating an incentive to delay investment (indirect effect). Since
the indirect effect dominates in this case, a rise in interest rate volatility lowers r̄.
From the point of view of a firm that is characterized by (Zi, Kit) a single
interest rate r prevails in the economy. When deciding whether or not to invest,
each firm checks whether this r lies below or above r̄. The result in the section
shows that keeping the level of r constant and raising σ2r will cause more firms to
fall into the investment inaction region.
The results from case 1 and case 2 indicate that 1) an increase in the interest
rate level and 2) an increase in interest rate volatility induce more firms to delay
investment, and are thus associated with an expansion of the inaction region.
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C.4 Model Solution
The model is parametrized according to section 5.3. I use value function
iteration to solve the model.
Table C.2: Parameter Values
δk δl κ λ w ρA 100σA R̄ ρR 100σR 100σ̄σ ρσ 100σσ Pk Pl ρz 100σz
2.5% 8% 0.25 0.50 1 0.95 1.75 1.015 0.84 0.32 0.32 0.455 0.30 0.38 0.266 0.765 0.17
Notes: The parameter values are reported for the baseline model. The model is calibrated at a
quarterly frequency.
1. Grid points:
(a) Exogenous state variables: I use 5 grid points for idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity (z), which evolves according to an AR(1) process. The interest
rate also evolves according to an AR(1) process, but I fix the minimum
and maximum values of the R grid based on the lowest and highest real
interest rates I observe in the data. The smallest value is 1.0039 and the
highest is 1.036. I use 5 grid points for the interest rate. Interest rate
volatility also evolves according to an AR(1) process. I use 2 grid points
for volatility and fix the low value to equal the long run mean (σ̄σ) and
the high value to equal the realized volatility at the onset of the crisis in
1998:Q3 (0.014). Aggregate productivity/demand (A) evolves according
to an AR(1) and I discretize the grid, allowing for 3 grid points, and
compute the transition matrix using the Tauchen method.
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(b) Endogenous state variables: I pick the minimum and maximum grid
points for both l and k such that the firms never choose the boundary
points. Because l represents hours its state space is bounded between
0 and 1. I choose 68 grid points for l and 200 grid points for k. I use
log-linear spacing so that grid points are concentrated at the lower end.
Moreover, I incorporate depreciation into the grid so that the choice of
no investment and no hiring can be made on the grid. This trick (used
in Bloom et al. (2018)) is extremely helpful computationally as it makes
the model with three exogenous states, two endogenous states, and two
kinks in each policy function arising from non-convex adjustment costs
in both labor and capital, tractable to solve.
2. Value function iteration:
(a) Standard: the value function iteration is standard and I use a Howard
policy iteration loop to speed up convergence.
(b) Convergence: I set the tolerance parameter for convergence at 1.e-6 and
iterate until the value function converges. Usually the policy function
converges well before the value function does, but I require the value
function to converge before exiting the value function iteration loop.
3. Unconditional simulation:
(a) Simulation: when calibrating parameters I run an unconditional sim-
ulation of 5,004 periods, with a burn in of 4,884 periods. This leaves a
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total of 120 periods, or 30 years, which is consistent with the length of
my balanced panel (28 years). Each period is characterized by an aggre-
gate exogenous state given by (A,R, V ), where A denotes the realization
of aggregate productivity/demand, R denotes the realization of the real
interest rate and V denotes the realization of interest rate volatility.
(b) Calibration: when calibrating the model, I simulate the aggregate pro-
cess as described above, along with a sample of 1,000 establishments to
whom I assign productivity values according to the AR(1) process for
idiosyncratic productivity. Since the model is solved at a quarterly fre-
quency, I use the simulated panel of firms to aggregate observables to
an annual frequency and generate the model moments that I compare to
data moments for calibration.
4. Impulse responses:
(a) Shocks: I consider the economy’s response to two shocks, interest rate
level and interest rate volatility. I do a simulation of 101 periods and
impose the shock in the 45th period. When I consider an interest rate
level shock, interest rate volatility evolves normally. When I consider an
interest rate volatility shock I let the interest rate level evolve normally
(i.e. the interest rate volatility shock does not generate a rise in the
interest rate).
(b) Simulation: I begin the simulation at the stochastic steady state dis-
tribution, the middle of the A and R processes and at low interest rate
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volatility. I simulate 2,000 economies over 101 periods. Each of the
economies has two copies. One copy may experience the shock and the
other will never experience the shock. I say that the economy may ex-
perience the shock because in order to generate an R level shock of a
similar magnitude as the sudden stop episode I first find the probability
with which each of the 2,000 economies experiences the shock such that
the average increase in the interest rate across all economies is equal to
this magnitude. I only consider shocks to R and interest rate volatility. I
leave a comparison of the IRFs to these shocks with IRFs to an A shock
for future research.
(c) Impulse Response: once the simulation is complete, I compute the
impulse responses as the deviation of the copy of each economy that
may experience the shock from the copy of the economy that does not
experience it. The impulse response is generated as the average across
all the economies after discarding 200 of the economies.
C.5 Construction of Real Interest Rate for Chile
The EMBI spread for Chile is only available beginning in June 1999. In order
to produce the series for November 1994 through May 1999 (for figure 3.1), I follow
the procedure in Ates and Saffie (2016). I first regress the EMBI Chile spread on the
EMBI spread for South Africa, which was chosen for its high correlation (0.92) with
Chile’s EMBI. Data for South Africa’s EMBI are available beginning in November
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1994. I use the regression results to generate a predicted EMBI Chile series and
calculate the changes in the spread between periods in November 1994 and May
1999. EMBI Chile data are generated between 1994 and 1999 by applying these
growth rates to the existing series.
For calibration I construct the interest rate series for 1998:Q1 through 2015:Q4
using the same approach as above. However, I do not have EMBI spread data for
South Africa during this period. Instead, for the regression I use EMBI spread
data for Latin America. The resulting real interest rate series for calibration is
highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.81, with the interest rate series
presented in figure 3.1.
C.6 Alternative Targets for Calibrating the Productivity Process



















The current calibration assumes that κs = αs (1− 1/η), λs = (1− αs) (1− 1/η),
where η = 4 and αs = α = 1/3. In table C.3, I report the results for ρ
D and σD
for two alternative measures of κs and λs. The baseline results are reported in the
first column. In the second column are results based on αs being one minus the
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U.S. labor share for each industry. The last column uses κs and λs estimated using
WLP. The results indicate that ρD and σD are similar across the three methods,
and that the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity is quite low and its volatility
is very high.
Table C.3: Alternative measures for ρD and σD
Common α U.S. sector-specific α Estimated elasticity
ρD 0.42 0.49 0.49
σD 0.40 0.42 0.42
Notes: The table reports alternative calibrations for the parameters (pD and σD) of the AR(1)
productivity process. The model is calibrate assuming common elasticities (second column). The
third column reports the parameter estimates using US sector-specific elasticities. The last col-
umn reports the parameter estimates using elasticities estimated through the Wooldridge (2009)
extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
C.7 Alternative IRF for interest rate level shock
In the main text I consider the impact of a one percentage point increase in
the real interest rate. The resulting fall in output is under 2.5%, which is short
of the 4% observed in the data. Assuming (and recognizing that this is a strong
assumption) that the interest rate was wholly responsible for the fall in output, I
now impose a 1.6 percentage points increase in the interest rate, which generates
a 4% decline in output. A shock of this magnitude generates an extremely large,
and implausible, fall in investment. It also strengthens the endogenous response of
productivity, which now falls by 0.46%, which is still only about 1/9 of the decline
observed in the data.
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Figure C.3: Response to a Volatility Shock: Output, Investment and Hiring




























































Notes: The figure shows the IRFs in response to an interest rate level shock (1.6 percentage point)
for output (left), investment (middle) and hiring (right). To produce the IRFs two versions of two
economies are simulated for 100 periods each. In each of these economies, in one version the shock
hits in the 45th period and in the second it does not. The IRFs are the cross-economy average
percent differences between the shocked and unshocked simulations.
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